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Sommario
La sicurezza dei dispositivi mobili di nuova generazione è al momento un proble-
ma di massima importanza. Negli ultimi anni, smartphone e tablet sono diventati
estremamente popolari, soprattutto nei paesi sviluppati, dove i dispositivi di nuova
generazione ammontano al 95% del totale di tutti i dispositivi mobili. Data la loro
popolarità, questi dispositivi hanno rapidamente attirato l’attenzione di sviluppato-
ri malevoli che hanno iniziato a implementare e distribuire applicazioni capaci di
danneggiare la privacy dell’utente, il suo denaro e persino l’integrità del disposi-
tivo e dei dati contenuti. Questi sviluppatori hanno astutamente sfruttato la sem-
plicità dei meccanismi di distribuzione delle applicazioni, la sensibilità delle infor-
mazioni memorizzate e delle operazioni accessibili tramite un dispositivo mobile,
insieme alla limitata attenzione dell’utente medio ai problemi di sicurezza. Que-
sta tesi presenta studio, progetto e implementazione di un sistema di sicurezza
a più componenti per il popolare sistema operativo per dispositivi mobili Android.
L’obiettivo di questa tesi è di fornire uno strumento di sicurezza leggero, usabile,
modulare ed estensibile, che sia in grado di contrastare le minacce alla sicurez-
za di Android, presenti e future. Il sistema sfrutta metodologie di white-listing per
identificare a tempo di esecuzione comportamenti malevoli delle applicazioni, sen-
za essere prono al problema degli zero-day-attacks, ossia le nuove minacce non
ancora identificate. L’approccio white-list è accoppiato a un approccio black-list,
che riduca la possibilità di falsi allarmi e che sia in grado di contrastare comporta-
menti dannosi noti, prima che possano avere effetto. Il sistema proposto combina
elementi di analisi statica e dinamica sfruttando elementi di teoria dei contratti,
di cui si propone un’implementazione probabilistica e l’intercettazione di eventi a
livello nucleo e API. Inoltre, il sistema proposto è configurabile, in modo da poter
essere totalmente trasparente all’utente, o che abbia un’interazione più marcata,
I
quando l’utente è maggiormente interessato ad un certo livello di consapevolezza
della sicurezza sul suo dispositivo. Il sistema proposto è stato testato su più di
12000 applicazioni che includono anche due grandi archivi di applicazioni male-
vole. I risultati di detection (95%) e sui falsi positivi (1 al giorno) provano l’efficacia
del sistema. Inoltre uno studio sull’usabilità che include il feedback di 200 uten-
ti, mostra il basso overhead (4% di batteria 1.4% di performance) e la generale
accettazione degli utenti.
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Abstract
Security in new generation mobile devices is currently a problem of capital im-
portance. Smartphones and tablets have become extremely popular in the last
years, especially in developed country where smartphones and tablets account
for 95% of active mobile devices. Due to their popularity, these devices have fast
drawn the attention of malicious developers. Attackers have started to implement
and distribute applications able to harm user’s privacy, user’s money and even de-
vice and data integrity. Malicious developers have cleverly exploited the simplicity
of app distribution, the sensitivity of information and operation accessible through
mobile devices, together with the user limited attention to security issues. This
thesis presents the study, design and implementation of a multi-component secu-
rity framework for the popular Android operative system. The aim of this thesis
is to provide a lightweight and user friendly security tool, extensible and mod-
ular, able to tackle current and future security threats on Android devices. The
framework exploits white list-based methodologies to detect at runtime malicious
behaviors of application, without being prone to the problem of zero-day-attacks
(i.e. new threats not yet discovered by the community). The white-list approach is
combined with a black-list security enforcement, to reduce the likelihood of false
alarms and to tackle known misbehaviors before they effectively take place. More-
over the framework also combines static and dynamic analysis. It exploits proba-
bilistic contract theory and app metadata to detect dangerous applications before
they are installed (static analysis). Furthermore, detects and stop malicious kernel
level events and API calls issued by applications at runtime (dynamic analysis),
to avoid harm to user and her device. The framework is configurable and can be
both totally transparent to the user, or have a stronger interaction when the user
is more interested in a security awareness of her device. The presented security
III
framework has been extensively tested against a testbed of more than 12000 ap-
plications including two large Android malware databases. Detection rate (95%)
and false positive rate (1 per day) prove the effectiveness of the presented frame-
work. Furthermore, a study of usability which includes energy evaluation and more
than 200 user feedback is presented. These results show both the limited over-
head (4% battery, 1.4% performance) imposed by the framework and the good
user acceptance.
IV
To those who dream and follow their dreams always, no matter what...
i.e. my Love and my Family.
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1Introduction
Smartphones and tablets changed in the last ten years the way users access the
Internet, web services and multimedia contents. The technological evolution of the
data connection, which gradually moved from the 2 Mbytes of UMTS, to more than
1 GBytes with LTE advanced, has been paralleled by a strong evolution of the
components and capabilities of the physical devices.
In 2008 it was correct to consider a mobile device, such as a smartphone or
a tablet, as constrained. However, the continuous evolution brought in the last two
years smartphones off-the-shelf whose features surpass the ones of an average
desktop computer.
Hence, the features that best describe smartphones and tablets produced from
2012 to now, shape a scenario different from the one of some years ago:
• Device highly connected : current mobile devices have data connection (UMTS
or LTE), WiFi interface, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC) and infra-
red. The presence of these interfaces ensure a seamless Internet connection,
together with the possibility to connect and communicate directly with other
devices.
• High performance devices: The computational power of current mobile devices
is comparable with average computers. As an example, the smartphone Mo-
torola Nexus 6 comes with a 2.7 GHz eight-cores CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
• Highly Customizable: Operative systems for mobile devices allows the installa-
tion of third party applications. Thanks to third party apps, mobile phones can
currently be used to access the Internet, play video-games with 3D graphics
and realistic physics [3], receiving driving directions, access social network and
publish multimedia live contents, or even developing new applications.
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Smartphones and tablets have usage possibilities which supersede the ones
of desktop and laptop computers. In particular we list here a set of common smart-
phone and tablets usage, with reference, when possible, to some common appli-
cations providing the described service.
• Access email server or mailbox (IMAP, POP3) or email cloud services (e.g.
GMail).
• Create and edit Office documents, including databases, spreadsheets and
presentations.
• Acquire, watch, edit or stream videos (YouTube).
• Acquire, edit and share pictures (Instagram, Facebook, Tumblr).
• Access maps and receive driving directions or location based information, also
exploiting the several geo-localization interfaces (Maps, Navigator, FourSquare,
TripAdvisor).
• Can be used to buy products online or perform home banking operations (Ama-
zon, Ebay).
• Communicate with other people through instant message programs or VoIP-
like systems. (Whatsapp, Yahoo, Viber, Skype)
The aforementioned functionalities, while increasing the usage possibilities for
mobile devices, also bring intrinsics and serious security issues concerning user’s
privacy and money, together with device and data integrity.
Addressing these security issues is of capital importance. This thesis describes
the design and implementation of a security framework for mobile devices to tackle
attacks brought through malicious applications on Android devices.
1.1 Motivation
In this section, we will explain in detail what motivates the performed research,
describing the timeliness and impact, and justifying the choice of implementing
the solution on the Android system, which is currently the most popular among
mobile operative systems.
At the end of 2014 the number of active mobile subscriptions all over the world
is of almost 7 billions [6], where more than 2 billions of these subscriptions are for
3G (third generation connectivity: UMTS, HSPA, HSPA+)or 4G (fourth generation
connectivity: LTE, LTE+) mobile contracts [6]. More precisely, in developed coun-
tries there are in average 1.2 mobile devices per person and more than 90% of
mobile users have a smartphone or tablet [6, 8].
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Given the strong penetration and popularity, unfortunately smartphones and
tablets have become in a few years a main target for attackers. Though first attacks
to 3G mobile devices have been performed starting from 2004 [88], the situation
has become dramatic only in the last years. In 2012, in fact, the mobile security
scenario has experienced an increase of 600%, with respect to the previous year,
of attacks targeting smartphones and tablets [38]. In the specific, Figure 1.1 de-
Figure 1.1: Increase of mobile malware samples between 2011 and 2012 mea-
sured by Avast [38] (x-axis date format: yymmdd).
picts this sudden increase of mobile threats, showing the change in the number
of mobile malware samples, which has been experienced during 2012. As will be
discussed in the following, mobile malware is practically the only relevant attack
vector threatening mobile devices [88]. As shown in the graph of Figure 1.1, till
2011 the amount of mobile malware samples available was negligible, mainly con-
stituted of proof-of-concepts designed by the research community to show vulner-
abilities of mobile devices [88]. Instead, starting from 2012, the amount of mobile
malware samples started a sharp raise. Moreover, as shown in the graph of Fig-
ure 1.2, this increasing trend in mobile malware samples has continued also for
the four quarters of 2013. Now, at the end of 2014, there are more than 1 million
of malicious applications which could be found in the wild, where more than 98%
of these malware samples target the Android system [37].
Android is an operative system for mobile devices. The Android project is
mainly controlled by Google and at the current time is the most popular opera-
tive system for mobile devices, with a share greater than 80% (see Figure 1.3). As
depicted in the graph of Figure 1.3 currently the main players on the mobile market
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Figure 1.2: Mobile malware samples identified by Kaspersky [37] in 2013.
Figure 1.3: Eveolution of mobile OS market share
are in order: Android, iOS (Apple) and Windows (Microsoft). All these systems offer
the possibility of installing mobile applications (apps), which are distributed through
online marketplaces. Marketplaces collects applications published by developers.
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Then mobile users can download published apps directly from the market, without
a direct interaction with the developers.
Mobile markets strongly improve the access to mobile applications and at the
same time increase the overall security, providing a more protected environment
compared to the wild web, where there is no control on the identity of the app devel-
opers. However, unfortunately, also mobile market are far from being totally secure
[90]. Malicious apps, in fact, have been found in these years also on these con-
trolled channels, for example more than 15000 malicious apps have been found
up to 2013 in the official market for Android applications: Google Play [90].
As a matter of fact, starting from 2012, Android has become almost the ex-
clusive target for mobile attacks [37] with more than 98% of attacks targeting this
system. The main reasons are the large popularity, i.e. greater number of possible
victims, and the open source nature of the Android project. More specifically, An-
droid code is totally available, thus it is easier to find vulnerabilities which could be
maliciously exploited. Other reasons have to be found in the app distribution phi-
losophy of Android, which privileges flexibility to strong security controls, making
easier for attackers to distribute malware through non official marketplaces and
even through the official one. Thus, more than 1/3 of the current Android user,
have already encountered at least a malicious application until now [37].
Though simple, malicious applications are extremely dangerous and capable
of seriously harming both the device and its user. In fact, cleverly exploiting the var-
ious interfaces and functionalities of a smartphone or tablet, attackers can [135]:
• Steal user private information: Mobile devices store the user’s contacts, private
messages (SMS or instant messaging), emails, social network account data
and even bank account or credit card numbers for home banking operations.
• Steal user money: Phone calls and SMS text messages are paid services. At-
tackers may impose a direct loss of money to the user sending background text
messages in large amounts (e.g. messages for SPAM purposes), or to register
to paid premium services (e.g. subscription to weekly multimedia downloads).
Most of these attacks are performed in background and the user is unlikely to
notice them before it is too late.
• Hijacking bank transactions: Some malicious apps have been found to be
able to intercept some home banking operations, forcing the user to authorize
money transfers to account controlled by the attackers.
• Violate the device integrity: Malicious apps can access the device storage and
then add, modify or delete stored data.
• Take control of the attacked device: Some malicious applications, once in-
stalled, open a back-door for attackers. This backdoor can be used to use
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the attacked device as part of a botnet, or to install additional malicious code
for other attacks. Often, once a device is under the control of an attacker, data
wiping and factory reset are the only solutions to restore the normal function-
ality. It is worth mentioning that such operations are dangerous and may result
in device permanent damages1.
Given the consistent threat represented by malicious applications, several se-
curity solutions have been proposed, both by mobile producers and research com-
munity. Notwithstanding, the problem is still far to be solved, for different reasons.
Malicious applications are hard to be discovered, since they come disguised as
genuine ones. These apps works correctly, providing a useful service to the non
suspicious user, however, they run malicious code in background. These applica-
tions are referred as repackaged or trojanized. Moreover, the malicious behaviors
performed by applications are hard to detect. In fact, malicious apps maliciously
exploits operations that are legitimate. For example, sending a text message, it
is not by itself a malicious operation. However, sending stealthy text messages to
premium numbers to perform hidden registration to paid services is a malicious be-
havior. Distinguishing between these two behaviors automatically however it is not
trivial [112]. To detect these misbehaviors it is necessary an approach which con-
siders together different parameters such as required authorizations and methods
invocation, which are extracted analyzing the application behavior both statically
and at runtime. Such an approach allows the definition of complex security policies
that, when enforced, should prevent and stop app misbehaviors.
Finally, another issue is introduced by the weakest ring of the security chain,
which is the user [70]. Current Android security mechanisms are mainly based
on a preventive approach, that show to users the potential threats represented
by new apps. However, several users, often skip the security warning of Android,
either because they do not understand them, or because they are more concerned
about having new application functionalities than about security [71]. Moreover,
also users that are more responsible result to be concerned about the overhead
introduced by security mechanism, which may affect performances or the user
experience (e.g. interrupting normal activities to send security warnings). Thus, to
pursue user acceptance, a security framework should be lightweight, with limited
impact on the performance and whose action is as much as possible transparent to
the user. Such a framework should show security warning without interrupting the
user activity and presenting information accurate, still clear and easy to understand
also to non-expert users.
1 http://androidforums.com/threads/bricked-after-factory-reset.760103/
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Wrapping it up, the arguments which motivate and drive our study, i.e. the de-
sign of a new security framework for Android mobile devices, can be summarized
as follows:
• The problem of malicious applications on new generation mobile devices is of
capital importance and concerns billions of users around the world.
• Android is the most popular operative system and it is target of 98% of attacks
toward mobile devices.
• Misbehavior of malicious applications seriously affect user’s privacy, money
and device integrity.
• Identifying misbehaviors of malicious apps is a challenging task and only par-
tially addressed from current security solutions.
• Users hardly accept the overhead and tend to ignore warnings of current se-
curity solutions.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents the study, design and realization of a security framework,
aimed at tackling at different levels the various types of misbehaviors performed
by malicious Android applications. This framework combines the action of compo-
nents both off-line, i.e. static components not present on the protected device and
on-line, i.e. on host mechanisms for dynamic monitor and security enforcement.
This framework at first attempts to prevent the installation of malicious apps, then
monitors the behavior of the device at application, API and operative system level,
looking for malicious behavioral pattern which violate system or user-provided se-
curity policies. Thanks to monitoring based on hooking, such misbehaviors are
blocked as soon as they are detected and before they can be effective. Afterward
the application deemed as responsible for the detected misbehavior is safely re-
moved from the device and the details of the malicious applications are shared with
the community of users of the proposed framework. The framework has been de-
signed to be lightweight and usable, focusing the runtime analysis only on these
apps deemed as suspicious by static components. Moreover, the framework is
designed to be as much as possible transparent to the user, requiring an active
interaction only to ask confirmation before removal of an application deemed as
malicious. Furthermore, the framework has been designed to convey information
to the user in a simple but effective way. Tests on user acceptance, presented
in the following, confirm that the security information provided by the proposed
framework is more effective than the native Android security mechanisms.
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The framework also implements a collaborative scheme, which allow frame-
work users to cooperate, sharing knowledge on application behavior and security
alerts.
The proposed framework strongly relays on the concept of “contract-based se-
curity”, which allows to formally prove the compliance between a security policy
and a contract describing the application behavior. To this end, a part of this thesis
implement on the Android OS a well established contract-based security mecha-
nism, the Security-By-Contract (SxC). A consistent contribution of this work is the
extension of the SxC framework with the introduction of Probabilistic Contract and
Probabilistic Policies. The theoretical and practical results of this extension will be
thoroughly analyzed in the following.
1.2.1 Framework Architecture
To better describe the contribution, an high level description of the framework is
now presented. Figures 1.4 shows the components and the work-flow of the pre-
sented security framework. As shown, the framework takes as input an Android
Figure 1.4: High Level Description of the Proposed Framework.
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app installation file (apk o a new app to install on the device) and a set of informa-
tion received from the market, the device user and the community of users of the
proposed framework. This information is exploited at first by three static analysis
components, which verify app security properties and assess the risk before the
app is run on the device. Afterwards, four additional components monitor both the
app and the device behavior enforcing security policies to prevent misbehavior and
to remove malicious apps. A brief description of the main framework components
will now follow.
Static Analysis:
The apk is actually an archive containing binary files, static resources and xml
documents which describe the application structure. In particular, the file Android-
Manifest.xml included in every apk contains the description of the app components
and the declared permissions, i.e. the list of resources accessed and critical oper-
ations performed. This set of information, together with the data extracted from the
market are used by the static analysis component of the proposed framework to
evaluate the security risk brought by the application, exploiting the Analytic Hierar-
chy Process (AHP), a multi-criteria decision algorithm. The analysis is performed
at deploy-time, i.e. before the app execution, and the analysis result is presented to
the user through a simple and easy to understand index (a colored smiley), which
should correctly drive the user final decision on app installation. Details on this
components are reported in Chapter 2. For further insight, the interested reader
can also refer to [56].
Contract Generator:
The contract generator is an off-line component used to generate an application
probabilistic contract. The probabilistic contract is a document which extends the
AndroidManifest.xml file, presenting a probabilistic description of the application
behavior. More specifically, the probabilistic contract specifies the security rele-
vant actions performed by the app, specifying also sequence of actions with their
probability to be executed. The contract generally is provided by the app devel-
oper. If a developer do not provide the application contract, the contract generator
will automatically generate a new one, running the app in a protected environment,
attempting to reproduce the app possible behaviors. The contract generator soft-
ware is very flexible, in fact it can also be used by the app developer itself to build
the contract, or in alternative, can be used to monitor and record the behavior of
the app while is running on the user device. The proposed framework is then able
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to merge the collected executions which may also come by a community of users,
to build a still more precise probabilistic contract.
Contract Verification:
The contract verification module is a component whose contribution is two-fold.
1. Verifies if the app probabilistic contract matches a user-defined security pol-
icy. The matching is verified through probabilistic model checking techniques,
before the app is installed on the device.
2. Checks if the app is repackaged (trojanized) exploiting both collaborative prob-
abilistic contract provided by the user community and the one generated by the
contract generator.
If the contract matches the user security policy, the app is considered safe and
can run on the device without further security checks. If the app is recognized
as repackaged and/or the contract does not match the policy, the framework will
propose to the user the app removal.
The contract verification and contract generator component will be analyzed in
detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The interested reader can refer to [19].
Apps Monitor, App Removal and Feedback Module:
The apps monitor is a dynamic component of the proposed framework whose
task is to analyze the runtime behavior of a subset of applications deemed as
suspicious by the Static Analysis or the Contract Verification component. The apps
monitor hijacks the security critical operations performed by the app, verifying for
each action if:
• The action is part of a behavior allowed by the policy.
• The action is not a known blacklisted misbehavior (heuristics).
If at least one of the two former checks fails (Policy Violation in Figure 1.4), the ac-
tion is blocked at the act of invocation. Misbehaving apps are reported to the user
who can take decisions on the blocked operation, and on the definitive removal of
the app. The apps monitor also verifies, for all applications, if their behavior is re-
ally consistent with the one declared in the app contract. If a contract inconsistence
(Figure 1.4) is found, the contract may be updated and the decision of the Con-
tract Verification module may change accordingly. A Feedback Module will handle
this contract inconsistence, implementing configurable policies which may include
modification to the developer reputation, or communicating the inconsistence to
users in the community.
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Global Device Monitor:
The global device monitor monitors device events at both API and operative sys-
tem level. The global monitor is dual and complementary to the Apps Monitor,
being able to find a subset of misbehavior that deceive per app monitoring tools.
In particular, several operations are not performed directly by the app, instead
is the app that demands to the operative system to perform them. In this set of
operations fall both the “buffer overflow attacks”, used to illegally get super user
privileges and the “confused deputy attacks”, where two or more apps join or re-
delegate their authorizations to perform complex attacks. These malicious oper-
ations cause noticeable changes in the pattern of issued system calls, detected
by the global device monitor, which exploits a statistic classifier to find anomalies.
The global device monitor implements a white list detection approach to be able
to detect zero day security threats. The global device monitor send threats report
to the Apps Monitor component, which exploits heuristics to infer the app that is
effectively performing the misbehavior.
The global device monitor will be described in details in Chapter 5. For further
details, please refer to [60].
1.2.2 Contribution Summary
It is possible to summarize the contribution of this thesis as follows:
• Security issues on Android: The thesis will survey the Android native security
mechanisms, the current state-of-the-art solutions to improve or supersede the
native mechanism weaknesses and a detailed description of the main security
threats to Android device.
• Framework Description: A detailed description of the study, design and imple-
mentation of the proposed Host-based security framework for mobile devices
will be presented. In particular the discussion will focus on the following points.
• Deploy-Time App Analysis: A methodology based on a multi-criteria decision
algorithm to assess the risk brought by an Android app. This methodology is
implemented in a component able to analyze new apps at deploy time directly
on the device, without causing any runtime overhead and without extracting
binaries or execution code.
• Contract Generation: Methodology and tool to extract the application behav-
ior, computing automatically a probabilistic contract from it. This component
can run on the user device, in a sandbox, or even rely on a community of
users that collaborate to create a contract. Contract can be used to verify if an
application is repackaged.
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• Introducing probability in SxC, the SxCxP framework: We will propose the
Probabilistic Security by Contract (SxCxP) as an extension of the contract-
based security methodology Security by Contract (SxC). SxCxP substitutes
the boolean approach of contract-based security, in which any operation can be
either “allowed” or “forbidden”, with quantitative clauses. Thus, any operation
is considered either “likely” or “unlikely”. This refinement allows to write more
complex and flexible security policies, and contracts which take in account the
real behavior of an application. The theoretical analysis and implementation
details on Android are reported.
• Multi-Level Monitor and Security Enforcement: Description of a dynamic
component able to monitor the events both at kernel and API level, intercept-
ing the events, classifying them as genuine or malicious thanks to computa-
tional intelligence. Malicious events are stopped before they can be effectively
performed and the malicious application is killed and removed.
• Real World Tests: The effectiveness of the framework as a whole, has been
tested against more than 12000 Android applications including both malicious
and genuine apps.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we describe MAETROID,
the module of the proposed framework which analyzes new apps at deploy time,
assessing their risk level. The multi-criteria decision system is presented, together
with a classification of Android permissions. The chapter also reports an analysis
on 12000 apps and the survey presented to 200 users to estimate their accep-
tance. Chapter 3 describes PICARD, the module for the generation of probabilistic
contracts and detection of repackaged apps. The chapter presents the theoret-
ical basis under the representation and generation of probabilistic contracts ex-
tracted dynamically from app execution. The results on repackaged app detection
are also reported. In Chapter 4 it is reported the description of the Probabilistic
Security By Contract (SxCxP) and its extension which also includes a Trust mod-
ule (MAETROID, described in Chapter 2) for contract verification (SxCxTxP). The
chapter connects to the results of Chapter 3, reporting the theoretical background
of probabilistic contract verification based on ε-simulation. Afterward it propose
the implementation on Android systems. Chapter 5 presents MADAM, the global
device monitor which enforces security at runtime, detecting anomalous behav-
iors and malicious applications, exploiting proximity based-classifiers and heuris-
tics. MADAM has been tested against two dataset of malicious apps, accounting
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to more than 1300 malicious apps. The detection results, an analysis of the false
alarm rate, and of the performance and energy overhead is reported. Finally Chap-
ter 6 briefly summarizes the obtained results, proposing directions for future work.
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2Risk Analysis of Android Applications: A
Multi-Criteria and Usable Approach
2.1 Introduction
In the last years, smartphones and tablets have replaced legacy GMS/GPRS (2G)
mobile phones. According to a recent market analysis [7], in several countries
more than 90% of registered mobile devices have a 3G or 4G subscription, leading
to more than 2 billions active subscribers. Noticeably, more than 80% of these
devices are based on the Android operating system, which is the most popular
operating system (OS) for smartphones and tablets [122]. Such a dominance of
use makes Android also the almost exclusive target for mobile threats identified
in the last years [5]. Currently, 99% of the Android security attacks are brought
through infected mobile applications (apps) [5].
Currently, apps for mobile devices are distributed through online marketplaces,
such as Google Play or App Store. These marketplaces act as an hub where app
developers publish their own products, which can be bought or downloaded for
free by users. Usually, official markets charge users for these apps, while several
unofficial marketplaces distribute their own apps free of charge. In this last case,
trust is at risk, since there is no centralized control, as it happens with official mar-
kets, and it may happen that untrusted developers distribute malicious apps. This
issue is particularly serious for Android – which represents the reference of our
study – as it is both the most popular OS for mobile devices and the system with
the greatest share of malware in the last years [5]. In particular, in 2013 Android
accounted for 97% of all mobile malware. Moreover, the number of new malware
is alarming: on average, more than 160,000 new specimens are reported every-
day [9]. Recently, work in [123] pointed out that a quarter of all Google Play free
apps are clones, i.e., repackaged apps of popular ones, such as WhatsApp and
Angry Birds.
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Android security policy it is not based on a strict control of the app distribution
method. In fact, apps are published on the official market without strong security
checks and Google is not condemning the presence of unofficial markets. This
approach favors a greater flexibility and freedom of choice for both developers and
users. Differently from Apple, which enforces application security directly on the
market, publishing only apps that have passed a long and complex verification
process (vetting), Android enforces security directly on the device. Android, in fact,
implements the Permission System to force app developers to declare the security
critical resources that the app can access and the security critical operations that
the app can perform. Then, at run-time, the Android OS blocks any undeclared ac-
cess or illegal operation attempt. The Android permission system has been proved
to show flaws and weaknesses (see [71]), mainly for some assumptions on users’
expertise in understanding the permission semantics. In fact, before the app is in-
stalled, requested permissions are shown to the user as a list. Then, the user has
to decide if the app is trustworthy or risky by only visualizing the permissions list.
Hence, if the user decides that some permissions are not justified, the installation
procedure is aborted. Unfortunately, several users may not have enough expertise
to understand whether an app is malicious or not by reading the permissions list
only. Moreover, according to the analysis in [71], a large number of users does
not even read permissions and simply installs the app. In this case, the permis-
sion system does not help such users in protecting them from malicious apps.
The main criticism that has been raised against the permission system is that they
are too coarse-grained and difficult to understand, both for users and developers.
We argue that an evaluation of the Android apps trustworthiness deserves more
representative methods and techniques.
In this paper, we present MAETROID (Multi-criteria App Evaluator of TRust in
AndrOID), a mechanism to evaluate the trustworthiness of Android apps, i.e. their
level of risk in terms of potential security and privacy risks. To this end, MAETROID
performs a static analysis of the app by using five different parameters, found in
the app itself or retrieved from the marketplace. Then, MAETROID builds a sin-
gle easy-to-understand trustworthiness decision for the app, which is shown to
the user when installing a new app, i.e. at deploy-time. MAETROID is based on a
customized instantiation of a well-known multi-criteria decision process, the Ana-
lytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [108]. AHP conveys in a single index an evaluation
performed through criteria which are both objective and subjective. MAETROID
exploits AHP to analyze apps through both objective criteria, i.e., declared permis-
sions, number of downloads, and market, and subjective ones, i.e., the app rating
and the developer reputation. The outcome of MAETROID is an advise suggesting
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the user whether the considered app should be installed or not. The approach of
MAETROID is scalable, since apps are evaluated at deploy-time, directly on the
user device. Thus, despite the huge amount of available Android apps and their
possible different provenances, the proposed approach is viable, since (i) it sim-
ply requires the users to install the MAETROID app on their devices (ii) apps are
evaluated at installation time only.
We have tested the framework by classifying more than 11,000 apps. Further-
more, we have analyzed the user response and acceptance of MAETROID, de-
signing and proposing a survey to a set of about 200 subjects. The survey results
have been analyzed to synthesize outcomes on the users perception of mobile
security and related threats. In particular, in our user-set, subjects are aware of
mobile security threats, since only 10% of the interviewees state that they are not
concerned about possible threats at all. However, more than 25% of the subjects
gives no importance to the Android security warnings and only 27% of the sub-
jects considers the Android permissions as useful and meaningful. The results of
the survey have also confirmed that the MAETROID evaluation is effective in driv-
ing the users decision, by avoiding the installation of malicious apps. In particular,
90% of the interviewees changed their mind about installing a malicious app after
that MAETROID evaluates the app as dangerous.
Contributions of the Paper
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• we propose an evaluation of the app threat level based on the analysis of the
threats represented by each declared permission. We have rated each of the
145 Android permissions with three threat values, which correspond to threats
to user’s privacy, device, and financial ; these values are used to compute the
app global threat score, based on the required permissions. The threat score
is the first of five criteria exploited by our framework;
• we describe the design of MAETROID, a system for the analysis of Android
apps at deploy-time. Whenever a new app is being installed on the user mobile
device, MAETROID exploits five criteria to evaluate the app trustworthiness,
then returns to the user a simple decision to help the user in deciding whether
to install or not the app;
• we have tested MAETROID against a set of more than 11,000 apps, coming
either from Google Play, unofficial markets and two important mobile malware
database, namely Genome [136] and Contagio1;
1 http://contagiominidump.blogspot.it/
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• we present the implementation of MAETROID for Android devices (which can
be downloaded from: http://icaremobile.iit.cnr.it/);
• we discuss the results about users’ expectations and MAETROID acceptance,
by detailing the results of a survey presented to almost 200 mobile device
users. The survey was aimed at evaluating (i) the users understanding and
knowledge of security mechanisms already existing on their mobile devices,
(ii) the criteria that average users consider representative of the app trust-
worthiness, and (iii) whether the MAETROID outcome is more effective than
the Android permission system in driving the user towards the right decision
(whether to install or not install a new app).
In a nutshell, the current work largely extends and improves the description of
previous work in [56]. The completely novel contributions are the implementation
of MAETROID as an Android app, the classification of 11,000 apps and the study
on the user’s acceptance and understanding of MAETROID through the survey.
Structure of the Paper
In the next section, we discuss related work on the security of mobile devices.
Section 2.3 recalls some notions about Android security mechanisms and pro-
vides a brief description of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Section 2.4 describes
the MAETROID approach by discussing in detail the criteria used for assessing
the trustworthiness of an app. The current implementation of MAETROID for An-
droid devices is presented in Section 2.5, which also discusses the results of the
analysis on the testbed apps. Section 2.6 presents a survey, which was submitted
to 189 subjects, to test user’s perception on security on mobile devices and users’
acceptance of MAETROID approach. In Section 2.7, we discuss the MAETROID
framework, by discussing its advantages and limitations, by comparing it with al-
ternative solutions, and finally we analyze in details the results and findings of the
survey. Finally, Section 2.8 draws some conclusions and proposes some further
future research directions.
2.2 Related Work
Several extensions and improvements to the Android permission system have
been recently proposed. The work presented in [126] proposes a security frame-
work that regulates the actions of Android apps defining security rules concerning
permissions and sequence of operations. New rules can be added using a spec-
ification language. The app code is analyzed at deploy-time to verify whether it is
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compliant to the rule, otherwise it is considered as malicious code. With respect to
this work, MAETROID does not require the code to be decompiled and analyzed.
Indeed, it only requires the permissions list that can be retrieved from the manifest
file and other pieces of information that can be retrieved from the website where
the app can be downloaded.
Authors of [131] present a finer grained model of the Android permission sys-
tem. They propose a framework, named TISSA, that modifies the Android system
to allow the user to choose the permissions she wants to grant to an app and
those that have to be denied. Using mocking data, they ensure that an app works
correctly even if it is not allowed to access the required information. However, their
system focuses on the analysis of privacy threatening permissions and it relies on
the user expertise and knowledge. A work similar to TISSA is presented in [92],
where the authors design an improved app installer that allows users to define
three different policies for each permission: allow, deny, or conditional allow. Con-
ditional allow is used to define a customized policy for a specific permission by
means of a policy definition language. However, the responsibility of choosing the
right permissions still falls on the user, whilst MAETROID directly shows to the
user the risk classification of the app, performing automatically the permissions
analysis.
In [61], the authors present a multi-level behavior-based intrusion detection
system called MADAM. The proposed system learns the correct devices’ behav-
ior and then detects significant deviations signaling an intrusion. The MADAM ap-
proach is orthogonal to that of MAETROID because MADAM analyzes the app be-
havior at run-time, while MAETROID performs a risk analysis before installing the
app. In [45], apps have been classified based on their required permissions. Apps
have been divided in functional clusters by means of Self Organizing Maps, prov-
ing that apps with the same set of permission have similar functionalities. However
this work does not differentiate between good and bad (trojanized) apps. Another
analysis of Android permissions is presented in [21], where the authors discuss a
tool named Stowaway, which discovers permission overdeclaration errors in apps.
Using this tool, it is possible to analyze the 85% of Android available functions, in-
cluding the private ones, to obtain a mapping between functions and permissions.
This work mainly concerns the analysis of permissions without proposing a direct
link between declared permissions and apps security, as with MAETROID. A sys-
tem to implement security policies on Android devices is presented in [24]. This
system is based on the introduction of a monitor of security critical functionalities,
which matches the performed actions with security policies defined by the mobile
device user. However, the presence of the monitor imposes a consistent over-
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head. Another security framework based on user defined policies, preventing app
to perform non compliant operations, is presented in [59]. The framework attempts
to reduce the overhead and to improve the effectiveness through a probabilistic
contract based approach. This leads to a probabilistic satisfaction of security re-
quirements.
TrustGo [120] is a framework aimed at classifying mobile apps exploiting a
multi-criteria analysis. TrustGo gives users a full description of the security threats
brought by an app and also works as an antivirus. TrustGo is catalogue-based:
available Android apps are analyzed by security experts and are inserted in a cata-
logue, checked when a TrustGo user is installing a new app. TrustGo is effective
and the catalogue-based approach ensures a good accuracy. However, it is not
possible to collect all the existing apps, since only the apps distributed through
official channels can be analyzed. Moreover, if an app is updated, it is possible
that some security features may change in the new version, i.e., new permissions
are added in the manifest and this requires a catalogue update, which may not
be triggered in time. On the other hand, MAETROID is independent from the app
version, i.e., the app is analyzed “as is”. App update will trigger a new classifi-
cation process. Moreover, MAETROID classifies the app at deploy-time, without
requiring any centralized catalogue. Thus, any app can be classified even if com-
ing from unknown marketplaces. Another app classification system is presented in
[101], where apps are classified in comparison with formerly analyzed apps. The
methodology exploits probabilistic generative models to analyze apps on different
criteria including permissions. However, the performed analysis is more effective
in creating an awareness on developers in trying to avoid issues like permission
overdeclaration, instead of providing an index effective in driving the user decision
on the app installation.
Analysis of the Android permission understanding have been performed in [71],
where subjects from an university campus have been asked to fill a survey on
Android security and on their current approach to the permission security mecha-
nism. The results of this survey matches with the ones discussed in the first part
of our survey used to validate the effectiveness of the MAETROID evaluation. In
particular, the percentage of users considering permissions when installing a new
app is mostly equivalent. Recently, Android has introduced a service of remote
monitoring of installed apps, called VerifyApps [80], which acts as a remote an-
tivirus. The visual approach is similar to MAETROID: when an app is considered
dangerous, the user is advised about the potential threat and asked if she desires
to install the app considered dangerous. However, VerifyApps behaves like an an-
tivirus, by looking directly for known malware signature. On the contrary, the risk
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analysis of MAETROID is based on different parameters that do not depend from
the app code. A dangerous app can be considered malicious by MAETROID even
if it is a brand new app with an unknown signature.
A similar approach to MAETROID is Androlyzer [48], which is a web-based
service that gives the user a lot of information about the used API, used libraries,
privacy leaks, requested permission, which might be too overwhelming for an ordi-
nary user. For these reasons, in MAETROID we have decided to keep the output
of the results as simple as possible as a first step towards a better understanding
of the risk of an app from the point of average users. Furthermore, these reputation
services, again with similar ones [22] [127], are usually centralized, hence they are
not very scalable. In fact, these services need, first of all, to download all the apps
(or the most important ones), and are usually limited to unofficial markets. Further-
more, their databases need to be constantly updated and the centralized service
need to cope with several concurrent requests of different users. On the contrary,
MAETROID is run locally on the user device and only for the newly downloaded
app so there are not scalability issues due to checking a large number of apps
concurrently.
2.3 Background
This section describes the Android permission system and discusses both its
strengths and weaknesses. Then, it recalls the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP),
the multi-criteria decision system used by MAETROID.
2.3.1 Android Permission System
To reduce the likelihood that a user installs a dangerous apps, Android implements
an access control mechanism called Permission System. The Permission System
forces app developers to declare the security critical resources that the app can
access and the security critical operations that the app can perform. At run-time,
an Android component called permission checker monitors the access requests to
security critical resources and operations. If an access request is issued by an app
without authorization declared in the Permission System, the permission checker
denies the access.
Figure 2.1 reports a time-line of the evolution of Android during 2009-2014,
by highlighting the major changes concerning permissions and security. In partic-
ular, until 2011 existing malware for Android systems were only confined to re-
search proof-of-concepts. In 2011, Android-specific malware started to spread, by
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Figure 2.1: Time-line of Major Changes in the Android Permission System.
exploiting a vulnerability of the Gingerbread system, named Gingerbreak, which
allowed malicious apps to get root privileges. This issue has been fixed with the
introduction of Android Ice Cream Sandwich in 2012. However, in 2013, another
important permission vulnerability has been discovered (see [74]) that allowed
the modification of the app permissions without modifying the app signature. This
issue has been solved in the latest release of Jelly Bean (2013), which also
includes for the first time the possibility to dynamically revoke, or grant, single per-
missions to apps.
During the period of observation (2009-2014), starting with the original set of
90 permissions, a further set of almost 50 permissions has been added, mainly
due to new device resources and apps functionalities. Currently, Android defines
145 permissions2, where each permission is related to either a specific device re-
source or a critical operation. Permissions required by an app are declared by the
developer in the AndroidManifest.xml file (manifest for short), which is included
in the app package (apk), bound to the app code by means of digital signature.
Android classifies permissions in four classes: normal, dangerous, signature, and
signature-or-system. For the scope of this paper, we only focus on normal and
dangerous permissions. In fact, signature and signature-or-system permissions
cannot be required by any app. Only apps signed with the Google private key, thus
developed by Google, can declare those permissions. The rationale behind sig-
nature and signature-or-system permission is that Google is directly interested in
providing only genuine apps.
The Android permission classification is used to choose which permissions
are shown to the user at deploy-time. All dangerous permissions are automatically
shown to the user, whereas the normal ones are listed in a separate sub-list, the
2 http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.
html
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“Other Permissions” list. Once a permission has been granted, the app can access
the corresponding protected resource (or perform some corresponding critical op-
erations) without asking for further authorizations.
Several criticisms have been raised against the Android permission system.
Firstly, the system is considered too coarse-grained [131], since the user can only
choose whether to accept all of the permissions declared by an app or to refuse to
install the app. Even if the latest versions of Android includes the AppOps feature,
which allows users to revoke selected permissions to an already installed app,
issues related to the coarse granularity of the system still exist. In fact, anytime
the app tries to perform an operation for which the permission has been revoked,
the operation is denied by the permission checker. Thus, since the error coming
from the denied operation is not handled, the app is likely to terminate with error
(it crashes).
One of the problem with such an approach is that a user is generally unable to
determine if an app can be trusted. In fact, by only looking at the list of the required
permissions it can be noticed that the list is not very user-friendly. An example of
this is depicted in Figure 2.2, where we can see that it is difficult to fully understand
the risk posed by such permissions. Since the number of requested permissions
is rather large, and since some of them are quite difficult to understand, even for
expert users, several users simply ignore them when installing a new app, leading
to malicious apps being installed [71].
Another issue is that often developers declare (by mistake or for convenience)
more permissions than those actually necessary, leading to the so called Permis-
sion Overdeclaration [21]. This happens because some permissions have similar
names and their description is not self-explicative for some developers. It is quite
intuitive that users, seeing a very long permissions list, are less encouraged to
read and understand them.
2.3.2 Analytic Hierarchy Process
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [110] is a multi-criteria decision making
technique, which has been largely used in several fields of study [111], including,
e.g., work in [44], in which AHP has been applied to multi-factor reputation sys-
tems, work in [96], [40], and [104], all of them presenting apps related to security
policies and access control.
The AHP approach is the following: given a decision problem, where several
different alternatives can be chosen to reach a goal, AHP returns the most relevant
alternative with respect to a set of previously established criteria. The decision
23
CHAPTER 2. RISK ANALYSIS OF ANDROID APPLICATIONS: A
MULTI-CRITERIA AND USABLE APPROACH
Figure 2.2: Example of Permission List for an App.
problem is structured as a hierarchy, by linking goals and alternatives through the
chosen criteria (Figure 2.3). AHP subdivides a complex problem into a set of sub-
problems, equal in number to the chosen criteria. For each criteria, a local solution
is computed. Then, the most relevant alternative, i.e., the best solution for the
decision problem, is computed by properly merging the local solutions.
Differently from classical computational intelligence or statistic techniques
used for classification, the AHP decision process does not require a training phase,
because decision parameters are assessed directly by experts of the decision
problem. The value of these parameters are based on both objective and subjec-
tive interpretation of the problem elements. For example, let us consider a decision
problem in which one has to decide which car is the best to buy. An example of
an objective criterion is the “price”. Instead, if we consider the “aesthetic” criterion,
its value is the output of a subjective evaluation. In general, in AHP problems it
is up to some experts to assess the relevance of each criterion and the resulting
assessment is generally subjective.
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Figure 2.3: Generic AHP Hierarchy
Table 2.1: Fundamental Scale for AHP
Intensity Definition Explanation
1 Equal Two elements contribute equally to the objective
3 Moderate One element is slightly more relevant than another
5 Strong One element is strongly more relevant over another
7 Very strong One element is very strongly more relevant over another
9 Extreme One element is extremely more relevant over another
Pairwise Comparison Matrices
Local solutions for each criterion are computed by means of comparison matrices,
which describe how much an alternative is more or less relevant with respect to
another one in a pairwise fashion. For each criterion, the relevance of each alterna-
tive with respect to others is expressed in a matricial form. A pairwise comparisons
matrix M is a square matrix n× n (where n is the number of alternatives), which
has positive entries and it is reciprocal, i.e., for each element aij , aij = 1aji , where
aij ∈ {1, ..., 9} (see Table 2.1).
The concept of consistency is defined for comparison matrices. A compari-
son matrix of size n × n is consistent if ai,j · aj,k = ai,k, ∀(i, j, k). If a com-
parison matrix is consistent, the pairwise comparisons are well related between
them. However, it is difficult to obtain perfectly consistent matrices using empiri-
cally defined comparisons. AHP requires that comparison matrices are, at least,
semi-consistent. To measure the consistency of a comparison matrix, the consis-
tency index CI = λmax−nn−1 has been defined [109], with λmax being the largest
matrix eigenvalue. For a consistent matrix, we have that CI = 0, whilst a ma-
trix is considered semi-consistent if CI < 0.1. If this condition does not hold, the
comparison matrix should be re-evaluated.
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Computing Local Priorities
Local priorities express the relevance of the alternatives for a specific criterion.
Given a comparison matrix, local priorities are computed as the normalized eigen-
vector associated with the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix [109]. Thus, for each
criterion cj , AHP extracts from the comparison matrix a vector pcj of size n ex-
pressing the relevance in percentage of each alternative for that criterion.
Computing Global Priorities
The relevance of a criterion with respect to the goal is described by means of an
additional pairwise comparisons matrix Pg of size k× k, where k is the number of
criteria.
Global priorities are computed through a weighted sum of all the local priorities
computed over the whole hierarchy (from alternatives to goal):
P aig =
k∑
j=1
pcjg · paicj (2.1)
where P aig is the global priority of the alternative ai, p
cj
g is the local priority of
criterion cj extracted from Pg with respect to the goal and paicj is the local priority
of alternative ai with respect to criterion cj .
2.4 MAETROID
In this section, we describe in detail the MAETROID framework. First, we present
a permission classification method, in terms of the amount and the type of the
declared permissions to evaluate the potential threat represented by an app. Then,
we describe the specific and customized instantiation of AHP to assess the apps’
trustworthiness.
2.4.1 Threat Score
Each Android permission regulates the access to a specific resource or operation
on an Android device. Generally, the more permissions are declared by an app, the
greater is its potential threat, since more security critical operations are granted to
the app. However, the number of permissions should not be the only parameter to
assess the global app threat level. In fact, some permissions are related to oper-
ations or resources much more critical than others. For example, the permission
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to send text messages represents a different threat from the permission to control
the smartphone vibration. For this reason, we propose a novel way to compute the
threat score, i.e. the level of risk, of an app based upon the number and typologies
of the declared permissions. MAETROID performs a static analysis of declared
permission on new apps to compute a threat score representing the dangerous-
ness of the app. This score is represented through a number ranging over the
interval [0, 15], where 0 represents an app that requires no permissions, or only
harmless permissions, whilst 15 represents the worst case of an app that requires
all the Android permissions, or only dangerous one. The value is proportional to
the dangerousness of the requested permissions, as will be detailed later.
To properly compute the threat score, we have manually analyzed all the per-
missions defined by Android. This operation has been done to assess what re-
sources and operations can be accessed through each permission and what is
the effect of the misuse of such resource. In particular, each permission has been
scored according to the level of threat represented against three security parame-
ters, namely: privacy threat (threat to the confidentiality of the user), system threat
(threat for the system integrity), and financial threat (threat for user’s mobile credit).
Finally, we have created a table which assigns to each permission a score for each
of the three threats. The score is in the range [0, 1] according to the six levels of
severity defined in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Threat Levels
0 No Threat
0.2 Low Threat
0.4 Low-to-Moderate Threat
0.6 Moderate Threat
0.8 Moderate-to-High Threat
1 High Threat
To explain the rationale behind this permissions analysis, let us consider
the permission android.permission.CALL_PHONE as an example. We have as-
signed a score of 0.6 to the corresponding privacy threat, since this permission
allows an app to perform phone call without the user being aware of it. For exam-
ple, this permission enables an app to listen and remotely record the user activities
and nearby sounds to infer her behavior. We have further assigned a score of 0.2
to the system threat, since the phone drains the battery faster during a call but it
is unlikely that an attacker can exploit phone calls to attack the device integrity by
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reducing the battery lifetime. Finally, we have assigned a score of 1 to the finan-
cial threat, since an app with this permission can call any phone number included
premium-rate numbers. Hence, a malicious app can cause a consistent financial
damage to the user, e.g. by issuing calls to premium numbers which are likely to
pass unnoticed until the user credit ends or the user receives the phone bill.
Table 2.15 in Appendix 2.10 gives an excerpt of the threat score we have as-
signed to all the Android permissions (for the full list please refer to [55]), where
acronyms PT, ST, and FT are an abbreviation of privacy, system, and financial
threat, respectively. The threat values have been given according to the documen-
tation associated with each permission, which gives details on how permissions
can be exploited by an app. The rationale behind the assignment of threat values
to permissions is detailed in the following.
Privacy Threat. According to [119], personal data, i.e., any information referring
to an identified, or identifiable, individual (i.e., the data subject), are subject to
principles aiming to guarantee and preserve their privacy. As an example, the
Use Limitation Principle states that “Personal data should not be disclosed,
made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified at
the time of data collection except: i) with the consent of the data subject, or ii)
by law.”.
Permissions that refer to actions that may compromise or shatter these prin-
ciples, such as permissions about access to users’ contacts, files, Internet
bookmarks and chronology, or SIM and device information, such as the IMEI
and IMSI codes, have received a high value for this index. In this cases, such
permissions are considered risky from the privacy point of view. In particular,
based on the principles highlighted in [119], we have given the highest privacy
threat value to the following permissions:
• android.permission.READ_CONTACTS: access the contact list on the de-
vice. This may create a serious privacy leakage since an app can send the
read data to an attacker through Internet or text message.
• android.permission.READ_PROFILE: access information of the user ac-
count. User’s account may contain private data like birth-date, location and
occupation and apps with this permission can read, store and eventually
send it outside of the user device.
• android.permission.READ_SMS: access the text message Inbox. This
may constitute a serious privacy leakage, since the app is able to read
both the text and the sender number of all private text messages stored in
the device.
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• android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS: allows the app to control and han-
dle the event of incoming text message. Similar privacy risk of the READ_SMS
permission, but the app can only intercept incoming messages and is not
able to access the history. However, the app with such a permission may
even decide not to show any notification of the received message to the
user.
• android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS: allows the app to control and han-
dle the event of incoming multimedia message. Same considerations for
the former permission but applied to multimedia messages.
Moreover, a medium-to-low value has been assigned to those permissions that
access sensors, such as camera or microphone, since they could be poten-
tially exploited to spy the user behavior. All the remaining permissions, which
neither access sensitive resources nor use a resource at all, have been given
a low or zero value.
System Threat. A high value of system threat is assigned to permissions access-
ing system components and that if misused can cause integrity issues to the
OS, to personal files, or even the physical device. A list of permissions which
are critical on the system threat is the following:
• android.permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES: allows the app to install new
packages. This functionality has been used by several malware to install
later other dangerous apps with additional permissions (e.g. the ZFT mal-
ware) or advertisement apps (Adware).
• android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE: allows the app to mod-
ify the external memory content. An app with this permission can fill the de-
vice memory and remove or permanently modify files of the user of other
apps. As an example, the malware Moghava permanently damages all the
pictures in the user gallery overlapping on them a propaganda image.
• android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE: gives to an app the control
on the WiFi device status. The WiFi interface has a consistent impact
on the device battery lifetime and also may cause Internet disconnection,
since WiFi overrides the mobile data connection even if the access point
is not connected to the Internet. Thus, a malicious control on the WiFi rep-
resents an integrity violation.
Other permissions with a consistent value of system threat are all those per-
missions that give access to device interface and peripherals (e.g. camera,
vibration, etc.) whose (mis)use cause both a performance or battery overhead.
Financial threat. High values of this index are assigned to permissions related to
the usage of services that imply a financial cost, such as phone calls or outgo-
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ing SMSs. Conversely, if the cost is indirectly related to a specific permission, it
receives a medium financial threat value. Some permissions that we consider
critical for financial threat are the following:
• android.permission.SEND_SMS: allows an app to send text messages.
With this permission an app can virtually send as many messages desires
to whatever number. Sending text message is an operation which has a
monetary cost established by the provider and that may vary with the re-
cipient. Moreover text messages can be used for subscription to premium
services which impose a weekly or monthly cost. Such a strategy has been
exploited by several malware known as SMS Trojan [130].
• android.permission.CALL_PHONE: gives to an app the authorization to
initiate phone calls. Phone calls have the same financial implications of text
messages, with usually a higher cost which can be imposed on the user
[4].
• android.permission.INTERNET: gives to an app the authorization to
open sockets for external connections. Bytes of data received and transmit-
ted is another element that telephony providers charge to users. Opening
a connection and streaming data on it always generates a cost and an app
with this permission can virtually send any amount of data. This permission
becomes particularly dangerous if coupled with the CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
permission discussed formerly, whose financial threat is in fact considered
moderate (0.6).
An additional detailed example of threat score assignment, which consider the
privacy, system and financial threat is given in Table 2.3 for the SEND_SMS permis-
sion and discussed in the following.
SEND_SMS Permission
The SEND_SMS permission enables an app to send SMS messages, also without
requiring user confirmation. Hence, an app that declares this permission can send
SMS messages, with any text, at the current rate, and at any phone number, with-
out the user noting it (unless the user checks periodically the available credit).
This permission has been exploited by several malware to leak the user credit by
sending messages to premium-rate numbers, or to threaten her privacy by send-
ing information, such as the IMEI and IMSI codes, to a phone number controlled
by the attacker [130]. Therefore, we set its financial threat to “High”. The financial
threat is considered high since sending SMS text messages has a cost and they
can be used to perform subscriptions to premium services. The privacy threat is
30
2.4. MAETROID
considered medium-high since SMS messages can be used as a vector to steal
sensitive information. However, this information has to be accessed before it can
be sent and this requires other specific permissions. Finally, sending text mes-
sages does not represent a threat to the system itself. Hence, the system threat is
set to zero. It is worth noting that the threat levels have been assigned only to the
permissions defined by Google.
Table 2.3: Threat Level of SEND_SMS Permission
Permission
Privacy
Threat
System
Threat
Financial
Threat
SEND_SMS 0.8 0 1
Global Threat Score
For each app α, we define the global threat score σ, which summarizes in a sin-
gle index the threats of all the requested permissions declared. This is done by
analyzing the manifest file, and by calculating a weighted sum as follows:
σ =
n∑
i=1
wp · pti + ws · sti + wf · fti
1 + dlog(1 + n)e (2.2)
where n is the number of permissions declared by a specific app, pti, sti, fti
are, respectively, the privacy, system, and financial threat of the i-th permission
required by the app, and wp, ws, wf are the corresponding weights. In the current
implementation, we consider wf being three times greater than ws and wp: this
means that we consider the financial threat more relevant than the system and
privacy threats, since it can harm the user with more impact. The denominator of
(2.2) has been added so that the dangerousness of the permission is considered
more relevant than the number of permission. We consider apps with σ lower than
4 as low-threat apps, while ones with σ in the interval [1, 4[ are moderate threat to
high-threat. Higher values of σ mean extremely critical apps.
The value σ estimates how much an app is critical from the security point of
view, by considering the declared permissions only. Hence, the more permissions
are required by an app, and the more dangerous these permissions are, the more
critical the app becomes. The idea is that if an app receives a low-threat score,
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this should increase the likelihood that this app is downloaded and, as a conse-
quence, this should encourage developers to accurately choose the permissions
required by their apps. However, several apps actually require a large number of
permissions to perform all their functions, especially communication and social
apps, and they should not be considered as suspicious. This leads us to rely on
a multi-criteria decision system (presented in Section 2.3.2) in order to classify an
app with respect to a set of criteria, among which the threat score σ.
2.4.2 Classification Problem Instantiation
Since the global threat score σ, computed from the requested permissions, should
not be the only parameter used to assess the trustworthiness of the app, we in-
stantiate the AHP decision methodology to include further criteria. In detail, an
Android app is described by the following parameters: a threat score σ, a devel-
oper δ, a number of download η, a market µ, and a user-rating ρ. The goal consists
in assigning the app one of the following alternative labels:
Trusted. The app works correctly and does not hide malicious functionalities. A
trusted app is characterized by a low threat score, i.e. it is considered not be
able to harm the system due to the low threat of the required permissions.
Moreover, a trusted app generally comes from the official market, downloaded
by thousands of users, having very good reviews and/or developed by a devel-
oper with outstanding reputation (i.e. top developer). All the aforementioned
features shape an app which is both secure and appreciated by the users.
Therefore, the user can safely install such an app. MAETROID will show a
green “happy” smiley when installing a trusted app.
Medium-Risk. The app does not work correctly and includes unwanted functional-
ities. An app is considered to represent a Medium-Risk to the device security
when, even if it shows an acceptable (low) threat score, it has received poor
reviews, or has been downloaded by too few users (less than 100) to infer that
the app does not hide threats. Generally this decision is given to low quality
apps published on official or unofficial market by non-skilled developers. An-
other reason is that the app is likely to be unwanted from the user, such as an
Adware, who should rethink about installing it. A yellow smiley with a neutral
expression (“poker face”) is shown to the user when installing a Medium-Risk
app.
High-Risk. The app likely includes malicious code. This decision is given to apps
that require several dangerous permissions, representing a potential threat to
the device and its user. In fact, the greatest majority of malware (95% [5]) asks
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for several dangerous permissions related to text messages, which reasonably
should not be asked by any app which is not related to instant messaging.
As discussed in the following, apps that genuinely ask for several dangerous
permissions are recognized by MAETROID thanks to the positive user reviews
combined with a conspicuous number of downloads (more than 100,000).
Figure 2.4 gives a graphic description of the AHP instantiation of the MAETROID
classification problem. The variables σ, δ, η, µ, ρ represent the problem criteria,
but, differently from classic AHP instantiation, for each criterion more comparison
matrices are defined. A specific comparison matrix is chosen for each criterion,
based on its variable value. Hence, for two different apps, the AHP classification
problem is instantiated with different comparison matrices3, representing however
the same criteria.
Figure 2.4: AHP Instantiation of the MAETROID Classification Problem.
In the following we detail the building and choice process for AHP comparison
matrices used by MAETROID and their relation to the possible values of each of
the criteria.
Criteria
We have defined five criteria, namely µ for the market, δ for the developer, ρ for
the user rating, η for the number of download, and σ for the threat score. They are
detailed in the following.
Market (µ). Apps are normally distributed through online marketplaces. The most
popular market is Google Play, also referred as the official market. This mar-
ket is considered as a more protected environment since app developers build
3 The whole set of comparison matrices is presented in [55].
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their reputation on the base of the apps they publish. More specifically, a de-
veloper who wants to publish apps on Google Play has to buy a developer
account, at the price of 25$. In exchange, the developer receives a private
key which can use to digitally sign her apps [107]. If users report an app as
malicious, then this app is removed both from the market and remotely from
all the devices that have installed it. Moreover, the developer can be tracked
and blacklisted. In addition, Google Play includes some reputation indexes
that should help users to understand the app quality. These features make
the official market a trustworthy place where to download apps. Nevertheless,
several malware have also been found in the official market [5] [13] [103].
There also exists a plethora of unofficial marketplaces, among which:
• http://www.appbrain.com
• http://www.aptoide.com
• http://www.androiddrawer.com
• http://androidlife.ru
• http://www.anruan.com
• http://www.appsapk.com
• http://android.pandaapp.com
• http://slideme.org
These marketplaces do not require developer registration, however still at-
tracts several users since these markets usually give access to apps that are
not available on the market or distribute free versions of apps that on the Play
store . However, unofficial markets often miss reputation indexes and some-
times there is no control on the quality of the apps, so it is easier to down-
load malicious apps. Related to the market source, in the problem instantiation
we also consider another parameter, namely app that are manually installed,
which happens when the user manually installs the app, e.g. when download-
ing the app apk and installing it through a file manager.
With reference to Table 2.1, we show the relevance of each alternative, for the
three possible values of µ:
• µ = official: we consider that Trusted is moderately more relevant than
Medium-Risk and strongly more relevant than High-Risk;
• µ = unofficial: we consider that High-risk is moderately more relevant than
Trusted and slightly more relevant than Medium-Risk;
• µ = manually installed: we consider that High-Risk is slightly more relevant
than Trusted and Medium-Risk (that are equally relevant).
According to this information, comparison matrices are directly computed.
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Developer (δ). We consider three types of developers: Standard, Top, and Google.
Google rewards the best app developers with a Top Developer badge, which
is reported on each app they publish. Hence, these developers should be con-
sidered strongly trusted since they produce high-quality apps and should not
be interested in lowering their reputation. On Google Play, Google Inc. itself
is considered a Top Developer; however, we consider Google more trusted
than other developers, given the interest that Google has in the well being of
Android users.
All the other developers are considered standard and since the Top Developer
badge is only used on Google Play, all developers of apps coming from unof-
ficial markets have been labelled standard as well. We make this assumption
because the bound between app and developer is not ensured on unofficial
markets.
The comparison matrix for the developer parameter is defined according to
the following analysis:
• δ = Google: we consider that Trusted is extremely more relevant than
Medium-Risk and High-Risk (that are equally relevant);
• δ = Top Developer: we consider that Trusted is very strongly more relevant
than High-Risk and Medium-Risk (that are equally relevant);
• δ = Standard: we consider that the three alternatives are equally relevant.
User Rating (ρ). On several markets, users can rate apps and leave a comment,
which can be shown to other users. Rating is generally expressed as a num-
ber that ranges from 1 to 5 (or it is normalized in this range). We consider
apps with a rate less than 2 as low-quality, for which the Medium-Risk alter-
native is extremely more relevant than the Trusted one. A score higher than
4 means a high-to-very-high quality apps for which the Trusted alternative is
very strongly more relevant than the other two. Intermediate values mean a
neutral comparisons matrix.
Number of Downloads (η). Several markets report the number of downloads for
each app. As an example, the so-called “killer apps”, i.e., extremely popular
apps, have been downloaded from Google Play more than 100 millions of
times. These apps should be considered differently from those downloaded
a lower number of times, e.g., less than 100 times. In fact, apps with a very
high amount of downloads are popular apps already tested by several users
and, usually, more trustworthy. Notice that the number of downloads, though
independent, is needed to contextualize the User Rating criterion. In fact, a
rating of five stars (out of five), given to an app downloaded by a single user,
is practically meaningless. Hence, we define 7 intervals in which the value η
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may fall. For very high values of η, Trusted is extremely relevant. As the value
of η decreases, the relevance gradually turns from Trusted to High-Risk.
Threat Score (σ). For each app, the threat score is computed as explained in Sec-
tion 2.4.1. We define the following intervals:
• σ < 4: trusted is very strongly more relevant than High-Risk and moder-
ately more relevant than Medium-Risk;
• 4 ≤ σ ≤ 7 : High-risk is very strongly more relevant than the other alterna-
tives (that are equally relevant);
• σ > 7: High-Risk is extremely more relevant than Trusted, and Medium-
Risk is strongly more relevant than Trusted.
For marketplaces without download counters and/or rating systems, we define
two additional comparison matrices whose elements are all equal to 1. When using
these matrices to describe a criterion, all the alternatives have the same relevance
for that criterion. Hence, this criterion will not influence the decision. We have
defined 20 comparison matrices, but it is possible to increase their number to
have finer, or customized, granularity for each criterion. Finally, it is worth noting
that the list of proposed criteria is not exhaustive, and the methodology enable the
insertion of other rules to evaluate the alternatives. In the current implementation,
we consider all the criteria as equally relevant.
The classification process of MAETROID is depicted in Figure 2.5, which
shows that apps belong to one of the three classes of the left-hand side of the
picture (safe, unwanted behavior, malware) and are classified using one of the
three indexes of the right-hand side (Trusted, Medium-Risk, High-Risk). The pa-
rameters used to perform the classification are the market reputation, developer
reputation, threat score (computed from the permission list), download number
and user rating.
2.5 A Prototype Implementation of MAETROID
The MAETROID framework has been implemented as an app for Android devices.
The MAETROID app is composed of an activity4 and several services5 running
in background. Whenever a new app is being installed, MAETROID intercepts the
event broadcasted by Android through an intent filter6. Hence, the MAETROID app
4 http://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/Activity.html
5 http://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html
6 http://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters.html
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Figure 2.5: MAETROID Classification Process.
comes in foreground with its activity, showing to the user that the app is being an-
alyzed. In the meanwhile, analysis services retrieve the values of the five criteria
(market, developer reputation, user rating, number of downloads, threat score) for
the app being analyzed. The threat score is computed by parsing the app mani-
fest file, to retrieve the set of requested permissions, and by computing the global
threat score as shown in Section 2.4.1. Note that the evaluation is performed lo-
cally on user-devices whenever a new app is going to be installed. Hence, there
are not scalability issues on the market, since the market is not affected by the
computation or by the threat values.
The market is inferred from the installer of the downloaded app. In fact, as
discussed in Section 2.4, both official and unofficial markets provide an on-device
custom app called “installer”, which is used to browse the marketplace, download,
and install some selected apps. The name of the installer is reported in the mes-
sage which is broadcasted by the OS to communicate the event of a new app
installed on the device. The other criteria, namely user rating, number of down-
loads, and developer reputation are extracted by parsing the HTML code of the
market web page. Upon computing the values for the five criteria, MAETROID
implements AHP through Jama, the Java matrix package for matrix calculi7.
Upon completing the analysis (left screenshot in Figure 2.6), MAETROID re-
turns its decision in the form of a smiley (Figure 2.6, second, third and fourth
screenshots). We have decided to use a simple output decision in the form of a
smiley to make it more user-friendly and understandable also by ordinary users.
If the app is considered High-Risk or Medium-Risk, the user is advised of the po-
tential threat (through a red ‘sad’ smiley or a yellow ‘poker face’ smiley) and asked
if she wants to uninstall such an app. If the user decides to uninstall the app,
7 http://math.nist.gov/javanumerics/jama/
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Figure 2.6: Some Screenshots of the MAETROID App.
MAETROID handles the unistallation process. Otherwise, if MAETROID consid-
ers the app as trusted, the user is invited (through a green ‘happy’ smiley) to run
the installed app. It is worth noting that MAETROID does not block the installa-
tion process, but prevents the app from being started until the analysis outcome is
shown and the user has taken her decision. The fact that the installation process
is not blocked a priori by MAETROID is not harmful. In fact, in Android an app
does not perform any operation (including deploying assets and saving files on the
device) until it is run. Given that users follow the MAETROID advise, a dangerous
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app can neither harm the user nor the device, since apps can be opened only after
that users trigger the app start from the launcher app.
It is worth noting that the app classification is performed directly on the device
by the MAETROID app. This approach has the following advantages:
• MAETROID is not affected by scalability issues, since it is not necessary to
classify “a priori" all the existing Android apps, building a centralized database
which would need continuous update and maintenance;
• app updates automatically trigger a reclassification process as soon as the up-
dated version is downloaded. Thus, if the classification result changes because
the updated version asks for more permissions, the new version will not be run
on the device, given that the user follows the MAETROID decision.
The sequence of steps of the MAETROID analysis process are depicted in
Figure 2.7.
Step 1: a new app is downloaded locally from the marketplace;
Step 2: the user decides to perform the app installation;
Step 3: the installation process is hijacked (and paused) by the MAETROID app
(which is installed on the user device);
Step 4: MAETROID retrieves the metadata used to perform the classification, lo-
cally from the app manifest file and remotely from the marketplace;
Step 5: MAETROID exploits the retrieved metadata to apply the AHP classifica-
tion locally on the device;
Step 6: the decision is shown to the user, in form of a smiley;
Step 7: the user decides whether to continue the installation or remove the app,
based on the output of the classification.
2.5.1 Classification Results
To test the ability of MAETROID in detecting potentially malicious Android apps
and classifying the risk of Android apps, we have conducted two set of experi-
ments, one on a large set of applications coming from known databases and one
on a smaller set of apps manually analyzed. In the first set we have used the classi-
fication algorithm of MAETROID to classify a dataset of 11,046 apps. This dataset
is composed of 9,804 apps selected from the official market Google Play, while the
remaining 1,242 apps come from the database of known malware Genome[136].
To extract the meta-data of the Google Play apps, we have built a crawler to re-
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Figure 2.7: Overview of the Steps in MAETROID Process
trieve the rating, download number and permissions set starting from an existing
database 8.
The classification results are shown in Fig. 2.8 and also reported in Table 2.4
for the sake of clarity. As shown, malicious apps of the Genome database have
all been classified as risky from MAETROID. More precisely 85% of the malicious
apps of Genome have been classified as High-Risk and the remaining 15% as
Medium-Risk. None of the apps from Genome have been classified as Trusted.
We have used the apps from Google Play as a control set. We can see that the
greatest share of Play apps (77,37%) have been classified as Trusted, while 22,4%
have been classified as Medium-Risk and only 0,23% with High-Risk. It is worth
noting that in these tests there is no knowledge beforehand whether the apps com-
ing from Google Play are really secure or infected by malware, but the classification
on the control set is plausible. In fact, the classification results show that more than
75% of the apps from Google Play do not represent a threat to security, while about
22% of the apps show some criticalities, usually due to a low number or down-
load, and only a very small number of apps represent a potential threat to security,
mainly due to the set of dangerous permission they ask. Additional details on this
set of experiments, i.e. links to the tested apps and their metadata, can be retrieved
at http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~dsgandur/maetroid/app_list_final.xlsx.
8 https://github.com/MarcelloLins/GooglePlayAppsCrawler
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Figure 2.8: Classification Results on 11,046 Apps
Table 2.4: Classification Results on 11,046 Apps.
Trusted High Risk Medium Risk
Google Play 7586 22 2196
Genome 0 1064 178
In the second set of experiments we have verified the classification accuracy
of MAETROID, by measuring both its precision and recall (i.e., the overall classi-
fication error). The testbed dataset does not overlap with the previous one and is
composed of 180 Android apps, which are known in advance to be:
• Safe Apps: those apps that behave correctly both from the security and func-
tional point of view. This class is further divided in two subclasses: Official and
Unofficial, stating, respectively, whether the app has been downloaded from
Google Play or not. Good Apps are correctly classified by MAETROID if its
output is “trusted" (green “happy” smiley);
• Apps with Unwanted Behavior : the app permissions given to these apps may
be used to cause potentially unwanted behavior, such as with Adware. These
apps are correctly classified by MAETROID if its output is “Medium-Risk" (yel-
low “poker face” smiley);
• Malicious Apps: those apps infected by a malware. Malicious Apps are cor-
rectly classified by MAETROID if its output is “High-Risk" (red “sad” smiley).
In more details, the test-set consists of 180 manually vetted apps, of which
90 come from Google Play, 50 from unofficial markets, and 40 are downloaded
from Websites that are different from marketplaces (these apps are denoted here-
after with “manually installed"). Among all these 180 apps, 40 are infected by well-
known malware. Apps belong to different categories: augmented reality, books and
news, communication, desktop manager, entertainment, file managers, game, so-
41
CHAPTER 2. RISK ANALYSIS OF ANDROID APPLICATIONS: A
MULTI-CRITERIA AND USABLE APPROACH
cial and utility, and anti-virus. The app user rating ranges over [1, 5], the number of
downloads ranges over [0, 10M+], and the apps were produced either by standard
developers, or by Top Developers, or by Google.
The MAETROID outcome over the test-set is reported in Figure 2.9, where
the x-axis shows the three possible outcomes of MAETROID (Trusted, High-Risk,
Medium-Risk), while the y-axis shows the number of apps classified per outcome.
The light-green color represents safe apps (in dark green the ones coming from
unofficial markets), the red color represents apps infected with malware, whilst vio-
let (vertical lines pattern) represents apps with unwanted behavior. All the infected
apps have been correctly recognized by AHP as High-Risk. It is worth noting that
some good apps also fall in this class. These apps come from unofficial markets
(labelled as “Good Apps (Unoff.)” in Figure 2.9). Since no user rating is available
for these apps, MAETROID applies a safe approach by considering them as High-
Risk, at least initially. However, as soon as new information become available for
these apps [58], they will eventually be classified as trusted ones. All the apps
coming from Google Play have been classified either as trusted or Medium-Risk
based upon the user rating, threat score, and number of downloads. All the apps
with unwanted behavior coming from Google Play have been correctly considered
as Medium-Risk. These apps do not work as expected or they crash upon starting.
An example of this class of apps is the game Avoid the Ghosts9, which is a re-
production of the classic Pac Man game. The app does not work correctly: in fact,
when the app starts, it is impossible to control the Pac Man movements. The app
has been found on the official market, but it has been downloaded few times and
it received bad ratings. However, Avoid the Ghosts does not require dangerous
permissions and, hence, it is considered Medium-Risk by MAETROID rather than
High-Risk.
To better understand the functionalities of MAETROID, in the following we show
the classification process for two popular apps, namely Angry Birds Space and
Skype.
Classification Example 1: Angry Birds Space
The values of the five criteria in input to MAETROID are shown in Table 2.5. The
app developer is a Top Developer. The app has been downloaded by more than
10 millions of users, receiving a global rating of 4.7. Furthermore, it comes from
the official market Google Play and it has a low threat score (2.7).
9 The app was available on Google Play at time of experimentation, while at time of writing
it was not available anymore.
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Figure 2.9: Classification Results on Validation Set
Table 2.5: Parameters of Angry Birds Space
σ ρ µ δ η
2.7 4.7 Google Play Top Developer 10M+
Table 2.6 shows the matrix used to compare the three alternatives with respect
to the “App Developer" criterion for this app. Top Developers generally produce
high quality apps and they are not likely to publish malicious apps. Following this
intuition, we assigned the following pairwise relevances to the alternatives: trusted
is very strongly favorite with respect to Medium-Risk and strongly favorite with
respect to High-Risk. Trusted (green “happy” smiley) obtains the highest priority
(0.7) compared to the other two alternatives.
Table 2.6: Comparison Matrix for Top Developer for Angry Birds Space
Top Developer Trusted
High
Risk
Medium
Risk
Local
Priorities
Trusted 1 4 7 0.7
High-Risk 14 1 4 0.23
Medium-Risk 17
1
4 1 0.07
Using Equation (2.1), MAETROID merges the local priorities for criterion “de-
veloper" with the ones coming from the comparison matrices of the other four
criteria, to finally obtain the global priorities [0.7, 0.16, 0.14]. The three values rep-
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resent the priorities for the three alternatives, respectively Trusted, High-Risk, and
Medium-Risk. Trusted is the alternative with the highest value and, thus, it is also
the result of the MAETROID classification for that app.
On the contrary, when MAETROID analyzes a version of Angry Birds Space
found on a database of infected apps it outputs High-Risk as the highest priority.
This app has been found in the past to be infected by the malware Geinimi [130].
The malware steals information concerning both the user and the device, which
are sent via SMS to a number controlled by the attacker. To perform these further
operations, the malware asks for several other permissions (Figure 2.10), leading
to a threat score equal to 7.3. This high value for the threat score correctly drives
AHP towards the High-Risk outcome.
Figure 2.10: Permissions Declared by Angry Bird Space Trojanized by Geinimi.
Classification Example 2: Skype
Skype is a popular software used for VoIP and free chat and its mobile version
has earned a positive outcome, since it enables phone calls with smartphones,
using the data connection instead of traditional (and more expensive) landline and
cellular calls connections. To work properly, the Android version of Skype requires
a large number of permissions. Computing the global threat score by means of
Equation (2.2), Skype gets a score of 6.8. Skype is an example of a high-threat
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app. In our analysis, we have considered two Skype versions, one from the official
market the other one from an unofficial market, as reported in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Two Skype Versions
Name σ ρ µ δ η
Skype 1 6.8 3.8 Google Play
Standard
Developer
10M+
Skype 2 6.8 4 Unofficial
Standard
Developer
N.A.
MAETROID computes the global priorities vector [0.47, 0.4, 0.13] on the Skype
version coming from the official market. These results slightly favor the trusted al-
ternative (green “happy” smiley). Both the marketplace and the large number of
downloads increase the trustworthiness of this app, even if it has a high threat
score. For the Skype version downloaded from the unofficial market, which does
not even provide a download counter, the global priorities are very different from
the previous ones: [0.29, 0.52, 0.19] and the app is labeled as High-Risk (red “sad”
smiley). Even if the two versions require the same set of permissions, it is possible
that their source codes are different (possibly malicious). Since more than 10 mil-
lions of users have downloaded the version from the official market, it is strongly
unlikely that malicious behaviors have not been noticed and reported, forcing the
app removal from the market.
2.6 Evaluation of MAETROID Effectiveness: User Expectation
and Acceptance
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of the MAETROID approach in con-
veying its decision, by analyzing the users’ response to the trustworthiness in-
dex. In particular, we have created a survey with a list of questions related to
the security of Android apps. The survey also contains questions to evaluate
the usefulness of MAETROID, i.e., how the MAETROID outcome influences the
user’s decision (whether to install an app or not). The structure of the survey
is available both in 2.9 and online at http://icaremobile.iit.cnr.it/survey/
mobilesecuritysurvey.htm.
The survey consists of twelve multiple-choice questions which are understand-
able by average mobile device users. The survey has been made available both
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online and physically, at a public event about Internet technology10. During the
period of observation, in October 2013, we have collected 189 responses, by sub-
jects with different age, background, and technical expertise. The subjects have
not been formerly instructed about the survey content.
In the following, we present the survey structure and analyze the answers.
2.6.1 Subjects Set
The first four questions of the survey aim at assessing the variety of the sample. In
Table 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, we report, respectively. the distribution of age, background,
of the subjects. Most of the subjects, as shown in the Table 2.8, range over 18
to 45 years. One third of the subjects are students, 55% are workers, and 17%
answer “other" or nothing.
Table 2.8: Age of Respondants.
Age % of Respondants
< 18 3.17%
18− 25 23.28%
26− 35 38.90%
36− 45 19.04%
> 45 15.87%
No answer 0.52%
Table 2.9: Gender of Respondants.
Gender % of Respondants
Female 32.2%
Male 66.6%
No answer 1.05%
We have also asked the users to specify their mobile OS. Figure. 2.11 shows
the percentage of market share of mobile OSes among the subjects. As shown,
60% of the subjects use an Android-based mobile device, while the 30% of them
10 http://www.internetfestival.it/
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Table 2.10: Occupation of Respondants.
Occupation % of Respondants
Student 29.10%
Worker 54.50%
Other 15.34%
No answer 0.52%
use iOS (other OSs are used by the remaining subjects). These shares are in line
with statistical results by a recent market analysis in [7].
Figure 2.11: Platform Shares
2.6.2 Security Understanding
Questions 5, 6, and 7 are related to subjects’ concerns on security threats on
mobile devices. In particular, these questions aim at verifying how much the aver-
age user is aware of the existence of security threats against their mobile devices,
e.g., coming from the installation of non secure apps. Also, the subjects are asked
about existing security countermeasures (e.g., anti-virus) and their trust towards
them.
Question 5 presents a list of security threats and asks the subject to select
those threats that are perceived as the most dangerous. Subjects are allowed to
choose from none to all of the presented options. The questions and percentage of
subjects that selected the corresponding option is shown in Table 2.11. As shown
in the Table, about 50% of the subjects is concerned about the theft of their phys-
ical device and attacks to their private data, whilst 40% of the subjects are aware
about the possibility of installing malicious software on their mobile devices. These
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Table 2.11: Security Concerns of Respondants.
Security Concerns % of Respondants
Smartphone theft 50.80%
Identity theft (e.g., Facebook credentials) 33.33%
Credit card data theft 27.51%
Installing Malware (e.g., virus, etc) 35.98%
Attacks to privacy (location tracking) 44.44%
Other 9.52%
None 3.70%
results show that most of the subjects have basic understandings about security
problems. It is worth noting that there is a relevant percentage of subjects (about
10%) that are not concerned about security at all. However, according to results,
average users are worried about mobile security issues.
Question 6 asks the subjects what security mechanisms and practices they use
to protect their mobile devices. Subjects are allowed to select any of the presented
options. The questions and percentage of subjects that selected the corresponding
option is shown in Table 2.12. As shown in the Table, most of the subjects protect
their SIM card through a PIN. A large percentage of users also protect their phone
and data through backups and OS update. Several subjects deactivate GPS when
not used, but it is possible that most of them are driven by the high battery con-
sumption, rather than by a privacy concern. About one third of users check the
app permission list when installing the app. This shows that most of the users (i.e.
2/3) is not concerned at all about the possible risks due to apps asking too many
permissions. As we have already discussed, this is because permission list is too
difficult to understand for users. Hence, a simple and understandable index as the
one proposed by MAETROID is needed. Finally, only a low percentage of subjects
(15.87%) has an anti-virus installed on their devices.
Question 7 presents to subjects a list of security features and asks to select
those that they would consider useful for their devices. The questions and percent-
age of subjects that selected the corresponding option is shown Table. 2.13. As
shown in the Table, the most required feature is the anti-theft functionality, which is
able to lock and/or locate a stolen device. This result is sound with the one of Ques-
tion 5, stating that users are afraid of having their device physically stolen. Inter-
estingly, the subjects have shown a keen interested in other two security features,
namely a classifier of apps (39.15% of preferences), in terms of their hazardous-
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Table 2.12: Adopted Security Features and Practices of Respondants.
Adopted Security Feature % of Respondants
USIM PIN protection 56.08%
Lock screen with password/sequence/PIN 33.33%
Disable GPS when not used 44.33%
Constantly update OS and apps 41.27%
Check permissions required by apps at install time 34.39%
Disable WiFi connection in public places 10.05%
Use anti-virus or secure apps (e.g., to encrypt private data) 15.87%
Backup personal data 31.75%
Other 4.76%
None 10.58%
ness, and the availability of feedback on the app behavior (40.21% of preferences).
We want to underline that MAETROID provides both these features.
Table 2.13: Requested Security Features by Respondants.
Requested Security Feature Respondants (%)
Disable applications 24.33%
SMS blocker 22.22%
Call blocker 20.11%
Anti-theft features (e.g., remotely block a stolen smartphone) 60.85%
Classification of an application hazardousness before installing it 39.15%
Do not install applications from unofficial markets 19.05%
Anti-virus 35.98%
Personal data encryption with a password 32.80%
Send of SMS to secure number in case of anomalous event 40.21%
Block adult content 8.47%
Hide GPS positions to some apps 35%
Secure/anonymous browser 31.75%
Data Backup 33.33%
Disable permissions given to apps 27.51%
Feedback on bad app behavior 40.21%
Other 0.53%
None 5.30%
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With question 8, subjects are asked to specify the level of importance that they
give to some parameters when evaluating the risk of installing an Android app. In
this question, the subject is asked to choose a value of importance, ranging from
1 (very low importance) to 5 (very high importance), for each index. Namely, these
indexes are:
• the number of permissions;
• the number of downloads;
• the app rating;
• the app popularity;
• and marketplace.
It is worth noting that these indexes reflect the criteria used in MAETROID to eval-
uate the trustworthiness of apps. This question has been inserted in the survey to
evaluate how much people consider such criteria relevant for defining the app risk.
Figure 2.12 reports the perceived levels of importance for each index. The bars
concerning the market index shows that this criterion is perceived as highly impor-
tant for a large number of subjects (30%). However, almost the same number of
subjects (28%) consider the market as a criterion with a very low importance. Quite
obviously, the latter are exposed to a high risk of downloading malicious apps. The
user rating criterion is considered important by most of the subjects. In fact, only
20% of subjects give this criterion a limited importance (i.e, option “very low” or
“low”). On the other hand, only 24% of subjects consider permissions as an im-
portant criterion. Instead, 25% of the subjects give no importance to permissions
when deciding whether or not to install an app. Popularity and number of down-
loads are considered from moderately important (medium) to highly important by
most of the subjects. Summarizing these results, on average, the importance given
to the five criteria is comparable with the relevance we have assigned to the same
criteria in the AHP instantiation presented in Section 2.4. The only exception is
the user rating criterion that is considered slightly more important by the users,
and the permissions index that is consider less important than the other criteria.
Although the user rating criterion is an index perceived as very important by inter-
viewed people, it has two major problems when adopted as the main evaluation
criterion. Firstly, its meaning need to be coupled with both the total number of rat-
ings and with the aggregator metric used to compute the global rating [84]. For
example, a single, very positive rating, which can also be assigned by the devel-
oper himself, does not imply a good quality of the app. A second shortcoming
is that, as discussed in Section 2.4, several markets do not include user ratings.
These results suggest that users have not a clear understanding of which parame-
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ters are more relevant when deciding whether to install or not an app based on the
perceived risk. As such, we believe that MAETROID, which incorporates a more
careful selection of weights for the indexes, help users in taking a more informed
decision.
Figure 2.12: Importance of the Evaluation Indexes for the Respondants
2.6.3 Selection of apps
In the last two questions, the survey shows a list of apps with different features,
asking which apps the subjects would like to install on their (brand-new) mobile
devices. For each app, the survey includes a screenshot of the market that shows
the set of requested permission and available criteria (the market name, the de-
veloper, and the user rating, when applicable.). The apps included in the survey
provide basic features to a mobile device. Each app has three further parameters:
• very popular or unpopular,
• free or premium versions,
• from official or unofficial markets.
The rationale of this question is to understand whether users prefer a free,
even if unknown and, hence, potentially harmful app, versus a popular but not
free one. The two apps Angry Birds Space Premium Unofficial Free and
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Ruzzle Unofficial Free are the trojanized versions of two popular games.
These are infected by the trojan GEINIMI, which exploits text messages to reg-
ister to premium services.
The question has two variants: the first one (question 11), without an index
helping the users to make an informed decision, while the second one (question
12) also shows the MAETROID classification result represented by a coloured smi-
ley (see Sect. 2.5). As shown in the results of Table 2.14, a consistent percentage
of subjects choose the free (and Trojanized) version of the games, instead of the
versions coming from the official market. This happens even if the permission list
of such trojanized versions declares some anomalous permissions, like SEND_SMS,
and a large subset of the interviewed users would install such bad apps (probably,
this happens just because they are free). Comparing the second column of Ta-
ble 2.14 with the first one, we notice that now less subjects are willing to install the
trojanized apps, after knowing the MAETROID decision (10%). In fact, 90% of the
subjects prefer not to install the trojanized apps after having seen the MAETROID
classification result. It is worth also noting that users prefer not to install that app
even from the official markets.
Table 2.14: Subjects Willing to Install Apps (Questions 11 and 12).
App
% of Respondants
Before MAETROID
Decision
% of Respondants
After MAETROID
Decision
Whatsapp (Play) Free 77.25% 80.42%
Skype Whatsapp (Play) Free 77.7% 57.67%
Angry Birds Space Premium (Play) 0,89 e 11.11% 11.11%
Angry Birds Space Premium (Unofficial) Free 14.29% 4.23%
Monkey Jump 2 (Unofficial) Free 1.06% 1.06%
Viber (Play) Free 39.68% 40.74%
WeChat (Play) Free 11.11% 6.35%
Candy Zuma (Unofficial) Free 4.76% 0.53%
Ruzzle (Play) 2,50 e 12.17% 13.22%
Ruzzle (Unofficial) Free 17.99% 5.82%
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2.7 Discussion
MAETROID is an app that helps users understand the risk level of downloaded
apps, i.e. if they have potential security and privacy risks. Several factors con-
tribute to make an app likely dangerous. The most relevant is the requested set of
permissions, which effectively gives the app the “power” to invoke critical functions
and access critical resources. This, per se, cannot be the only parameter used to
decide whether an app is risky or not. In fact, genuine apps may request these
permissions to legally access, for example, the contact detail (as a contact man-
ager), or to send SMSs (as a customized text manager), and so on. Obviously,
if these permissions were dangerous regardless of the apps, then Android would
remove the possibility of using them. Hence, other criteria are relevant, such as
the marketplace (an official market has usually a pre-filtering step to remove some
malicious or repackaged apps), the developers (the most important ones do not
want to risk their reputation), the user ratings and the number of downloads (which
are an indicator of the app “goodness”).
MAETROID is shipped as a custom app to run on the user-device. Whenever
a new app is downloaded, the installation process is paused to run the classifi-
cation process locally. Then, MAETROID gives the user a user-friendly decision
about the app risk level. Then, it is up to the user to decide whether the installation
needs to be resumed. We have to point out that MAETROID is not an anti-virus nor
an intrusion detection system. MAETROID focuses on elements which are visible
to every users, i.e. permissions, market and app popularity, by evaluating them
and then generating a single decision, easy to understand. Furthermore, it does
not analyze the app’s code. On the contrary, anti-virus solutions base their deci-
sion by looking statically for known bad signatures inside the app’s code (black-list
approach). Other approaches, such as anomaly intrusion detection systems, look
for anomaly patterns at run-time. For these reasons, we see MAETROID as an
orthogonal approach to these solutions. In particular, MAETROID can be the first
line of defense in deciding whether an app may be potentially dangerous. As an
example, if an app is classified as Medium-Risk (yellow face), one can decide to
run it in a sand-boxed environment under control of an IDS.
The analysis of MAETROID, as already discussed in the former sections, is
performed at deploy time and no further checks are performed after the user ac-
cepts the decision. In particular, MAETROID does not enforce security at run-time,
to not impose any overhead on the apps execution. Thus, MAETROID strongly dif-
fers, by design choice, from security frameworks like MOCANA [16] or Samsung
Knox [39] which are designed for “high-security government or military deploy-
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ment”, enforcing security from the hardware to app level through trusted storage
for remote attestation and a dedicated market where only vetted apps are pub-
lished. Furthermore, the configuration of these systems are usually centralized
and implemented by expert administrators. The MAETROID solution is, on the
other hand, designed for a wider set of users, not requiring dedicated hardware
nor customized OS, and with little (or none) knowledge of security.
As discussed in Section 2.4, in our analysis we first assigned to all the five
criteria the same priority (0.2). After elaborating the answers to question 8 of the
survey, we have re-classified all the 180 apps discussed in Section 2.4, assigning
different priorities to each of the criteria, namely by ranking them based on the
user’s perception of importance. More precisely, we considered the “user rating"
criterion two times more important than the other criteria and we reduced the im-
portance of the “permission" criterion by half of its value. The new classification of
the apps yielded slightly worse results than the one obtained in our first analysis,
i.e. with apps more app being misclassified. This is due to the fact that by reduc-
ing the importance of permissions there are more chances of installing malicious
apps. MAETROID coalesces in a single and easy-to-understand decision index
five criteria that describes the security and quality of an Android app. This trust-
worthiness index could be significant for yielding better advices to the users than
the permission system currently adopted by Android devices, as the first results
of our survey-based investigation indicate. In fact, as shown by the comparison of
the answers to questions 11 and 12, several subjects changed their mind when
installing malicious apps after using MAETROID. Those apps that have been clas-
sified by MAETROID as highly-dangerous have been selected by less than the
0.5% of the subjects. The number of users willing to install dangerous apps has
noticeably decreased after the MAETROID classification results, in particular by
66% for Angry Birds Space Premium Unofficial and Ruzzle Unofficial,
and by 90% for Candy Zuma Unofficial, respectively. For apps classified as
Medium-Risk, such as Skype, a significant percentage subjects are not willing
to install the app anymore (25% less than before). These results are encouraging,
since they indicate that MAETROID is effective in driving the correct decision when
installing a new app.
One limitation of the MAETROID approach is that it uses a single index for
evaluation, with three possible values only, and this might somehow be too coarse-
grained in some situations. As an example, the vast majority of apps found on
official market, such as Google Play, are classified as trusted. This is because it
rarely happens that malicious apps are hosted on official markets. However, one
could argue that even if safe, these apps sometime requires a too large set of
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permissions and should be penalized. Further, advanced users would like to know
more about the threats for each of the MAETROID categories (financial, privacy
and system), which is not represented by the final output. The first issue can be
easily taken into account by penalizing apps that requires a large number of per-
missions regardless of the market, developer or the number of download. As we
have already detailed, the parameters, such as the weight given to each criteria,
can be customized by the users. Regarding the second issue, one future develop-
ment concerns the addition of some further explanations to the final decision, e.g.
in the form of an optional tab that the user can open to understand in detail the
final decision.
Concerning the results of the classification, we have to say that weights (i.e.,
the importance) of the parameters can be customized as to have more granular
results with respect to the user’s expectation. As an example, one can decide to
give more importance to the developer rather than to the market, if the user always
downloads from official markets. Further, if a particular user is really concerned
about the privacy, the matrix weights can be biased towards giving a higher threat
score whenever an app includes more privacy-risky permissions. To summarize
the results of the survey, we can conclude that subjects are aware of the security
threats brought by malicious mobile apps. However, the current Android alerting
system, which consists of showing to the user the list of permissions requested
by an app before installing it, seems to fail to be effective. As highlighted by the
answers to the survey, several subjects gave to permissions a limited importance
and they base their decision (either to install an app or not) on non security-related
criteria, such as the number of downloads and the user rating, which we have
shown no to be relevant.
2.8 Conclusions
Protecting users from dangerous apps is a compelling issue. Though the main
mobile OSes have already introduced some security mechanisms for device and
user protection, they still present several usability-related flaws. The results of the
survey we have conducted show that users have a realistic view of mobile security
threats and are willing to protect their devices. However, users are often tricked in
installing malicious apps looking as genuine, since users seem to consider the app
popularity and user rating more important than, e.g., the declared permissions. To
this end we have developed MAETROID, a multi-criteria decision framework for the
analysis of Android apps. MAETROID has been exploited to classify more than
11,000 Android apps, coming from Google Play and from a database of known
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malware. In our experiments, the trustworthiness index of MAETROID has proved
to be able to drive correct decisions on whether to install dangerous apps.
We believe that the introduction of a simple index, as the one produced by
MAETROID, may improve the overall mobile device security and user awareness.
In fact, suspicious apps could be identified and further analyzed, before being ex-
ecuted by users. Moreover, the presence of the threat score could be an incentive
for developers to accurately choose the permissions needed by their apps, effec-
tively tackling also the permission overdeclaration issue. MAETROID comes as an
Android app which enforces security without imposing overhead to the user, since
it becomes active only when installing a new app.
2.9 Survey Structure
Survey on security for mobile devices. Welcome to the survey on security for mo-
bile devices!
This survery helps users understanding their awaireness of how to securely
use their smartphones.
There are 12 questions in this survey.
1. Age of user.
Please choose only one of the following:
• < 18
• 18− 25
• 26− 35
• 36− 45
• > 45
2. Gender.
Please choose only one of the following:
• Female
• Male
3. Occupation status.
Please choose only one of the following:
• Student
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• Worker
• Other
4. What kind of smartphone do you use?
Please choose all that apply:
• Android
• iPhone
• 8 Windows 8
• No one
• Other
5. What are the threats for smartphones you fear most?
Please choose all that apply:
• Theft of Smartphone
• Identity Theft (eg., Facebook credentials saved on the Smarpthone)
• Theft of credit card data
• Anonymous calls / stalking
• Installing malware (e.g virus, etc)
• Attacks to user privacy (access to personal images from unauthorized peo-
ple, position tracking)
• None
• Other
6. Which of the following basic security functionalities do you use to protect your
Smartphone?
Please choose all that apply:
• PIN to protect calling card
• Lock screen with password/sequence/PIN
• Disable GPS when not used
• Constant update of operating system and apps
• Check permissions required by apps at install time
• Not use wireless in public places
• Use of Anti-virus or secure apps (e.g., to encrypt private data)
• Backup of personal data
• None
• Other
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7. Which of the following features would you like to see in a security app?
Please choose all that apply:
• Disable applications
• SMS blocker
• Call blocker
• Anti-theft features (e.g, remotely block a stolen smartphone)
• Classification of an application hazardousness before installing it
• Do not install applications from unofficial markets
• Anti-virus
• Personal data encryption with a password
• Send of SMS to secure number in case of anomalous events (e.g change
of SIM, settings)
• Block adult contents
• Hide GPS positions to some apps
• Secure/anonymous browser
• Data Backup
• Disable permissions given to apps
• Feedback on bad application behavior (leaking user money, battery deple-
tion, download of apps in background, etc)
• None
• Other
8. How much each of the following item is critical when deciding whether to install
or not an application (1 little, 5 very much) ?
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
• Market: 1 2 3 4 5
• User ratings: 1 2 3 4 5
• Few permissions: 1 2 3 4 5
• Number of download: 1 2 3 4 5
• Popular application: 1 2 3 4 5
9. Would you use an application that, automatically, rates the degree of haz-
ardousness of an application you are going to install?
Please choose only one of the following:
• No
• Yes, with a score between 1 (harmless) and 10 (dangerous)
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• Yes, with a traffic light: red (harmless) / yellow (suspicious) / red (danger-
ous)
• Yes, with a smiley: smile (harmless) / “poker face” (suspicious) / sad (dan-
gerous)
• Other
10. The score on WhatsApp degree of hazardousness downloaded fron an UN-
OFFICIAL market shows a red light (sad smiley): what are you going to do?
Please choose all that apply:
• I’m not going to install it and I quit
• I’m going to search it in another market
• I’m going to install it because it’s very popular
• Other
11. Which of the following applications would you install on a brand new Smart-
phone?
Please choose all that apply:
• Whatsapp (Google Play) Free
• Skype (Google Play) Free
• Angry Birds Space Premium (Google Play) 0,89e
• Angry Birds Space Premium (Unofficial) Free
• Monkey Jump 2 (Unofficial) Free
• Viber (Google Play) Free
• WeChat (Google Play) Free
• Candy Zuma (Unofficial) Free
• Ruzzle (Google Play) 2,50e
• Ruzzle (Unofficial) Free
12. If you also had a score on the hazardousness of an application using a smiley,
which of the following applications would you install on a brand new Smart-
phone?
Please choose all that apply:
• Whatsapp (Google Play) Free
• Skype (Google Play) Free
• Angry Birds Space Premium (Google Play) 0,89e
• Angry Birds Space Premium (Unofficial) Free
• Monkey Jump 2 (Unofficial) Free
• Viber (Google Play) Free
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• WeChat (Google Play) Free
• Candy Zuma (Unofficial) Free
• Ruzzle (Google Play) 2,50e
• Ruzzle (Unofficial) Free
2.10 Excerpt of Analyzed Android Permissions
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Table 2.15: Partial list of Android Permissions and Associated Threat Levels, per
Index
Permission Class PT ST FT
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Dangerous 0.4 0 0
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Dangerous 0.8 0 0
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS Normal 0.2 0 0
android.permission.ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION Normal 0 0.4 0
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Normal 0.2 0 0.4
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Normal 0 0 0.4
android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS Dangerous 0.6 0 0
android.permission.BATTERY_STATS Normal 0 0.2 0
android.permission.BLUETOOTH Dangerous 0.6 0.2 0
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN Dangerous 0.8 0.6 0
android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY Normal 0 0.2 0
android.permission.CALL_PHONE Dangerous 0.6 0.2 1
android.permission.CAMERA Dangerous 0.8 0.6 0
android.permission.CHANGE_CONFIGURATION Dangerous 0 0.4 0
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE Dangerous 0.2 0.6 0.6
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE Dangerous 0 0.2 0.2
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Dangerous 0 0.6 0.6
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE Dangerous 0 0.2 0
android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS Dangerous 0.8 0.6 0.2
android.permission.READ_CALENDAR Dangerous 0.8 0 0
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS Dangerous 1 0 0
android.permission.READ_SMS Dangerous 1 0 0
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Normal 0.2 0.4 0
android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS Dangerous 1 0 0.8
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS Dangerous 1 0 0.8
android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH Dangerous 0.4 0.6 0.6
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO Dangerous 0.8 0.6 0
android.permission.REORDER_TASKS Dangerous 0.4 0.2 0.4
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES Normal 0 0.2 0
android.permission.SEND_SMS Dangerous 0.8 0.2 1
android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR Dangerous 0.8 0.2 0
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS Dangerous 0.6 0.6 0
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Dangerous 0.2 0.6 0
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Dangerous 0.4 0.2 0
android.permission.WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM Dangerous 0.6 0 0
android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS Dangerous 0 0.4 0
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3Detection of Repackaged Mobile Applications
through a Collaborative Approach
3.1 Introduction
The large diffusion of smartphones and tablets experienced in the last years has
drastically changed the paradigm of application distribution. Currently, applications
for mobile devices (apps, for short) are distributed through online marketplaces,
such as Google Play or App Store. These marketplaces act as an hub where
app developers publish their own products, which can be bought or downloaded
for free by users. Usually, official market charge users for these apps, while sev-
eral unofficial marketplaces distribute their own apps free of charge. In particular,
with unofficial markets users can simply download the app file and install it later
without adhering to the official installation steps. In this last case, trust is at risk,
since there is no centralized control and it may happen that untrusted developers
distribute malicious apps. This issue is particularly serious for Android – which
represents the framework of reference for our study – as it is both the most popu-
lar operating system for mobile devices and the system with the greatest share of
malware in the last years [5]. In particular, Android accounts for 97% of all mobile
malware in 2013. The number of new malware is pretty scary: on average, every
day more than 160,000 new specimens are reported [9]. Moreover, recently, re-
searchers [123] have found that a quarter of all Google Play free apps are clones,
i.e., repackaged apps of popular apps such as WhatsApp and Angry Birds.
The vast majority of mobile malware is Trojan, which comes in the form of
trojanized app [89]. These apps look like genuine ones, but they run malicious
code in the background. Typical misbehaviors of these apps include private data
leakage, user position tracking, stealthy outgoing of SMS messages and forced
subscription to premium services. Trojan related to SMS and subscription to pre-
mium services are extremely common and constitute a Trojan class named SMS
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Trojan, which accounts for almost 83% of the total Trojan malware. These mali-
cious apps send SMS messages, which by itself is a cost for the user, who will
not even notice this misbehavior, since in Android devices SMS sent by apps are
not stored in the outbox [54]. Moreover, SMS trojans often send SMS messages
used to subscribe the user to premium services. These services charge the user
periodically for services, generally multimedia contents, sent via SMS or MMS.
However, SMS trojans intercept the action of incoming messages and if they are
from a white-list of premium numbers, then they are dropped without notifying the
user. Only after a substantial amount of money has been leaked in this way, it is
likely that the user notices the misbehavior.
Diffusion of malicious apps is a serious issue. In general, it is well-known that
they can be easily distributed through unofficial markets, which are known to be
non-secure. However, malicious apps have been also found in the Google Play
store. Furthermore, extremely popular apps have been distributed also through
uncontrolled channels, like simple Web pages, which thus represent the best target
for developers of malicious apps. An example is given by the case of the Flappy
Bird app. This extremely widespread app has been recently removed from the
official market for reasons that are not related to security, but it is still possible to
get it through other channels. Currently a considerable share of the Flappy Bird
app available online are trojanized [11].
Since it is hard for a user to detect misbehaviors due to hidden malicious code,
it is worth adopting ad-hoc, automatic, control mechanisms. Android includes se-
curity mechanisms to protect the device and its user from malicious apps. In par-
ticular, the Android permission system provides an access control mechanism for
all the resources and critical operations on the device. However, the effectiveness
of this system is limited against trojanized apps. The main reason is that permis-
sions are too coarse-grained to express effective security policies [21], while users
may find hard to understand the security threat brought by apps by simply reading
its permission list [71].
In this paper, which is a revised and extended version of a work presented
at CTS 2013 [17], we present PICARD (ProbabIlistic Contracts on AndRoiD), a
probabilistic contract-based intrusion detection system to recognize and block the
misbehaviors performed by trojanized apps on Android devices. PICARD is a col-
laborative framework based on probabilistic contracts generated from the execu-
tion traces collected by a network of collaborative users. A contract is a document
that describes the expected behavior of an app. A version α of an app executed by
the user is compliant with the contract γ related to the app, denoted α |= γ, when
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all the sequences of actions effectively performed by the app are included in the
contract.
A contract can be defined using information that can be computed either stat-
ically or dynamically. In the static approach, the contract can be built by learning
some properties from, e.g., the source code. However, it may be difficult to know
in advance some properties of the code, such as the behavior of the app depend-
ing on specific inputs or interactions. Moreover, static approaches are based on
the availability of the app source code, which is seldom distributed by the app de-
velopers. In the dynamic approach, a contract can be defined by exploiting the
information learned from app’s execution, which is monitored at run-time to extract
its behavior. Our methodology focuses on the dynamic approach, as it is more suit-
able to represent apps whose behavior depends on user inputs. Contracts defined
by using dynamically-generated execution traces can also include quantitative in-
formation deriving from the direct observation of the app behavior. In particular,
such information can be obtained by analyzing the occurrences of any execution
trace. As we will see, by enriching the contract with specific information about the
frequency with which every behavior is expected to be observed, it is possible to
approximate probabilistically the relation α |= γ. More specifically, since both γ
and α include quantitative information, intuitively the idea is to verify whether α is
approximately compliant with γ up to some tolerance threshold ξ, written α |=ξ γ.
Finally, it is worth observing that in the proposed approach the contract is
based on execution traces provided by collaborative but possibly untrusted users.
Hence, to keep track of the trustworthiness of each user participating in the con-
tract generation, we integrate our framework with a centralized reputation system
employed to favor user collaboration and exactness of the contract.
Contributions of the Paper
The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We present PICARD as a collaborative framework in which users share,
through a central server, execution traces of the apps running on their mo-
bile devices. This is done through the PICARD app, which is the component
running on the mobile device used to collect execution traces of the apps at
the system call level and to protect the device itself from app misbehaviors.
• We introduce the concept of ActionNode to describe app behaviors and app
contracts through clustered graphs of system calls. Then, based on such a no-
tion, we present (i) an approach to the formal representation of app behaviors
and contracts through probabilistic automata, and (ii) a method to collabora-
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tively build a contract by merging several execution traces from different users,
by taking into account their reputation.
• We describe a method to match the behavior of an app with a probabilistic
contract through statistical tests, to discern between genuine and repackaged
versions of a mobile application.
Structure of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the de-
sign of the PICARD framework, by detailing the algorithm used to acquire traces
from collaborative users. In Section 3.3, we describe the methodology used to
generate probabilistic contracts. In Section 3.4, we define the statistical methods
used to match a monitored behavior with the contract. In Section 3.5, we show
the viability of the approach through experiments on some trojanized apps. Sec-
tion 3.6 reports on related work about contract-based approaches and probabilistic
techniques to monitor the app behavior. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the paper
by discussing some future works.
3.2 PICARD Framework Description
In this section, we describe in detail the framework of PICARD, which is a dis-
tributed, collaborative client-server platform (see Figure 3.1). In this framework,
different users share dynamically their experience in the usage of every specific
app – in the form of monitored execution traces – through a centralized server. The
objective of the server is to employ and combine the behavior of the app, as mon-
itored by every participating user, in order to build incrementally an app contract,
which is then broadcast to all the involved users. Basically, no trust assumptions
are made a priori on users. Hence, to enable a virtuous circle ensuring user collab-
oration and reliability of the collected information, user reputation is continuously
updated and considered during the whole contract lifetime.
As far as the client side is concerned, we assume that each user has a unique
identifier assigned by the PICARD server when the PICARD app is installed on the
user device. The identifier is based on a fingerprint of user’s phone IMEI (Interna-
tional Mobile Equipment Identifier) in order to ensure its uniqueness. Whenever
the user downloads a new app, the PICARD app notifies the central server in or-
der to obtain, if available, the app contract, which is signed by the private key (of
an asymmetric cryptography key pair) of the server. Then, at the client side the
PICARD app implements the algorithm depicted in Figure 3.2. Execution traces
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Figure 3.1: PICARD High-Level Architecture
of the monitored app are collected directly and constantly on the user device. If
the PICARD app has a contract for the app, then the monitored behavior is used
to detect possible misbehaviors with respect to the contract, otherwise it is simply
forwarded to the server. If a misbehavior is detected, then PICARD blocks the cur-
rent action and notifies the user that the app behavior does not match the contract.
The user can then choose to stop the misbehaving app, block and uninstall it, or
simply do nothing. Notice that if no misbehavior is detected, then the monitored
behavior is sent to the server to contribute to the contract maintenance.
PICARD exploits system call analysis to capture and monitor the app behavior
at the kernel level. The advantages of performing analysis at this level is that per-
forming a code hijack at such a low level is harder than doing it at an higher level,
e.g., API or application level. Hence, the obtained behavior representation should
be exhaustive and comprehensive of every action performed by any app. The se-
quences of system calls resulting from the monitoring activity derive from the app
usage during its lifetime. Typically, an execution trace is recorded from the time
when the app is started and ends when the app is closed, or after a sufficiently
long time of the app execution. When PICARD stops monitoring an app, i.e., the
monitored app is terminated or the trace length overcomes a specific threshold,
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Figure 3.2: Description of the Behavior of the PICARD App
the user is asked to send the execution trace as a report to the PICARD central
server. To reduce the required level of interaction, which can be considered an-
noying by users, it is possible to set the app to automatically send the execution
traces when they are available.
On the PICARD server side, a database of users, apps, and contracts is man-
aged. All the operations dedicated to user reputation and contract management
are handled by the central server. When a user sends the report concerning an
observed execution trace, the PICARD server verifies if the related app is already
in the database. If the app is missing, a new record is added. Then, the PICARD
server follows the algorithm depicted in Figure 3.3 to manage the app contract on
the basis of the received execution traces. As can be noticed, the first operation
upon trace reception consists of checking contract’s completeness, which is an in-
dex describing the reliability of the contract. Intuitively, a contract is not considered
complete (and not made available to the users) until enough traces have been
received from a sufficiently high number of users. As we will see in Section 3.3,
the completeness level is determined through statistical methods contributing to
validate the contract.
If the contract is not complete yet and if the reputation of the user exceeds a
given threshold θ, i.e., the feedback reported by the user is trusted enough, then
the execution trace and the reputation of the user are used to update the partial
68
3.3. CONTRACT GENERATION
contract of the app, as detailed in Section 3.3, otherwise the trace is discarded and
does not contribute to the contract. Merging the contributions provided by several
different users is fundamental to achieve contract completeness. In fact, if we only
consider the traces recorded by a single user (or a small group of users), then the
generated contract would be partial since a user rarely explores all of the possible
app behaviors.
As soon as the contract is complete, the fitness of any execution trace re-
ceived is tested against the contract. If the test is passed, then the reputation of
the user is increased to reward the collaborative behavior. Moreover, notice that
the contract, even if complete, is continuously updated to keep track of additional
contributions provided by new traces. If the test is not passed, then it may reveal a
potential malicious behavior of the user, whose reputation is decreased. Then, the
trace is recorded (and added to the contract) only if the user is trusted enough. In
other words, the behavior of users reporting their usage experience is rewarded
(or punished) in terms of reputation, provided that such a feedback is (or is not)
consistent with respect to the contract. In fact, it is likely that cheating users provide
false feedback that, however, does not fit the contract behavior. Hence, the fitness
test and the negative reputation variation related to unsuccessful tests represent
a way for isolating such behaviors.
The complete version of the contract is sent by the PICARD server to each
involved user, while new versions of the contract – resulting from the combination
of additional execution traces continuously sent by collaborative users – are re-
leased when necessary. These operations are clustered and the updated contract
is resent to users periodically. To strengthen the role of reputation as an incentive
to promote collaboration, the server may decide to privilege trustworthy users by
sending to them the updated versions of the contract more frequently with respect
to less trusted users.
Finally, we point out that the dynamic nature of the approach used to define
the contract is such that even a complete contract, which is essentially generated
through tests, cannot be completely specified in a formal sense. A fully specified
contract requires full state space exploration, which, however, could be impractical
in real scenarios.
3.3 Contract Generation
In the PICARD framework, generation of an app contract is based on the quanti-
tative analysis of a certain amount of different execution traces that represent the
usage of the app by several users. Each execution trace observed by a trusted user
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Figure 3.3: Behavior of PICARD Server upon the Reception of a New Execution
Trace
is transformed into a clustered execution graph, in which system calls are grouped
to form graph nodes and each edge between nodes represents the transition from
a node to the next one. From a collection of these graphs, we derive a probabilistic
contract that describes quantitatively the expected behavior of the app. In the fol-
lowing, we present step-by-step the generation of a probabilistic contract starting
from the acquisition of the execution traces.
3.3.1 ActionNode
To properly represent the contract, we introduce the notion of ActionNode [63],
which is a cluster of related system calls that (i) are consecutively issued and (ii)
are bound by some relation to represent an action, i.e., a high-level operation. In
general, any relation among system calls can be used, e.g., any partition of all
the subsets of system calls. However, in PICARD we only consider those relations
that produce a meaningful action. For instance, an ActionNode can be composed
by the system calls performed consecutively on the same file, where the relation
expresses the fact that all these system calls work on the same file descriptor
to produce a relevant action. As we will show in detail, all the system calls form-
ing an ActionNode represent a sub-graph of system calls, while the collection of
ActionNodes modeling the app behavior is in turn a graph.
As an example of ActionNode, see Figure 3.4, consider the sequence of
system calls: open(A) - read(A) - read(A) - close(A), where A is the file-
name. This ActionNode, called Read_File, represents at high level the action of
reading consecutively data from file A: this action requires that, firstly, the file has
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to be opened, then data is read in a loop and, finally, the file is closed. Some other
examples of ActionNodes are depicted in Figure 3.5. Notice that each ActionNode
is actually a graph of system calls. The three examples report, ordered left-to-right,
the actions of opening, writing, and closing a file (where the same list of operations
is performed at least twice), the action of reading a file and then manipulating the
underlying device parameters (probably a socket), and finally the action of reading
from a previously opened file.
Several advantages stem when using ActionNodes. In fact, by representing the
execution graphs through ActionNodes, the app traces can be seen as a graph
whose nodes are high-level actions. This representation is more meaningful and
compact than a graph whose nodes are just system calls. In fact, generally a pro-
gram executes several system calls that, taken as standalone in a trace, only give
limited information about the app behavior. This happens because only few sys-
tem call types are issued by apps repeatedly. In fact, by representing the traces
through a graph where each node is a different system call, then the program be-
havior would be represented by a graph with few nodes and a large amount of
edges, which form a full mesh. However, from this kind of graph it is not possible
to extract a significant contract capable of representing the probabilistic high-level
behavior of the app.
The internal nodes that compose an ActionNode, i.e., system calls, are called
SysCallNodes. In the following, we consider as SysCallNodes system calls that
act on files, namely the open, read, write, close, ioctl system calls. The
pseudocode for the generation of the graph of ActionNodes from the system call
traces is reported in [19]. When traversing the trace of system calls generated by
a monitored app, the algorithm checks, for each SysCallNode, if the argument is
the same as the previous one. Since the monitored system calls act on files, the
argument is the filename (or file descriptor). Then, a new ActionNode is created
each time a system call is issued with an argument that differs from that of the
previous system call (see Figure 3.6), which can be seen as the parameter of the
whole ActionNode. Different and subsequent system calls with the same argument
are inserted into the same ActionNode (Figure 3.7). If the system call is the same
Figure 3.4: Definition of an ActionNode
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Figure 3.5: Three Examples of ActionNodes
as the previous one, with the same argument, then an edge (between SysCallN-
odes) is generated that goes back to the same SysCallNode. If the argument is
the same, but the system call is different, a new SysCallNode is added to the cur-
rent ActionNode, provided it has not been already created. In this case, an arc
(between SysCallNodes) is added from the current SysCallNode to this existing
SysCallNode. Then, each ActionNode is considered as a node representing the
high-level operation.
After a new ActionNode is generated, an edge (between ActionNodes) is
added from the previous ActionNode to the current one. Self loops may arise be-
cause there might be two consecutive actions that are represented by the same
ActionNode. Furthermore, a new ActionNode is added only if a similar one does
not exist already. To check if an ActionNode already exists, a comparison is made
among the internal structure of the new ActionNode and of the existing ones (i.e.,
the structure of the graphs of the internal SysCallNodes must be the same). Notice
that the ActionNodes are oblivious of the filename, meaning that the same cluster
of operations performed on two different files generates the same ActionNode.
Figure 3.6: Generation of a New ActionNode
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start , open (10) , read (10) , read (10) , close (10) , open (11) , read (11) , read (11) , ←↩
close (11) , open (10) , read (10) , read (10) , close (10) , ioctl (20) , ioctl (20) , ←↩
open (10) , read (10) , read (10) , read (10) , close (10) , open (12) , read (12) , ←↩
read (12) , read (12) , read (12) , close (12) , open (14) , write (14) , write←↩
(14) , close (14) , ioctl (20) , ioctl (20) , ioctl (20) , open (11) , write (11) , ←↩
write (11) , close (11) , open (14) , write (14) , write (14) , close (14)
Table 3.1: Original Trace of System Calls
In the end, a graph of ActionNodes is generated. In the next step, to define the
contract, PICARD takes as input the graph of ActionNodes and outputs a proba-
bilistic automaton. As an illustrating example, Table 3.1 shows a simplified trace of
system calls issued by an app where, for the sake of conciseness, only the system
call name and the file descriptor are shown.
Figure 3.8(a) reports the graph of system calls representing the trace reported
in Table 3.1. The system calls are then clustered on the base of their parameter, in
order to extract the ActionNodes presented in Figure 3.8(b). Finally, Figure 3.8(c)
depicts the graph of ActionNodes obtained through the algorithm of Figure 3.6
and 3.7.
3.3.2 Traces Analysis and Contract Generation
In the previous section we have seen that by using the notion of ActionNode an
execution trace of system calls can be represented as a graph of ActionNodes. In
this section we give the formal representation of this type of graph, which is called
labeled multidigraph of ActionNodes (LMA, for short). We then show how to derive
a probabilistic contract from the LMA representing the observed app behavior.
Figure 3.7: Insertion of a New Node in an ActionNode
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(a) System call graph
(b) ActionNodes
(c) ActionNode graph
Figure 3.8: Transformation from System Call Graph to ActionNode Graph
Definition 1. A labeled multidigraph of ActionNodes (LMA) is a tuple (V, I, E, s, t, L),
where V is the finite set of ActionNodes that describe the high-level operations
performed by a specific app, I ⊆ V is the set of initial vertices from which traces
of observations can start, E is the finite set of edges, s : E → V is a mapping
indicating the source vertex of each edge, t : E → V is a mapping indicating the
target vertex of each edge, L : E → T is a labeling function from edges to the
trust domain T such that L(e) denotes the trust level of the user who observed the
execution associated to the edge e.
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Notice that there can be both multiple occurrences of edges with the same
source and target vertices and edges insisting on the same vertex. While the struc-
ture of the LMA is given by the user executing the specific app, the trust related
labeling is defined by the central server – when receiving the LMA – on the basis of
user’s reputation. Then, from the union of the LMAs collected by the central server
from all the collaborative users, which in turn is a LMA, a probabilistic contract is
built. It is worth noticing that any new multidigraph that is submitted to the central
server by a certain user is joined to the current one stored in the central database,
and from the union of the two a novel probabilistic automaton is recomputed.
Formally, the probabilistic contract is defined in terms of a structure called la-
beled probabilistic automaton (LPA, for short) which is built from the LMA.
Definition 2. A labeled probabilistic automaton (LPA) is a tuple (V, I, P, T ) where
V is the finite set of states, I ⊆ V is the set of initial states, P : V × V → [0, 1]
is the transition probability function satisfying ∀v ∈ V : ∑v′∈V P (v, v′) = 1, and
T : V × V → T is the transition trust function.
From the LMA (V, I, E, s, t, L) we derive the corresponding LPA (V, I, P, T ),
where P and T are defined as follows:
• P (v, w) =
{
p if ∃e ∈ E : s(e) = v ∧ t(e) = w ∧ p = mul(v,w)mul(v)
0 otherwise
where mul(v, w) is the multiplicity of the edges from v to w in E and mul(v) is
the number of outgoing edges from v in E.
• T (v, w) = f{L(e) | s(e) = v ∧ t(e) = w} where f is any function that, applied
to a multiset of trust values, returns a trust value.
On one hand, notice that edges of the LMA with the same source and target
vertices collapse into a unique transition in the LPA. Multiplicities of these edges
in the LMA are used to compute the transition probability in the LPA. On the other
hand, the trust level associated to a transition of the LPA derives from a combina-
tion of the trust levels of the edges of the LMA contributing to the transition. For
instance, provided that the trust domain is totally ordered and numeric, the combi-
nation can be formalized through a mathematical function like, e.g., min, max, and
avg. In particular, by using function max we assume that a transition is trusted as
the most trustworthy user who observed its execution.
For instance, consider the transformation depicted in Figure 3.9, related to the
same example of Figure 3.8. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract away from
the information related to trust. Let us concentrate on the ReadFile vertex of the
LMA, which has five outgoing edges, i.e., three self-loops, one edge directed to
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the IoctlOP vertex, and one edge directed to the WriteFile vertex. The corre-
sponding state in the LPA has three outgoing transitions, i.e., one self-loop with
probability 35 , expressing that three out of five edges departing from the vertex are
self-loops, one transition towards state IoctlOP and one transition towards state
WriteFile, both with probability 15 . Notice that the self-loop in state ReadFile
summarizes three edges that may derive from the multidigraphs of different users.
Hence, the trust level associated to such a transition results from a combination of
the reputations of these users.
At run-time, the quantitative compliance of the app behavior with the contract
is evaluated by comparing the frequency of the observed execution traces with re-
spect to the probability distributions of the expected behaviors extracted from the
LPA (V, I, P, T ) associated to the contract. These distributions refer to the prob-
ability, when starting from any state v ∈ I, of observing distinct finite executions,
which we call longest distinct paths. More precisely, a longest distinct path starting
from v is a finite path that traverses every state in the path at most once, except
possibly for the last one, which is either an absorbing state with no outgoing transi-
tions or the unique state of the path visited twice. Intuitively, a longest distinct path
describes a maximal finite observation of non-repeated behaviors. The motivation
behind the choice of considering the longest distinct paths is that any path includ-
ing two occurrences of the same state (different from the last one) can be actually
viewed as the concatenation of two distinct observations. Hence, any execution
trace that is observed at run-time represents a sequence of longest distinct paths,
(a) ActionNode graph
(b) Contract
Figure 3.9: From LMA to LPA
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each one associated to its own frequency. As mentioned before and as we will
see in the next section, such frequencies have to be compared with the probability
distribution associated to the set of longest distinct paths of the LPA, which are
calculated formally as follows.
Definition 3. Given a LPA (V, I, P, T ), a longest distinct path starting from state
v1 ∈ I is any finite sequence of states v1 . . . vn, with n ≥ 2, such that:
• P (vj , vj+1) > 0 with 1 ≤ j < n;
• ∀vj , 1 ≤ j < n, there does not exist k 6= j, 1 ≤ k < n, such that vj = vk;
• either ∃vj , 1 ≤ j < n, such that vj = vn, or vn has no outgoing transitions.
As usual, the probability of a path v1 . . . vn is computed as the product of the
probabilities of the transitions forming the path:
Prob(v1 . . . vn) = Π
n−1
i=1 P (vj , vj+1)
By following classical results related to probability distributions and measures for
probabilistic systems [73], it is natural to construct a probability space over the
set of distinct paths starting from any state v ∈ I (in this set neither of the given
paths is a prefix of another in the set). In particular, we have a unique probability
distribution over the set of distinct paths of the same length starting from v, whose
overall probability sums up to 1. Analogously, the finite set of longest distinct paths
starting from v is measurable as well and defines a probability distribution.
As an example, reconsider the LPA of Figure 3.9 and examine the possible ob-
servations starting from state ReadFile. The related set of all the longest distinct
paths is reported in the first column of Table 3.2, which is constructed by exploring
every possible sequence of transitions starting from state ReadFile and satisfying
the three conditions of Def. 3. By calculating the related probabilities as discussed
above, we obtain the probability distribution reported in the second column of Ta-
ble 3.2 (RF stands for ReadFile, IO for IoctlOP, and WF for WriteFile).
Then, by exploiting the trust information labeling the transitions of the LPA, we
associate a trust level to each longest distinct path. Intuitively, such a trust level
shall be a combination of the trust values associated to the transitions forming the
path. Similarly as previously argued for the definition of function T in Def. 2, several
functions are candidates to characterize such a combination. However, in order to
favor a conservative and cautious approach, we argue that the trust level of a path
should not be higher than the trust level of its weakest transition. For instance, we
advocate the use of function min, i.e., the trust level of a path depends on the least
trustworthy transition forming the path.
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To summarize, the probabilistic behavior specified by the contract is given by
the set of probability distributions associated to the longest distinct paths starting
from the potential initial states of the LPA, each of these paths equipped with the
related trust level. A fundamental issue is related to determining whether such a
set represents a complete, exhaustive contract for the app, i.e., it describes all the
possible expected behaviors of the app together with the related probabilities of
being observed. This is not a trivial issue that can be solved by comparing the ob-
tained contract with the set of potential behaviors determined, e.g., statically, and
that characterize the app functionalities, because the contract includes quantita-
tive, probabilistic information requiring some form of validation. In other words, we
need an objective condition establishing that the quantitative information extracted
from the LPA is sufficient to characterize the app behavior and, therefore, the ob-
tained contract is ready for distribution to the collaborative users. As anticipated
formerly, this level of acquired knowledge shall be stated by a completeness in-
dex, which is based on the accuracy of the quantitative information characterizing
the contract. To this aim, we notice that initially the construction of the probability
distributions of the longest distinct paths passes a transient phase during which
they change by virtue of the LMAs added by users. Ideally, after such a transient
phase, these distributions shall reach a steady state, which would represent the
completeness proof. In order to approximate such a theoretical result, we assume
that the contract is complete and ready for distribution whenever the last n con-
secutive trace executions received by the central server contribute to alter the
probability distributions up to a tolerance threshold . The choice of these two pa-
rameters defines the tradeoff between accuracy of the obtained contract and time
waited prior deployment of the contract. We point out that reducing the delay be-
tween app release and contract release is important from user’s standpoint, who
needs to check the compliance of the own installed app with respect to the con-
Path Probability
RF-RF 0.6
RF-IO-RF 0.1
RF-IO-WF-IO 0.05
RF-IO-WF-WF 0.05
RF-WF-IO-RF 0.05
RF-WF-IO-WF 0.05
RF-WF-WF 0.1
Table 3.2: Longest Distinct Paths Starting From State ReadFile (RF) of Figure 3.9
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tract as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is also worth recalling that even
a complete contract continues to be adjourned by further contributions provided
by users. These observations suggest to reduce the waiting time and augment
the level of approximation, by acting on parameters n and , in order to anticipate
as much as possible the contract release by sacrificing its correctness as little as
possible.
3.4 Contract Compliance
Once the contract has been built, it can be used to verify the compliance of differ-
ent versions of the same app on distinct smartphones where these versions have
been installed. A non-compliant app is an app exhibiting a behavior different from
the one declared in the contract. More specifically, an app is non-compliant when
it performs one or more operations not included in the contract, i.e., functional mis-
behavior, or when a sequence of operations is observed with a probability distri-
bution appreciably different from the one associated to the same sequence as de-
fined in the contract, i.e., non-functional misbehavior. Functional misbehaviors are
captured by solving a subgraph isomorphism problem [87] between the functional
projection of the LPA underlying the contract (obtained by removing probabilities
from the transitions) and an analogous version of the LPA that is extracted from
the observed behavior of the app at run time. On the other hand, non-functional
misbehaviors require the analysis of quantitative behaviors. In the following, we
consider such a case by showing how to compare quantitatively the probabilistic
behaviors of the contract and of the app at run-time.
Let C be the probabilistic contract of an app A. We want to verify the compli-
ance of A′, a possibly different version of A, against C. To this end, we monitor the
behavior of A′ by progressively building the ActionNodes resulting from the obser-
vations and then extracting both functional and nonfunctional characteristics of the
longest distinct paths that are obtained through the method discussed in the previ-
ous section. Then, the resulting probability distributions are compared with those
forming the signed contract C. The comparison among probability distributions is
typically estimated by means of similarity or distance measures [36]. In particular,
we propose the usage of two of these metrics.
The first metric we consider is based on the Pearson’s Chi Squared Test [102]
for estimating the consistency of the behavior of A′ with respect to the probability
distributions characterizing C. The Pearson’s Chi Squared Test belongs to a family
of distance measures containing the Squared Euclidean distance
∑
i(xi − yi)2,
where xi and yi denote the probability values of the i-th pair of elements under
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comparison, and is used in statistics to verify if a sample is statistically consistent
with respect to a known probability distribution. In our setting, the events generated
by A′ represent the statistical sample, whilst the contract describes the known
distribution associated to the observable longest distinct paths.
At run-time, by monitoring the execution of A′ we incrementally build the prob-
abilistic behavior of the resulting longest distinct paths. Given a certain state v, to
which the contract C associates n possible longest distinct paths, let us denote
with Oi the probability associated to the observation of the i-th longest distinct
path during the execution of A′, and with Ei the expected probability of the same
path as stated by the contract C. Then, the chi-squared χ2 is computed according
to the following formula:
χ2 =
n∑
i=1
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
To verify the chi-squared null hypothesis, i.e., the behavior of A′ has a distribu-
tion consistent with the one described in the contract C, the test statistic is drawn
from the chi-squared distribution. If the computed probability is higher than con-
ventional criteria for statistical significance the null hypothesis is not rejected, i.e.,
the behavior is compliant with the contract and the app should not be considered
repackaged.
By following such an approach, however, trust is not taken into account. In or-
der to consider this additional dimension, we propose to discount the result of the
i-th comparison by a factor proportional to the trust associated to Ei. Formally, we
normalize the trust values to obtain a value in the interval [0, 1] and then we mul-
tiply the normalized trust associated to the i-th longest distinct path by the term
(Oi−Ei)2
Ei
. In this way, we emphasize that differences about untrusted observations
are more tolerated with respect to analogous differences about trusted observa-
tions.
We point out that, by virtue of the chosen measure, a behavior with non-zero
probability in A′ that, instead, does not occur in C, cannot involve any comparison,
to emphasize that in this case the observed behavior is non-compliant with the
expected behavior specified by the contract. Notice that such a misbehavior would
be revealed also in a purely functional setting. However, while in the functional
setting such a result is simply binary – a new, unexpected behavior occurs that
is not allowed by the contract – in the quantitative setting we can estimate the
probability of observing such a misbehavior, which, if negligible, could be tolerated
to some extent.
To this end, we need a distance measure that allows PICARD to compare dis-
tributions over sets of elements some of which could be associated to null probabil-
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ities. A candidate metric is the Lorentzian measure, which combines the absolute
difference with the natural logarithm:
Lor =
m∑
i=1
ln(1 + |Oi − Ei|)
where the term 1 is added to ensure non-negativity and to eschew the log of zero,
while m refers to the cardinality of the union of the sets of longest distinct paths
observed in A′ and those defined in C.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the statistical analysis for contract compliance
is employed to verify a posteriori the statistical similarity between the probabilistic
behavior expected by the contract and the probabilistic behavior observed by every
collaborative user who has sent a proper execution trace to the central server in
order to generate the contract. Obviously, the same test is executed also for each
further execution trace received by the central server even after the generation of
the probabilistic contract. The objective of such a similarity analysis is to adjust
the reputation of every collaborative user proportionally to the fitness of the exe-
cution trace provided by the user with respect to the contract. In particular, strong
dissimilarities identify possibly malicious execution traces provided by users who,
deliberately or not, generated false or inaccurate multidigraphs. Hence, to keep
track of the result of such a similarity analysis, the reputation of the users involved
is increased (resp., decreased) if the distance measure is below (resp., beyond) a
given trust (resp., untrust) threshold, by an amount proportional to the difference.
3.5 Experimental Results
PICARD has been implemented for Android devices, mainly because of the wide
distribution of this mobile OS and its openness. Android is in fact an open source
project, based on a custom Linux kernel, which also allows for building customized
versions of the OS, called custom ROMs. The execution traces of system calls are
captured by using a kernel module, which hijacks the traced system calls and
writes on a file the system calls along with the relevant parameters (e.g., the file
descriptor). In the current version, the tested smartphones need to be rooted, since
command insmod, which is used to run the tracing kernel module, can be issued
only by a super user in the Android kernel. After hijacking the called system calls,
PICARD passes the collected information to the application level through a file
buffer shared between the two levels. At the application level, PICARD checks
continuously the shared buffer and stores the monitored system call traces.
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In order to avoid that an app can interfere, possibly maliciously with other apps
running on the mobile device, the Android Linux Kernel enforces isolation cleverly
exploiting the multi-user feature. In fact, each app runs in a Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM), which is an optimized version of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) acting
as a sandbox for the app. Every DVM (i.e., app) receives a Linux User-ID and is
treated as a Linux user by the kernel. Hence, each DVM has an home directory
and its own memory space. Moreover, every app can launch Linux processes and
threads whose owner is the associated DVM, identified by the User-ID. The User-
ID is extracted from the package of the specific app and we exploit this feature to
retrieve the actions performed by a specific app at the kernel level.
To prove the effectiveness of PICARD in discerning between genuine and tro-
janized apps, we tested our approach on a set of Android apps. The aim of PI-
CARD is to recognize if an app is repackaged, i.e., not compliant with a probabilis-
tic contract. To this end, we have analyzed a set of apps of which we were able
to analyze both the genuine and the repackaged version. In the following, we re-
port details about eight representative apps that we consider meaningful. The app
contracts have been built running the genuine apps, downloaded from the official
Google Play market, on real devices (Samsung Galaxy Nexus with Android 4.0)
collecting traces of real usage of different users. We report in Table 3.3 the list
Application Traces Length (min) ActionNodes Edges Misbehavior
TicTacToe 100 10 7 30 Send SMS
LunarLander 50 10 11 37 Send SMS
BaseballSuperstar 100 15 11 46 Geinimi
AngryBirds 100 10 21 103 Geinimi
K-Launcher 50 15 13 52 KMIN
Jewels 50 15 18 78 PJAPPS
Hamster Super 50 10 9 35 YZHC
Tower Defense 50 10 18 49 Geinimi
Table 3.3: Data About Traces Used to Build the Contracts
of tested apps including the number of collected traces, their length, the amount
of action nodes and edges of the app contract and the kind of misbehavior or
malware name found in their repackaged version. The first two applications are
distributed as sample, together with the Android SDK. Thus, modifying the source
code to introduce a misbehavior is simple. The other apps are real repackaged
apps found in the wild. In particular, they have been downloaded either from a
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repository of malicious applications1, or from an unofficial app market2. In all the
tests, PICARD has been effective in recognizing traces coming from all the mali-
cious apps as non-compliant with the contract. For the last seven apps of Table 3.3,
functional misbehaviors have been detected through the comparison between the
contract resulting from the generated ActionNodes and the behavior resulting from
several execution traces of the repackaged versions. Only for the TicTacToe app
the functional analysis was not enough, while statistical analysis was necessary
to reveal the malware.
Path Ei Oi
5-3-1-1 0.00005476 0
5-3-1-3 0.0002 0
5-3-1-5 0.000001 0
5-3-2-2 0.00188 0
5-3-2-3 0.0034 0.0003
5-3-2-5 0.00002 0.000026
5-3-3 0.0004 0.12
5-3-4-1 0.0000012 0.0012
5-3-4-3 0.00014 0.0054
5-3-4-4 0.000189 0.0024
5-3-5 0.0031 0.0015
5-3-7-3 0.0000156 0.00075
Table 3.4: Comparison Related to Some Longest Distinct Paths From state 5
In Figure 3.10 we report the contract of the Android app TicTacToe, where
transition probabilities are omitted for the sake of readability. We emphasize that
the set of execution traces used to generate this contract is representative of the
app behavior and, therefore, adequate to generate a complete contract. In particu-
lar, with respect to the completeness criteria discussed in Section 3.3, we point out
that the last of these traces contributes to changes in the probability distributions
specifying the contract below the tolerance threshold  = 10−5. It is also worth
noticing that traces longer than the ones collected are not representative of the
real usage of the app. In fact, it is unlikely that a user uses continuously one of the
reported apps for more than 10-15 minutes.
1 http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com/
2 appbrain.com.
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Figure 3.10: Probabilistic Contract of TicTacToe
Afterward, we extracted from a trojanized version of TicTacToe 10 traces of
a time span of 15 minutes. This trojanized version of TicTacToe sends an SMS
message to a phone number each time the user opens the activity to change the
graphic style of the game. This action has been triggered at least once for every
monitored trace. As an example, we report in Table 3.4 a list of some longest
distinct paths starting from state 5 and the related probability distribution both in
the contract and in one of the monitored traces.
To verify if the monitored traces are compliant with the app contract, the sta-
tistical tests of χ2 and Lorentzian measure have been used as described in the
previous section. The contract of the app includes m = 7 probability distributions,
as every state in the LPA is a potential initial state, except for node 0 that repre-
sents a fictitious initial state. The two statistical tests are performed for all these
probability distributions for each monitored trace. The observed behavior of the
app is compliant with the contract if the null hypothesis of the test is verified. For
the χ2 test, the null hypothesis h0 that has to be checked for each probability
distribution i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is χ2i ≤ γ, where γ is the critical value of the χ2 distri-
bution for one degree of freedom (as we are considering one monitored trace) and
a significance level α representing the desired tolerance (which is a configurable
parameter of the framework). As an example, by computing the χ2 test on the
distribution of longest distinct paths outgoing from state 5, which represents the
action node read(A)-read(A), we obtain a non-compliance result. For instance,
the value returned by the test for a representative monitored trace is χ25 = 37.22.
Notice that the critical value corresponding to tolerance α = 0.999 (which is a very
high tolerance) is γ = 10.828, which is much lower than the value returned by the
test. Thus, the null hypothesis h0 is not verified and the monitored trace is correctly
considered non-compliant with respect to the contract.
By performing the Lorentzian test on the same data, the obtained result is
Lor5 = 0.13. In order to favor a correct interpretation, we compare this value with
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the ones obtained from monitored traces belonging to the genuine version. The
highest value returned from a genuine trace is Lor = 0.0012, which is two orders
of magnitude lower than Lor5.
As far as performance aspects are concerned, we report the overhead of the
testing of PICARD executed on a Samsung Galaxy Nexus with Android 4.0. The
measured overhead of the PICARD app is 7% of the CPU usage and 3% of RAM
occupation when performing compliance check with the contract. The PICARD
app causes less overhead when simply collecting traces and sending them to the
PICARD server. The overhead of the kernel module for system call monitoring is
5% for CPU usage while RAM usage is negligible.
3.6 Related Work
In the literature, system call analysis has been proposed in several systems to
monitor and detect malicious behaviors. One of the first network intrusion detection
systems (IDS) based on state transition graphs analysis is NetSTAT [124]. Anal-
ysis of system calls with Markov models have formerly been performed on other
operating systems. For instance, Hoang and Hu [79] propose a scheme for intru-
sion detection. This model is based on system calls and hidden Markov models
and is able to detect efficiently denial of service attacks. Maggi et al. [93] present
another model relying on system calls and Markov models to detect intrusions.
Their system analyzes the arguments of the system calls but is oblivious of the
system call sequence. System call sequences and deterministic automata have
been used by Koresow [85] to detect anomalies, which are revealed when system
call sequences differ from an execution trace known to be secure. Crowdroid [34]
is an Android-based IDS that is based on the number of system calls issued by
an application. Misbehaviors are identified by applying computational intelligence
techniques.
A behavioral analysis of Android applications at the system call level is pre-
sented in [105]. The authors propose a framework called CopperDroid that dis-
cerns good behaviors from bad ones. Copperdroid tries to automatically stimulate
malicious applications to misbehave through instrumentation. The analysis of be-
haviors is automatic, which means that the behavior of the application stimulated
by user interaction is not considered. Another approach that aims at classifying
malicious behaviors is presented in [95], which aims at finding similar sub-graphs
describing common behaviors of malicious apps. A classifier is then used to de-
termine whether an app is malicious or not. The approach requires each app to
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be run in a sandbox, which may alter the execution of some actions that are usu-
ally performed on real devices. A framework for analysis of Android apps is pre-
sented in [132]. The proposed framework emulates in a virtual sandbox all the
components of the Android framework and can be used to analyze the behavior of
Android apps by collecting traces at the Dalvik level. This framework can be com-
plementary to the PICARD approach and as future work it would be worth consid-
ering the possibility of using the Dalvik level traces for higher level ActionNodes.
The framework proposed in [81] analyzes the behavior of Android applications by
running them on emulators in desktop environments. Each application is forced
to execute with as many input as possible, in order to discover as many hidden
behaviors as possible. The security analysis is then performed offline on the func-
tions called at the smali (bytecode) level. This approach is different from the one
of PICARD, which aims at finding discrepancies between the application behavior
and the contract. Thus, the concept of “misbehavior” in PICARD is more general,
which should be more effective in detecting zero-day attacks.
Some Android security frameworks try to protect the system by monitoring
the communication level and defining security policies. One of these systems is
CRePE [41], which allows the definition of context based security policies. An-
other typical approach to monitor Android app behavior is called tainting. In this
approach sensitive data flow is tracked to check the apps that are able to access
a specific piece of information. Examples of this approach on Android are [23]
and [68]. The tainting approach is more aimed at detecting privacy leakage, whilst
the PICARD approach addresses a more general concept of misbehavior. In [33]
a framework based on SELinux is proposed to enforce security policies on An-
droid devices and to tackle common misbehaviors performed by malware. The
approach is more focused on the application of security policies than on detection
of malicious apps. Moreover, a custom version of the operating system is required.
Aurasium [129] is another security framework for Android devices, which is able to
enforce security policies through repackaging of all the installed apps. Aurasium
forces the apps running on the device to call modified APIs, which are used to
perform security checks. Aurasium is aimed at enforcing security policies instead
of the detection of repackaged apps.
Another approach that exploits application contracts to monitor the behavior
of mobile applications is given by the Security-by-Contract framework [64]. This
framework has been extended [42] and applied in several ways and in different
scenarios [65, 76]. Differently from PICARD, the security by contract framework
does not perform intrusion and malware detection, but matches the application
behavior with a security policy. Thus, malicious behavior that is not specified in
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the security policy is not considered. Referring to quantitative models, probabilistic
contracts have been firstly introduced by Delahaye et al. [50, 52, 51] for analyzing
reliability and availability aspects of systems. Their approach to contract definition
and compliance check is static and is not related to practical applications in the
field of intrusion detection. On the other hand, we have shown that PICARD is
based on a dynamic approach using statistical analysis that turns out to be effec-
tive in detecting trojanized apps. Bielova and Massacci [28] present a notion of
distance among traces characterizing enforcement strategies by the distance from
the original trace. This approach is generic and, differently from PICARD, it does
not consider low level actions, nor proposes real applications. The chi-squared
test has been used to detect anomalies in several different fields. For instance, an
application to network traffic analysis is presented by Ye and Chen [134].
The work presented in [15] describes a system to classify malicious apps on
the base of the API calls they perform. The approach uses a classifier that stati-
cally analyzes features related to the called methods, with a particular attention to
intercommunication constructs. This approach is effective in foreseeing malicious
misbehaviors which are functional, albeit it is less likely to discover non-functional
misbehaviors.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed PICARD, a collaborative framework for generat-
ing and checking Android apps’ probabilistic contracts. PICARD performs analy-
sis of the app behavior at run-time, by building the contract dynamically. To this
aim, we have introduced the concept of ActionNode in order to describe the be-
havior of apps through clustered graphs and probabilistic automata. PICARD dis-
cerns between genuine and trojanized apps, by revealing both functional and non-
functional misbehaviors.
The dynamic approach used by PICARD is more specific with respect to an
approach relying on the integrity check based on the checksum of the apks. In
fact, if an app is updated, e.g., by changing only some of its data, such as an utility
app that changes a background picture, the app still performs the same actions
as the former version and, hence, has the same behavioral contract but, how-
ever, the checksum is different. Moreover, in PICARD the analysis is conducted
through statistical tests performed on the app execution traces described in terms
of probabilistic automata. Hence, the PICARD approach does not differentiate the
behaviors in “known” and “unknown” only, but it is also able to distinguish between
likely and unlikely behaviors. The dynamic analysis of PICARD does not require
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the program to be decompiled. Moreover, since the contract is built by monitoring
real user behaviors, it is possible to detect misbehaviors that may not be noticed
through static analysis. Thus, PICARD can be viewed as a framework complemen-
tary to static analysis systems.
The effectiveness of PICARD depends strongly on the cooperation of several
users, thus motivating the use of a reputation system stimulating collaborative,
honest behaviors. In particular, the proposed approach is based on a computa-
tional notion of trust inspired by the Jøsang model [82], which keeps track of the
history of the user behavior, by increasing reputation for each correct report and
by decreasing it otherwise. A similar approach is presented in [27]. Moreover, in
our approach the quantitative behavior of the app reported by users is weighted by
the reputation of the user, while the notion of contract compliance is based on the
comparison between probability distributions through a distance metric. Employing
reputation-based weights and similarity tests to rate the credibility of the reported
feedback is not a completely naive approach and is used, e.g., in the TrustGuard
framework [117], which defines heuristics to mitigate dishonest feedback. In or-
der to discourage false or inaccurate feedback, more sophisticated cooperation
incentives can be used (see, e.g., [72, 133]), possibly based on some form of
remuneration (see, e.g., [29]).
The validation of the trust configuration policies and parameters discussed in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 is left to sensitivity analysis in future work. We also plan to
extend the experimental studies by verifying whether the reputation system of PI-
CARD is effective to isolate selfish behaviors due to non-collaborative users and
to detect and punish (possibly orchestrated) malicious behaviors due to collabora-
tive users who deliberately cheat by providing false feedback during the contract
generation.
Further extensions are related to the notion of ActionNodes, which, in the cur-
rent implementation, are built on system call graphs. In particular, the concept of
ActionNode can be extended including complex nodes that describe higher level
actions, such as “Send text message”. Finally, we also plan to extend the experi-
ments on a larger set of apps, with the possibility of including an automatic analysis
approach, as in [97] and [91].
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4Introducing probabilities in contract-based
approaches for mobile application security
4.1 Overview
New generation mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) are becoming
day-by-day more powerful and popular. The growth in computing power, ubiqui-
tousness and capabilities of these devices has been parallelized by the growth of
available applications, specifically developed for smartphones and tablets. How-
ever, these applications may be not completely secure. In fact, malicious devel-
opers strive to design and deliver applications that may damage both users and
devices. In particular some applications may hide a Trojan horse that, even if it
looks unharmful, in background it performs malicious actions that the users did
not expect to happen.
The current security model, which rules (i) if an application can be safely in-
stalled on the device, (ii) what kind of actions the application may execute once
installed, still suffers from several weaknesses, in particular in its capacity of ex-
pressing proper contracts. Semantics of current security models is too naïve since
it is either based upon trust relationships or upon statements of purpose. In the
first case, users accept to run an application if they trust the provider. In the sec-
ond one, providers state the security relevant actions performed by an application
and it is up to the users to decide whether run the application if they consider
these operations safe. In the former case the trust level of the trusted entity also
determines the code privileges, essentially relegating an application into the “all
or nothing” policy, while in the latter case the semantics is too-coarse grained
(e.g., Android permissions) or hardly usable. For example, in the Android system,
security relevant actions are declared through permissions, which are difficult to
understand for average users.
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In this paper, we introduce probability aspects into the workflow of two contract-
based approaches developed for mobile devices, namely the Security-by Con-
tract [64] (S×C) and the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust [43, 42] (S×C×T) frame-
works. These two approaches integrate several security techniques to build a
chain of trust, which, in the end, ensures that the downloaded application will ex-
ecute only security actions that are allowed by the user’s policy. To this end, we
introduce a probabilistic description of the behavior of an application and a more
expressive version of the user’s security requirements. Indeed, the current models
only permit the definition of a set of allowed actions, e.g., the Android permission
system (first box of Figure 4.1). More expressive policies which take in account
a possible action hystory are modelled through automata that represent allowed
executions.
Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of the improvement in policies expressive-
ness.
We propose a probabilistic automata-based model that enables the developers to
define more expressive contracts through probabilistic clauses, e.g., how often a
security-relevant action may happen. The same expressiveness is given to users
to specify security policies. Since we include probabilistic clauses in the specifica-
tion of contracts and policies, the security mechanisms involved into the workflows
of S×C and S×C×T has to be redefined. Hence, we present a new workflow for
both S×C and S×C×T framework in which each module is updated to support
probabilistic functions. The advantage of using probabilities is the possibility of
describing more realistic usage scenarios for an application. In fact, many appli-
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cations depend on user inputs or context information and it is difficult to define
realistic policies based upon boolean conditions only. In these models, all the pos-
sible execution paths are considered legal. Hence, a low-probability operation is
considered valid even if performed several times. For this reason, we introduce
probabilities in the definition of security clauses to define more fine-grained con-
tracts and policies. These descriptions better fit real application use cases and
can be defined without alteration of the Security-By-Contract-with-Trust workflow.
Finally, we propose an extension to the Android permission system, which includes
the security properties of Probabilistic Security-By-Contract with Trust in the most
popular operative system for mobile devices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the main concepts
of contract-based approaches and briefly recalls the Security-by-Contract and the
Security-by-Contract-with-Trust frameworks. In Section 4.3, we propose a prob-
abilistic version of both Security-by-Contract and Security-by-Contract-with-Trust.
Section 4.4 presents an application of the proposed approach in Android systems,
proposing some extension to the current framework. In Section 4.5, we discuss
some related work, while Section 4.6 briefly concludes.
4.2 Contract-based Approaches
Contract-based approaches have been developed for mobile devices, such as the
Security-by-Contract [64] (S×C) and the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust [43, 42]
(S×C×T) frameworks. They integrate several security techniques to build a chain
of trust by sequentially applying them to safely execute applications. The three
cornerstones of these security frameworks are application code A, application
contract C, and client policy P , where a contract is a formal, complete, and cor-
rect specification of an application security relevant behavior, e.g., security critical
virtual machine API call, or critical system calls [77]. A policy is a formal complete
specification of the acceptable security-relevant behavior allowed to applications
executed on the platform [77]. We assume that both contract and policy are syn-
tactically described by exploiting the same language.
The basic idea of a contract-based approach is the usage of the contract for
guaranteeing that security aspects are satisfied. More in detail, using the contract,
it is possible to check at deploy time, i.e., before the application execution, if the
application satisfies the user policy or not. Let  denote the compliance between
two of the previous elements. A contract-based approach guarantees that
A  C  P ⇒ A  P (4.1)
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In the following, we describe the Security-by-Contract (S×C) and the Security-
by-Contract-with-Trust (S×C×T) frameworks as approaches that integrate the de-
scribed techniques to guarantee security at application execution time.
4.2.1 Towards Security Techniques
Several techniques have been proposed for tackling specific security aspects. Al-
most all the following are integrated into the S×C or into the S×C×T frameworks.
Application-Contract Matching. It enables statically verification of an application
code by using a third-party provided proof and also its validation. The proof is
linked to the application code. Verifying the proof validity is more efficient than
generating it. The verification procedure follows the steps of the proof and, if
all of them are correct, validates its conclusion. Examples of this approach are
the proof-carrying code [99] and the model-carrying code [114] methods.
Contract Policy Matching. It statically analyzes the compliance of a specification,
e.g., a contract, with a specified security policy.
Enforcement/Monitoring. The run-time enforcement approach consists of running
an application code inside the scope of a controller that checks, step-by-step,
the executed operations. At each operation, the behavior of the considered
application is compared with the consumer policy (policy enforcement), and
prevents violations by modifying the application behavior at run time, e.g. for-
bidding non-allowed operations.
This approach differs from monitoring that just observes the behavior of the
application and at the end of the executions it could also provide information
(e.g., audit, logs) for understanding its behavior, e.g., if the code does not work
as described by its contract (contract monitoring).
Metrics Manager. Security metrics aim at assessing security threats. For instance,
metrics can describe a system in terms of its reputation in a community, num-
ber of past, successful interactions or average number of failures per year.
Then, these values are exploited for taking security aware decisions. Among
the others, trust, risk, and probability aspects are receiving major interest.
4.2.2 Security-by-Contract and Security-by-Contract-with-Trust in a
Nutshell
The Security-by-Contract paradigm provides a full characterization of the contract-
based interaction. It combines different functionalities in an integrated way (see
Figure 4.2). In particular, it includes a module for automatically checking the formal
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Figure 4.2: The Security-by-Contract process.
Figure 4.3: The Security-by-Contract-with-Trust process.
correspondence between code and contract (Application-Contract matching). If
the result is negative, then the monitor is run to enforce the policy (Policy Enforce-
ment), otherwise a matching between the contract and the policy (Contract-Policy
Matching) is performed to establish if the contract is compliant with the policy. In
this case, the code is executed without overhead (Safe Execution), otherwise the
policy is enforced again (Policy Enforcement).
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Along this research line, in [43, 42] S×C has been extended in order to
deal also with the concept of trust. The new framework is named Security-by-
Contract-with-Trust (S×C×T) (Figure 4.3). S×C×T consists of integrating the
S×C paradigm with a monitoring infrastructure for trust management. As a matter
of fact, a crucial point of the S×C architecture is the verification of the relation
that exists between the application and its contract. Usually, nowadays a mobile
application is installed only if its origin is trusted. This means that users can re-
ject or accept the signature of the application provider based upon the trust level.
S×C×T extends S×C in two different phases: at deploy-time, replacing the app-
contract matching with a Trust Evaluator module. This component sets the moni-
toring state, and at run-time it applies the contract monitoring procedure for tuning
the provider trust level. In fact, the S×C architecture has been extended by adding
a component for the contract monitoring to check if the contract adheres to the
actual execution of the application and, according to the answer, it updates the
provider level of trust.
The advantages of these contract-based frameworks are that they are able to
identify unsafe applications before and without running them. In particular, using
the contract-policy matching functionality, it checks at deploy-time if the declared
behavior of the application is compliant with the required policy. This check, along
with the assurance that the application code is compliant with the application con-
tract, which is obtained through the application-contract matching module (S×C)
or by the trust evaluator (S×C×T), guarantees that the application satisfies the
user requirements. Anytime the contract-policy matching finds that a contract is
not compliant with the policy, the application is run in a controlled way through the
enforcement module. It is worth noticing that the cost, in terms of energy, of run-
ning a contract policy matching is much lower than performing the enforcement.
Hence, unsafe applications are not run at all by the user and possible unsafe ap-
plication are run in a controlled way. This leads to an attack risk reduction.
4.3 Probabilistic Security-by-Contract and Probabilistic
Security-by-Contract-with-Trust
In this section, we describe a probabilistic version of both S×C and S×C×T ar-
chitectures. It is worth noticing that, in both cases the original workflow is not
changed. Only the components are modified in such a way that, on one hand, they
are able to cope with probability metrics and, on the other hand, Equation 4.1 still
holds for an appropriate choice of the notion of compliance.
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Let us assume that both probabilistic contract and probabilistic policy are ex-
pressed through the same formalism.
Probabilistic contract and policy will be modelled as (substochastic) generative
probabilistic automata [78, 26].
Definition 4. A fully probabilistic or generative automata is a tuple (S,Act, P )
consisting of a finite set S of states, a set of actionsAct, and a transition probability
function
P : S ×Act× S → [0, 1]
A generative automata is said to be stochastic if∑
a∈Act
∑
t∈S
P (s, a, t) = 1
for all s ∈ S for all a ∈ Act. On the other hand, a generative automata is said to
be semistochastic or substochastic if∑
a∈Act
∑
t∈S
P (s, a, t) < 1
for all s ∈ S for all a ∈ Act. For C ⊆ S, we put P (s, a, C) = ∑t∈C P (s, a, t). A
state s ∈ S is said to be terminal iff∑a,t P (s, a, t) = 0.
Hereafter, we consider generative automata such that for each action there is only
one possible transition for each action a ∈ Act.
4.3.1 Probabilistic Security-by-Contract Workflow
Being the Security-By-Contract framework modular, introducing probability metrics
implies the substitution of some components with their probabilistic counterpart.
The Probabilistic Security-by-Contract workflow is depicted in Figure 4.4.
Probabilistic application contract matching is verified using some static validation
techniques able to deal with probabilistic description of behavior. For instance,
as proof carrying code [99] is used in S×C, here we can use the Probabilistic
Proof Carrying Code, e.g., [115, 121]. In particular, this method guarantees
that, for all possible k-length execution traces whose probability is calculated
as Pk =
∏k
i=1 P (si, ai, ti), the application is considered compliant if Pk > θk,
where θk is a given threshold value 0 < θk < 1 dependent from the length of
the execution trace.
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Figure 4.4: Workflow for Probabilistic Security-by-Contract
Probabilistic contract policy matching is performed by checking the compliance
between a contract and a policy. According to the level of required accuracy,
several relations can be considered in order to verify the compliance between
probabilistic contract and policy. In S×C, the contract-policy matching func-
tion checks if the contract and the policy are similar. This means that for each
action described in the contract, we check if there exists the same action de-
scribed in the policy and the description of the transition are similar again.
Hence, we assume that the policy specifies a rule for each security relevant
action, which we call SecAction.
Referring to the notion of ε-simulation given in [53], hereafter, we define a
slightly different ε-simulation.
Definition 5. A relation R ⊆ S×S is a relation of positive ε-simulation, where
ε ∈ [0, 1] if whenever (s, s′) ∈ R, then ∀a ∈ SecAction, ∀W ∈ S∑
t∈W
P (s, a, t) ≤
∑
t′∈R(W )
P (s′, a, t′) ≤
∑
t∈W
(P (s, a, t) + ε)
where R(W ) is the set of all states that are in relation with states in W trough
R. We say that s is ε-simulated by s′, written s ≺ε s′, if (s, s′) ∈ R for some
relation of ε-simulation R on S.
The idea is that, while the ε-simulation allows a deviation of a values ε ∈
[−1, 1], here, we are only interested in positive values of ε. Hence, the proba-
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bilistic distribution of the contract have to be less that the probability distribu-
tion of the policy of, at most, a value ε.
It is worth noticing that, according to our assumptions, having a positive ε-
simulation R means that whether (s, s′) ∈ R then, for each action a ∈
SecAction,
P (s, a, t) ≤ P (s′, a, t′) ≤ P (s, a, t) + ε
and (t, t′) ∈ R.
Enforcement of Probabilistic Policies is performed when either the application is
not compliant with the contract or the contract is not compliant with the policy.
At each step, the enforcement computes the probability that the application
performs a specific security relevant action a, starting from the current state
s, P p(s, a, t), where t is the destination state of the transition and p is the ex-
pected one stated by the policy. This computation exploits history-based con-
cerning the current execution of the application. The computation of the prob-
ability of the execution trace is similar to the one described in the application-
contract matching module P pk =
∏k
i=1 P
p(si, ai, ti). The application is consid-
ered compliant if P pk > θk, where θk is the same considered in the application-
contract module. The enforcement denies the non compliant operation se-
quence, ensuring that the policy is correctly enforced.
It is worth noticing that Equation 4.1 holds. Indeed, the fact that C ε P means
that Pk ≤ P pk because
Pk =
k∏
i=1
P (si, ai, ti) ≤
k∏
i=1
P p(si, ai, ti) = P
p
k
Hence, θk < Pk ≤ P pk LetΘ be the compliance relation used in both application-
contract matching and enforcement mechanisms, where Θ denotes the set of
threshold values θk for any k-length execution trace, and let us consider to use
the positive ε-simulation for the contract-policy matching then the following holds
A Θ C ε P ⇒ A Θ P
4.3.2 Probabilistic Security-by-Contract-with-Trust
Let us introduce probability also into the S×C×T architecture. Referring to [43,
42], we consider a trusted marketplace that provides trusted information about the
compliance between the application and its contract. The Probabilistic Security-
by-Contract-with-Trust workflow is depicted in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Workflow for Probabilistic Security-by-Contract-with-Trust
Referring to the probabilistic S×C workflow, the main difference here is that we
do not have the application-contract matching functionality. replaced by the Trust
evaluator.
Trust Evaluator assesses the trust level of the application to be compliance with
its contract. Also in this case, the compliance relation we consider is the same
that we consider in S×C, i.e., Θ. Note that even when the developer does
not provide a contract for the application. In fact, according to [18], given an
application, it is possible to automatically generate its probabilistic contract.
Let us assume that the marketplace is able to generate it. In this case the
level of trust we consider is the level of reliability of the probabilistic contract
as complete description of the application behavior.
Probabilistic Contract Generation. The contract is generated by analyzing
either application executions or the application code [18], i.e., the application
control-flow is analyzed to explore all possible executions, and associating to
each execution a probability. The union of all the possible executions con-
stitutes all the possible sequences of states that an application can follow.
From these sequences of states, if we only focus on the security relevant ac-
tions executed by an application, i.e., SecActions, then the contract is repre-
sented by a probabilistic automaton Q = (V, SecAction, P ), where the nodes
V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} is related to the set of states, SecAction is the set of Se-
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cActions performed by a specific application, and P is the probabilistic transi-
tion function P : V ×SecAct×V → [0, 1] defined as follows: let mul(vi, a, vj)
be number of times that the action a is executed in the state vi for reaching
the state vj and let mul(vi) be the number of output arcs from vi. Hence, for
all state vi ∈ V ,
P (vi, a, vj) =
mul(vi, a, vj)
mul(vi)
for each vj reached by vi through an action a. P (vk, a, vl) = 0 is associated
to any missing edge between vk and vl. It is worth noticing that this model is
a generative one.
Probabilistic Contract-Policy matching. Also in this case, matching is performed
by checking if there exists a probabilistic simulation relation or an ε-simulation
between the probabilistic contract and the probabilistic policy. It is worth notic-
ing that, in any case, a probabilistic automata is returned. Hence, we can ex-
ploit the same functionalities we have described in the Probabilistic Security-
by-Contract workflow.
Probabilistic Contract monitor. The contract monitor is performed when both the
trust level is greater than a policy-defined threshold and the contract policy
matching returns a positive answer. This is because, also for Probabilistic
Security-by-Contract-with-Trust holds the Equation 4.1. If no violation is de-
tected, then the application worked as expected. Otherwise, we are dealing
with a non-compliant contract. In this case, if the contract is provided by the
developer, the marketplace has to downgrade the level of trust of the appli-
cation. On the other hand, if we are dealing with the automatically generated
contract, the marketplace has to update the contract by taking into account
also the trace that contains the violation.
Probabilistic contract monitor and policy enforcement. Similarly to a pure enforce-
ment framework in Probabilistic S×C, our system guarantees that executions
are policy-compliant. However, monitoring contracts during these executions
can also provide a useful feedback. Hence, in this scenario, both policy en-
forcement and contract monitoring are active. To reduce the overhead of the
monitoring, the contract monitor is only activated on a statistical base depend-
ing on the level of trust of the application.
4.4 Use Case: Android System and Applications
A possible use-case for the probabilistic contract model is represented by the mo-
bile operative system Android.
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Android is an app-based mobile operative system: it allows users to download
and install applications specifically designed for Android devices. The Android op-
erative system is a complex framework that relies on a generic Linux kernel and
several libraries written in high level languages that enable the interaction with
all the device components. Applications offer several functionalities exploiting the
various interfaces and components of the device, by also accessing resources
that are security-critical, such as network interfaces, call dialer, SMS manager, or
even private data like contact lists, social network passwords, device IMEI and SIM
number. Due to the high number of security-critical resources, smartphones and
tablets are susceptible to a higher number of security issues than personal com-
puters. In fact, starting from 2009, the number of attacks targeted to mobile devices
has strongly increased [83]. In particular, in 2011 and 2012 several malicious ap-
plications (malware) have been developed specifically for Android devices.
Android already includes a contract-like system, based upon the concepts of
permissions and manifest. In Android each application comes shipped with a doc-
ument called AndroidManifest.xml (manifest for short) that describes the appli-
cation components and declares the security actions performed by the application.
If an application has to perform some critical operations, such as to access a de-
vice resource, or to read/write sensitive information, this has to be declared it in
the manifest file. To enforce this contract, a component on the system-side called
Permission Checker constantly enforces the policy by denying each operation for
which the permission has not been declared in the manifest file. Several criticisms
have been raised against this system, which results too coarse-grained [131] and
too much reliant on user knowledge and expertise [71]. The main problem of this
approach is that the acceptance policy for an application’s requested permission
is “all or nothing”, that is, the user cannot accept only a subset of the required
permissions.
We argue that is possible to enhance the Android permission system increas-
ing its expressiveness, including in Android the probabilistic Security-By-Contract
model. This is discussed in the next subsection.
4.4.1 Extended Manifest and Trust Evaluator
The first step to extend the Android permission system is the extension of the man-
ifest file to include a description of the probabilistic automata. The manifest file is
written in eXtensible Markup Language (XML), in which the inclusion of additional
data is straightforward. Exploiting this feature of the XML language, we extend
the manifest introducing a new xml tag: <contract_clause>. This tag contains
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a description of the contract probabilistic automaton in Graph Markup Language
(GML). GML gives an XML-like description of a graph or automaton and can be
easily embedded in an XML document. In this way, the <contract_clause> tag is
not analyzed by the Android system, which only checks the ordinary permissions.
Hence, in our proposed framework, the manifest file comes as a contract di-
vided in two parts. The first one is filled by the developer and specifies the appli-
cation components and permissions. The second part, which can be filled either
by the developer or directly by a trusted third party, e.g. the Google Play market,
contains the probabilistic contract. Since in Android the main vector for application
distribution is the on-line marketplace, Google Play, the trust relationship is not
directly established between users and developers. Developers build a trust rela-
tionship with the market, which decides how much it trust the applications coming
from a developer. This trust value is added to the manifest file. The trust value is
analyzed by the Trust Evaluator component, which decides whether the application
is trusted or not.
Example: “The probability that an SMS is sent to a number not in the contact list
is lesser than 3%”. In Android there are several SMS manager applications which
can be downloaded and installed, which may automatically send SMS messages
(memo or post-poned sending). These applications should send SMS to known
numbers and to unknown ones in a limited amount of times only. This avoids, for
example the unwilling subscription to premium services. Simply using the Android
permissions SEND_SMS and READ_CONTACTS, it is not possible to implement such a
policy, that even if simple requires a greater expressivity than the one provided by
Android. Using probabilistic automaton, the definition of such a policy is straight-
forward.
4.4.2 Policy Manager, Matching and Enforcement
The Policy Manager is used to specify the security policies, which can be global
or per-application. This component presents a simple user interface that allows
users to define policies. Moreover this component is able to learn user behaviors
concerning security relevant actions, e.g. learning the average of SMS messages
sent each day, and to instantiate a proper policy accordingly. In this scenario, the
policy manager either receives as input (i) the user-policy, either written in a policy-
specification language or even in natural language or (ii) is learnt by monitoring
the user behavior. Afterwards, the policy is translated in a probabilistic automata,
which can be used for contract-policy matching or policy enforcement.
The contract-policy matching verifies if the manifest extension matches the
policy provided by the Policy Manager. This control is executed at deploy time.
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If the contract does not match the policy, the user is prompted to decide if she
wants to abort the installation, or install however the application with a run-time
policy enforcement. The Security-By-Contract-with-Trust enforcement extends the
one performed by the permission checker, ensuring that the defined policies are
always enforced. Figure 4.6 depicts a workflow of the Security-By-Contract-with-
Trust extension on Android devices.
Figure 4.6: Inclusion of Security-By-Contract on Android
Notice that for sake of clarity, the Application-Contract Matching component
has not been included in Figure 4.6. This task is demanded to the Trusted Third
Party.
4.5 Related Work
In the last decade, the Security-by-Contract framework [64] has been extended
and applied in several ways and in different scenarios. For instance, in [43, 42]
the extension of the Security-by-Contract with Trust manager has been presented.
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Furthermore, in [42] it has been instantiated in a marketplace scenario and in
particular, it is integrated with a trust manager able to manage feedback obtained
by the monitoring module. Another application scenario is the one of web service
[65, 76, 20].
From the quantitative perspective, the problem of finding an optimal control
strategy is considered by Easwaran et al. in [66] in the context of software moni-
toring, where the system is represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph, and where
rewards and penalties with correcting actions are taken into account, thus using
dynamic programming to find the optimal solution. Similarly, an encoding of ac-
cess control mechanisms using Probabilistic Decision Process is proposed in [94],
where the optimal policy can be derived by solving the corresponding optimization
problem. From a different perspective, Bielova and Massacci propose in [28] a no-
tion of distance among traces, thus expressing that if a trace is not secure, it should
be edited to a secure trace close to the non-secure one, thus characterizing en-
forcement strategies by the distance from the original trace they create. A system
that exploits system calls to detect non-compliant application is presented in [62].
Referring to probabilistic models, probabilistic contracts has been firstly introduced
in [50] for analyzing reliability and availability aspects of systems. The generation
of probabilistic contract has been made by analyzing the occurrences of system
calls. In [79] a scheme for intrusion detection using probabilistic automata is pro-
posed. This system exploits system calls and hidden Markov models and is able
to detect efficiently denial of service attacks. [93] presents another system based
upon system calls and Markov models to detect intrusions. This system analyzes
the arguments of the system calls but is oblivious of the system call sequence.
System call sequence and deterministic automata have been used in [85] to de-
tect anomalies, which are detected when system call sequences differ from an
execution trace known to be good.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have discussed the current limitations of the semantics of the
security models for mobile applications. To this end, we have presented a prob-
abilistic version of the Security-by-Contract with Trust, which is able to guarantee
probabilistic requirements. We have discussed the advantages in terms of expres-
siveness achieved including probability in the S×C×T framework. Finally, we have
shown a possible use-case, including S×C×T in the Android operative system,
showing the feasibility of the proposed approach.
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Future extensions to this work will be the definition of probabilistic formalisms
and languages, which should be used to programmatically define probabilistic
contracts and policies, then to verify their compliance. This languages should be
equivalent in expressiveness to the probabilistic automata that we have used to ex-
press policies and contracts. Furthermore, we are going to include the presented
framework in real mobile devices, investigating if it is possible to distribute it as
common mobile application, which can give users a way to better control their
mobile devices.
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5.1 Introduction
At the end of 2014, the number of active mobile devices worldwide was almost
7 billions and in developed nations the ratio between mobile devices and people
is estimated as 120.8%. In particular, 95% of these devices are smartphones or
tablets [6]. Given their large distribution, and also their capabilities, in the last two
years mobile devices have became the main target for attackers [10]. Android,
the open source operative system (OS) introduced by Google, has currently the
largest market share [6], which is greater than 80%. For these reasons, Android is
almost the only target of attacks against mobile devices (98,5 %) with more than 1
million of malicious applications (apps) available in the wild [37].
Malicious apps constitute the main vector for security attacks against mobile
devices. Disguised as normal and useful apps, they hide treacherous code which
performs actions in the background that threatens the user privacy, the device in-
tegrity or even user’s money. Some common examples of attacks performed by
Android malicious apps [135] are stealing contacts, login credentials, text mes-
sages, or maliciously subscribing the user to costly premium services. Further-
more, all these misbehaviors can be performed on Android devices without that
the user can notice them or before it is too late. It has been recently reported1
that almost 60% of existing malware send stealthy premium-rate SMS messages.
One of the main reasons is that Android malware exploits operations that are not
malicious by themselves but if contextualized can be used to give a revenue for the
attacker. For example, the action of sending a text message is a normal operation;
however, sending a text message to a premium service number and deleting it
1 http://goo.gl/dMgpxm
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from the messages outbox (to pass unnoticed) is very likely a misbehavior. These
apps are part of a category of apps called trojanized, a subclass of repackaged
apps, and can be found in online marketplaces not controlled by Google. However,
also Google Play, the official market for Android applications hosted apps which
have been found to be malicious2. Even if these apps are removed both from the
market, and remotely from devices where the app has been deployed, they may
have already performed their misbehavior.
In an attempt to limit the set of (dangerous) operations that an app can per-
form, Android has introduced its native security mechanisms in the form of permis-
sions and apps isolation. The Android permission system enforces access control
on security critical resources and operations, forcing the developer to declare be-
forehand the resources and operations that the app needs to access. If an app at-
tempts to access a resource, or perform an operation without declaring the needed
permission, the access is denied. For what concerns app isolation, Android ex-
ploits the underlying Linux kernel and the virtual machines in which each app
is executed to ensure that an app cannot interfere with the execution of another
one. Moreover, each app has its own private memory space, since every virtual
machine receives a different Linux user ID and the corresponding home folder ac-
cessible only to that specific app. However, both permissions and isolation have
shown weaknesses [71], which have been exploited by malicious developers.
As a motivating example, let us consider the gaming app Baseball Superstar3.
While the app on the official store does not bring any harm to the device, on some
unofficial channel it is possible to find a trojanized version of this app [135][55].
The only hint on the possible danger brought by this app is that the list of declared
permissions includes the request to send text messages (SMS). This inconsis-
tency is likely to pass unnoticed (according to [71]), and hence, once granted the
authorization, no more evidence of the app misbehaviors are shown to the user. In
fact, the app looks like a video game correctly working. However, in background,
the malicious code of the malware Geinimi opens a back-door for a command
and control (C&C) server which can instruct the device to send text messages
from remote. It is worth noting that the outgoing messages will pass unnoticed
since in Android messages sent by apps are not stored in the outbox, nor noti-
fication to the user are sent. Not only sending text messages impose a cost to
the user, but the attacker, with the right authorizations, can also use these mes-
sages also to send private data of the user or device (such as IMEI and IMSI
code). Additional motivating examples are the apps hiding the rootkit LeNa [135]
2 http://goo.gl/IGmZhk
3 http://goo.gl/FWLNWw
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which stealthily installs other apps with dangerous authorizations, which are never
shown to the user. The installed apps are able to communicate between them, by
exploiting the Android standard communication mechanism and eluding the isola-
tion mechanisms. Through this scheme, even a single malicious app can enable
an attacker to fully control the device, and all the stored information. Moreover,
these frameworks generally requires a custom operative system [67]. Along with
the vast increase of Android malware, several security solutions have been pro-
posed, spanning from static or dynamic analysis of apps [112] [106], to applying
security policies enforcing data security[31] [25], to run-time enforcement [137]
[67]. However, the presented solutions still present important flaws. In particular
they are attack-specific, i.e. they focus and tackle a single kind of security attack,
e.g. privacy leaking [137] [67], or privilege escalation (jail-breaking) [31] [32].
In this paper we present MADAM (Multi-level Anomaly Detector for Android
Malware), a host-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Android device.
MADAM security enforcement is multi-layer in the sense that it spans from kernel-
level to user level, to prevent, detect and block malicious behaviors and their
causes. MADAM has been designed to be usable, i.e. with a limited overhead
(1.4% of performance overhead and 4% of battery depletion) and requires almost
none user interaction. MADAM is also adaptive, since it is able to progressively
learn the user and device behavioral patterns, by means of a classifier (K-NN)
which can continuously add new elements to its knowledge base. MADAM has
been tested against two large dataset of malicious apps [135] [1] and proved to be
effective in detecting and stopping malicious behaviors related to privacy leaking,
stealing money through text messages and mining device integrity.
MADAM comes as an Android app that, once installed, constantly monitors the
device with the following actions: (i) it assesses the risk of newly installed apps,
before they are executed, by analyzing the requested permissions and reputation
metadata, such as user scores and download number; (ii) it alerts the user when
a newly installed app is potentially dangerous, by handling the removal process if
the user does not decide to install it anyway; (iii) it monitors the amount of sys-
tem calls globally issued on the device and the user activity, learning through a
classifier user and device behavioral pattern and alert anomalies; (iv) it imple-
ments dynamic analysis of apps behavior with interception and blocking of poten-
tially dangerous actions (e.g. sending text messages); (v) it enforces security rules
(heuristics) which take in account device, user and app behavior.
The novel contributions of this paper are the following:
• This paper describes in details MADAM, a light-weight multi-level anomaly de-
tector for Android malware.
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• It is proposed a classification of Android malware in 8 macro-groups, to better
divide the several malware families which can be found in the wild.
• The paper details a methodology to detect global misbehaviors exploiting a
white list-based analysis of system events, intercepted at three different levels
(i.e. system calls, app and user).
• A configurable and adaptive heuristics-based system to detect and stop app
dangerous behaviors is presented.
• It is presented a module that performs a static pre-filtering based on app meta-
data, such as the declared permissions, to find apps that are considered as
risky. If this is the case, then MADAM focuses its dynamic analysis on them.
It then presents the advantages for performance and accuracy given by the
inclusion in the MADAM framework of this component to classify Android apps
at deploy-time.
• A thorough analysis on the MADAM classification capabilities is reported show-
ing the performance of the chosen classifier and the detection results.
• The results of MADAM analysis against two dataset of malicious apps are re-
ported. MADAM reported a detection rate of 95% on a testbed of 1300 mali-
cious apps.
• A study on usability to assess the MADAM overhead has been conducted.
MADAM shows a low performance overhead (1.4%), low battery depletion (4%,
1 hour on 24 hours of standby) and low false positive rate (one false alarm per
day, in average).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the rele-
vant works in related field. Section 5.3 reports background information on Android
security and threats, also proposing a malware classification in 8 macro-groups.
Section 5.4 presents the MADAM framework describing in details the components
and the workflow. Section 5.5 reports the analysis on the performance of differ-
ence classifier, motivating the choice of the K-NN. Afterward reports the detection
results on two large dataset of malicious applications, namely Genome and Con-
tagio Mobile, together with the performance and false alarm rate analysis. Sec-
tion 4.6 concludes presenting possible framework extension.
5.2 Related Work
Crowdroid [34] is a machine learning-based framework that recognizes Trojan-like
malware on Android smartphones, by analyzing the number of times each system
call has been issued by an app during the execution of an action that requires user
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interaction. A genuine app differs from its trojanized version, since it issues differ-
ent types and a different number of system calls. Crowdroid builds a vector of m
features (the Android system calls). Differently from this approach, MADAM uses
a global-monitoring approach that is able to detect malware contained in unknown
apps, i.e. not previously classified. Furthermore, on Crowdroid only two trojanised
apps have been tested, whereas on MADAM we tested ten real malware. A similar
approach is presented in [47], which also considers the system call parameters to
discern between normal system calls and malicious ones.
Another IDS that relies on machine learning techniques is Andromaly [14],
which monitors both the smartphone and user’s behaviors by observing several
parameters, spanning from sensors activities to CPU usage. 88 features are used
to describe these behaviors; the features are then pre-processed by feature selec-
tion algorithms. The authors developed four malicious apps to evaluate the ability
to detect anomalies. Compared to Andromaly, MADAM uses a smaller number of
features (13), and has been tested on real malware found in the wild, and shows
better performance in terms of detection and, especially, of false positives rate.
After the learning phase, the false positive rate of MADAM is 0.0001, whereas that
of [14], which uses a sampling method similar to that of MADAM and with a com-
parable sampling rate (2 seconds), is 0.12. The detection rate of MADAM is 93%,
while that of [14] is 80%.
Other approaches only monitor misbehaviors on a limited number of function-
alities such as outgoing/incoming traffic [46], SMS, Bluetooth and IM [12], or power
consumption [75] and, therefore, their detection accuracy is higher of other work
but less general. [113] monitors smartphones to extract features that can be used
in a machine learning algorithm to detect anomalies. The framework includes a
monitoring client, a Remote Anomaly Detection System (RADS) and a visualiza-
tion component. RADS is a web service that receives, from the monitoring client,
the monitored features and exploits this information, stored in a database, to imple-
ment a machine learning algorithm. In MADAM, the detection is performed locally
and, more importantly, in real-time. [128] proposes a behavior-based malware de-
tection system (pBMDS) that correlates user’s inputs with system calls to detect
anomalous activities related to SMS/MMS sending. MADAM is more general since
it considers all the activities on a smartphone. A further framework targeted at SM-
S/MMS monitoring is Proactive Group Behavior Containment [30], which is aimed
at containing malicious software spreading in these messaging networks.
[69] and [100] propose Kirin security service for Android, which performs
lightweight certification of apps to mitigate malware at install time. Kirin certifica-
tion uses security rules that match undesirable properties in security configuration
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bundled with apps. [112] performs static analysis on the executables to extract
functions calls usage using readelf command. Hence, these calls are compared
with malware executables for classification.
5.3 Background
5.3.1 Mobile Malware
Due to the predominance of the Android OS, more than 98% of current malware
for mobile device is target for Android [37]. These pieces of malware are generally
diffused through unofficial app markets, which distribute repackaged free versions
of apps that have a cost on the official market Google Play. Repackaged apps
are the main vector of malware for Android devices. These app include both the
normal code of the app plus malicious code that runs in background performing
misbehaviors. A subclass of this class is that of trojanized apps, which perform
extremely dangerous actions.
According to Kaspersky [37], more than ten million malicious apps for Android
were available at the end of 2013. More recently, a report for the first half of 2014
[90] presents 20 types of new malware. Notwithstanding the huge number of mali-
cious apps and threats, Android malware can be divided in families of malware that
show exactly the same behavior. In 2012 the Android Malware Genome Project
[135] presented a collection of more than 1000 thousand malicious apps divided
in 49 families. A more updated classification of Android malware [116], refers to a
website4 that lists 154 malware families. During the analysis of the malware, we
have noticed that, though the number of malware families is relatively high, the
classes of threats brought by these malicious apps is quite limited in number. In
fact, by only taking into account the goal of the malware, we have seen that mis-
behaviors performed by malware can be grouped in the following 10 categories:
• botnet functionality: open a backdoor on the device, waiting for commands
which can arrive from an external server or an SMS message;
• gains root access: perform buffer overflow to get super user privileges on the
device;
• SMS trojan: send SMS messages stealthily and without the user consent,
generally to subscribe the user to a premium services, or send spam messages
to all og user contacts;
4 http://forensics.spreitzenbarth.de/
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• steals location information: take pieces of data from location interfaces and
sends them to an external server without the user implicit or explicit consent;
• steals private information: superset of the previous group which also attempt
to steal device IMEI and IMSI, contacts, message inbox or social network ac-
count data;
• installs other apps or binaries: install apps with new authorizations to in-
crease the capability of harming the system.
• banking trojan: exploits authentication mechanism of some bank institutes,
based on SMS messages to authorize unwanted transactions;
• infects a connected computer: send malicious payload on a personal com-
puter when the infected mobile device is connected via USB;
• make the device unusable: continuously shows an activity on top of the
screen preventing the user from interacting with the mobile device;
• violate file integrity: modify or delete data from the device without the user
consent.
We can furtherly refine this clustering by merging the two classes “Banking Tro-
jan” with “SMS Trojan” in a single class “Trojan”, since banking Trojans cleverly
exploits SMS messages to perform unsolicited bank transactions. Moreover, we
can also merge “Steals location information” with “Steals Private Information” in a
single misbehavior class, since location is a private data itself. Considering that the
various pieces of malware in the wild perform one or more of the aforementioned
misbehavior, we propose the following malware classification:
(i) botnet : malware performing the “botnet functionality” misbehavior;
(ii) rootkit : malware performing the “gains root access” misbehavior;
(iii) SMS trojan: malware performing “SMS trojan” or ”banking trojan” misbehavior;
(iv) spyware: malware stealing private or location information;
(v) installer : malware installing additional apps without the user consent;
(vi) vessel : malware that waits for the infected device to be connected via USB to
a personal computer to be infected.
(vii) ransomware: malware that makes the device unusable and pretends to make
it again usable after a ransom is paid.
(viii) trojan: malware with generic misbehavior not belonging to the former cate-
gories.
Some malicious apps fall at the same time in more than one of these categories.
For example, several rootkit also hide inside botnet functionality, or capacity to
install apps and sending SMS messages.
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It is worth noting that malware for Android usually perform malicious actions
whose effects are indeed dangerous, and that may inflict even a direct monetary
loss to the user. However, these are standard actions and, for this reason, mis-
behaviors of malicious apps are really unlikely to be discovered by users on time.
In fact, malware prefer subtlety to aggressiveness. Moreover, malicious apps do
not follow a fixed scheme in the permission request. Some malicious apps re-
quire dangerous permissions, which clearly show the potential malicious intention
of the malware, whereas others cleverly hide the malicious permissions with le-
gitimate ones. As an example, a trojanized app for instant messaging can ask
for the SEND_SMS permission legitimately and then exploit it maliciously. Finally,
some pieces of malware do not ask for permissions since they acquire the root
privileges at the kernel level, avoiding the permission security mechanism. This
motivates the design of a security framework which automatically detects apps’
malicious behavior, analyzing elements (features) non-observable by the user.
5.3.2 Android Security
The Android OS includes native security mechanisms to protect the user and the
device from malicious apps. These are based upon Access Control and App Iso-
lation. Access control exploits the permission system to protect access to security
critical resources and operations. In particular, if an app wants to perform a secu-
rity critical operation, e.g. sending a text message or wants to access a security
critical resource, e.g. contacts in device contact list, the developer has to declare
this intention requesting the permission beforehand in the AndroidManifest.xml
file, part of every Android app. Thus, the developer declares all resources and
operation performed by the app through permissions. Then, when the user is in-
stalling the app (at deploy-time) the permission of the manifest file are shown and
the user decides if she wants to grant such authorizations or not. Note that the user
can only accept to authorize the app with all the permissions or deny them all. . Af-
ter several critics to this too corarse-grained “all or nothing” approach [57], Android
introduced the possibility to grant and revoke single permission to installed apps
through the system app AppOps. However, the improvement brought by AppOps is
quite limited. In fact, whenever an app tries to perform an operation without the
permission being granted, the Android permission checker will deny the operation
at run-time, returning an exception that, if not handled, causes the crash of the
app.
Android relies also on app isolation to improve the security of apps. Every An-
droid app runs in a different virtual machine (Dalvik Virtual Machine, DVM), by
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seeing memory as if it is the only app running on the device. Moreover, every DVM
is assigned with a separate Unix user ID. Thus, any app also has its private stor-
age space (home folder) not accessible to any other app or user. Notwithstanding,
Android app can communicate between them using Intents, which are a commu-
nication mechanism provided and handled by the Android OS, or through inter
process communication (IPC). Maliciously exploiting these communication mech-
anisms, it is possible to elude the app isolation security mechanism, performing
attacks like the Confused Deputy Attack [31].
5.3.3 Characterization of the Problem
Android malware are distributed in the form of Trojanized apps, which perform
malicious behaviors in background and, hence, are difficult to detect. Current anti-
virus software is based on a static analysis and a black-list approach aimed at
finding known malicious patterns in the app code or binary. However, the amount
of malware samples available grows every day [90]. These new pieces of malware
come either as modification of existing samples or totally new malware pieces
and are called Zero-Day threats. By definition, Zero-Day threats defy any black-list
approach, since their code (or binary) will be likely not registered in any database.
The procedure of finding the new threat and updating anti-virus software on user
devices can also take several days, in which the user remains vulnerable to these
attacks.
On the other hand, the weakness of the permission system is that the deci-
sion on installation is responsibility of the user only. In general we can say that
permissions effectiveness is extremely limited because several users do not un-
derstand them [71, 70] and often they simply install the app without reading the
requested permissions, making useless the whole security mechanism. For these
reasons, we need a system that checks for suspicious activities, in an automatic
way, without relying on the users.
5.4 MADAM
The Multi-Level Anomaly Detector for Android Malware (MADAM) is an host-based
IDS for Android devices. MADAM monitors multi-level features, namely system
call, API calls and user activity. The system calls describe the device behavior at
kernel level, in fact, any action performed by applications or OS is translated in
a sequence of system calls. For this reason the system call analysis has already
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been used in previous work to detect intrusions [47]. On the other hand, monitor-
ing specific API calls allows to control which high level operations are performed
on the device by the OS or applications, e.g. sending a text message, start a
phone call, start an application etc. Finally monitoring the user activity means to
understand when she is interacting with the phone and when she is not, relating
these two profiles with the device activity. In fact, when the user is interacting with
the phone, the number of events (both at system call and API level) monitored
on the device is generally higher than when the user is not interacting. Through
these features MADAM is able to discern between normal and anomalous device
behavior and to find the malicious actions performed by apps. In particular, is con-
sidered as normal the behavior of a device non-infected by any malware, learned
by MADAM in a training phase described in the following. The behaviors which
strongly differs from the normal ones are considered anomalous and deemed by
MADAM as malicious. Due to the anomaly-based approach, MADAM targets all
the aforementioned malware classes. Other main elements analyzed by MADAM
are the permissions declared by apps and apps’ reputation metadata, such as
rating, marketplace and download number. These elements are used by MADAM
for performing a risk assessment of the app at deploy-time. MADAM is aimed at
detecting those app misbehaviors which otherwise are not observable to users
and Android native security mechanism. To this end it combines the results of the
static analysis of app with the multi-level monitoring of the device behavior. To ef-
fectively enforce security, MADAM also implements heuristics aimed at stopping
known malicious actions (black-list). Examples of used heuristics are “prevents
apps from sending more than one SMS to a number not in the address book” or
“kill an app execution if it creates an amount of processes greater than a specific
threshold”. In the following we will present the MADAM architecture, detailing the
various components and describing their interaction.
5.4.1 Main Components and Workflow
MADAM is composed of four main functional blocks which analyze the smartphone
activities at different levels, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The first one is the App Classi-
fication Module (App Evaluator), which executes an app pre-filtering by analyzing
static features of the app package (apk) before the app is installed on the device,
eventually populating a set of suspicious apps. The second block is the Global
Monitor, which monitors the device and OS features at three different levels, i.e.
kernel (system call), API and user, to continuously shape the current behavior of
the device itself (i.e., not of any particular app, but of the system as a whole), by
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classifying it as genuine (normal) or malicious (anomalous). The third block is the
Per App Monitor, which implements a set of heuristics to monitor the actions per-
formed by the set of suspicious apps generated by the AppClassifier, and stops
malicious actions and then handles the procedure for removing malicious apps.
Finally, the user interface handles notifications to device user.
Figure 5.1: Architecture of MADAM
Figure 5.2 reports the workflow of the MADAM framework. The flowchart on the
left describes the pre-filtering procedure, which stars at the deployment of a new
app. The app evaluator will analyze the application package looking for required
authorizations and other metadata (detailed in Sect. 5.4.3) to assess the app risk.
If the app is deemed as malicious is added to a list of suspicious apps. The app
in the suspicious list are subject to the heuristics of the per-app monitor. Actions
performed by app deemed as genuine will be stopped only if specifically violating
one or more heuristics. This allows to reduce the amount of false alarms. The
right workflow of Figure 5.2 describes the behavior of MADAM when an alarm is
raised by the global monitor. MADAM checks if there are apps in the suspicious
list. If the suspicious list is empty, the alarm will be recorded for subsequent user
analysis. As discussed in the following, this event is unlikely. If some apps are in
the suspicious list, MADAM verifies if an heuristic has been violated by one of the
app in the list. The per app monitor stops the violating actions before they take
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place, through an hijacking mechanism detailed in Section 5.4. Afterward MADAM
proposes the app for removal, leaving the final decision to the user.
Figure 5.2: MADAM Workflow
5.4.2 Global Monitoring
The global monitoring component of MADAM is based on two proximity-based
(K-NN)Classifiers, whose task is to detect anomalous behaviors. As discussed, a
behavior is described by a set of features, collected at run-time and representative
of the current device activity. The features are extracted from the different kinds
of dynamic events (refer to Figure 5.1): User Activity, API Level (in particular, Text
Messages) and System Call (SysCall).
The global monitoring component includes two cooperating classifiers. The
first instance of the global classifier is a short-term monitor (classifier) with Tshort
sec, whereas the second instance constitutes a long-term monitor with Tlong sec
(both values are configurable at run-time). The cooperation of these two instances
detects different types of misbehaviors. The short-term monitor is more effective
in detecting “spiky” misbehaviors, i.e. with sudden, brief and sharp increase of the
system call occurrences. On the other hand, the long-term monitor is aimed at
detecting misbehaviors that distribute their action constantly in a long period of
time, such as spyware, i.e. whose effect is not immediate.
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The usage of computational intelligence (classifiers) and statistical techniques
for intrusion detection is a well known approach [47], which have already been
exploited on other OSes and for network analysis[125]. In fact, regardless of the
specific environment, intrusion detection can be modeled as a problem of binary
classification. The binary classification problem for intrusion detection can be for-
mally defined as follows. Let us consider the set of classes Ω = ω0, ω1 where ω0
is the class of good behaviors and ω1 is the class of malicious behaviors. Then,
given a behavior B ∈ Rm , B = {f1, . . . , fm}, where m is the total number of
features describing the behavior, assign to B the correct class in Ω, through a
function D : Rm → Ω named classifier.
Several classifiers correspond to this description and can be used to solve the
classification problem. Among them, the k −NN (k - nearest neighbor) classifier
[118] is the one that best meets the MADAM needs for the following reasons. (i) All
them features describing a behavior in MADAM are numerical, as explained in the
following.(ii) The rationale of MADAM’s classification process is that an intrusion
represents a consistent deviation from the device normal behaviors and using nu-
merical features it is possible to geometrically represent this difference. The k-NN
classifier exploits this geometric representation to classify behaviors close to gen-
uine ones as belonging to class ω0 and the behaviors close to the malicious ones
as belonging to class ω1. Formally stated, given a new element (behavior) x and
considering y be an element whose class is already known, the k-NN computes
the similarity between x and y through the following relation:
Similarity(x, y) = −
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2
where xi and yi are the features of the vectors x and y. Then assigns to x the
class of the y which yields the highest value for this similarity.
The global monitor’s classifier (Figure 5.1) is trained to recognize a list (white
list) of real genuine behaviors collected on devices. As discussed, MADAM is an
anomaly based IDS, which by definition, alerts as anomalies the behaviors which
appreciably differs from the known ones. However, if a classifier is only trained
to recognize genuine behaviors, it will never report any alert. For this reason, the
classifier is also trained with a set of synthetic behaviors which are appreciably
different from the set of genuine ones, but not related to a specific malware. Thus,
no malware is detected by the global monitor because its signature is known by
MADAM. Hence, MADAM should be effective against zero day attacks, given that
they performs behavior which differ from the known ones. The generation of syn-
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thetic behaviors will be detailed in Section 5.5. In MADAM, each behavior vector
Bi is composed by m = 14 features. Each of the first eleven features records
the amount of the 11 different system calls issued in the amount of time Tk. The
complete list of monitored system calls is reported in Table 5.1: these are the
syscalls related to file operations and network access and are relevant because
the greatest amount of operations of Android are translated at a low level as edit-
ing of system files. The 12-th feature represents the user activity (idleness) and is
defined as follows: at each time interval Tk.
f11 =
{
1 if screen is off and user is not calling.
0 otherwise.
We note that user activity is strongly related to the overall activity of the phone.
We can categorize the general status of the phone in two states. In the first state
either the user is actively interacting with the phone and the screen is on, or the
screen is off but a phone call is ongoing, otherwise, in the second state, the phone
is not active. In fact, when the user is active, the phone has to show interactive
contents on the screen and receives inputs from the user, or handles the elements
involved in a phone call. In these cases, a large amount of system calls is gen-
erated. On the contrary a low number of system call is generated. Hence, it is
possible to delineate two different profiles, as shown in Table 5.1, where the 12-th
feature represents whether the user is active (1) or not (0). Considering that 90%
of available Android malware are related to unsolicited outgoing text messages,
i.e. SMS trojan [135], the amount of outgoing text messages for every Tk interval
is also used as a feature (f13). Finally, the feature f14 represents the amount of
text messages sent to a recipient which is not in the device contact list.
open ioctl brk read write exit close sendto sendmsg recvfrom recvmsg idleness SMS Num SMS susp
6 19 18 1 4 0 7 16 2 2 0 0 0 0
147 652 192 711 4 282 229 7 15 7 13 1 0 0
Table 5.1: Comparison of Behaviors: User Idle (Top) vs User Active (Bottom).
5.4.3 Metadata Analysis of Installed Apps
When a new app is installed on the device (deploy-time), MADAM intercepts and
hijacks the installation event through the MAETROID method, presented in Chap-
ter 2. MADAM analyzes the metadata of the new app package to assess its risk.
The analysis exploits five parameters, namely: (i) the permission declared in the
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manifest, (ii) the market of provenance, (iii) the total number of downloads, (iv)
the developer reputation and (v) the user rating. MADAM automatically extracts all
these information in a process which is totally transparent to the user. The user can
decide whether she prefers to receive a notification of the App-Evaluator decision
(Figure 5.3), or to keep the process invisible. The five parameters are analyzed
through a hierarchical algorithm [55], which returns a decision on the app clas-
sifying it as safe or risky. Based on this decision, the user can choose whether
to remove the new app. If the user chooses to install a risky app (or decides not
to receive notifications) the app package name is recorded in the MADAM list of
suspicious apps, as formerly discussed. In the following, we assume that the user
chooses the transparent approach, allowing the other components of MADAM to
enforce security on the device.
Figure 5.3: App Evaluator Decisions Shown to the User for Safe (left) and Risky
(right)
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5.4.4 Intercepting System Calls
To intercept (i.e., hook) system calls on Android, MADAM does not require a mod-
ified kernel or custom operative system. In fact, MADAM exploits a kernel module
to hook those system calls that are considered critical from the point of view of
security. The kernel module is loaded through the insmod command and interacts
with the rest of the MADAM framework through a shared buffer, used to exchange
information between the application level and the kernel level. Loading the ker-
nel module requires the usage of the insmod command, which requires the super
user privileges to be taken. Hence, though there is no need for a custom operative
system or kernel, MADAM requires the device to be rooted (jail-broken).
5.4.5 Exploiting the XPosed Framework
The MADAM prevention module exploits the XPosed Framework [35] to inter-
cept calls to security relevant API functions. The XPosed Framework is based
on an app that modifies the /system/bin/app_process executable, to make it
load a JAR file at device startup. The JAR file changes the references to the de-
fault API calls, allowing the redefinition of any method of every class. Therefore,
Android will call henceforth the redefined method instead of the predefined one.
Through Xposed framework, MADAM redefines the security relevant API, such as
SendTextMessage() (method to send SMS messages), reading the method’s ac-
tual parameters and the issuing app. Furthermore, MADAM is able to avoid that
the method is executed, preventing the negative effect of the misbehavior.
5.4.6 Heuristics and Prevention
The decision whether a performed operation has be stopped is demanded to a
module the implements a set of heuristics which is configurable and extensible.
Heuristics apply to both global events (like outgoing text messages) and to events
generated by those apps which have been considered suspicious by the App Eval-
uator module. MADAM proposes two sets of heuristics: (i) System Call Heuristics.
These heuristics have been created by analyzing a set of app behaviors consid-
ered as malicious, using a tree classifier to infer the common elements of these
behaviors. From this analysis we have seen that misbehaviors are often related
to sudden increase of some system calls, namely open, read, write, close.
Given these system calls, it is possible to find the app which caused the sudden
increase in the list of suspicious ones, monitoring the system calls generated by
the single app and deem it as malicious. (ii) API Level Heuristics. These heuristics
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represent high-level behaviors that are considered suspicious, which have been in-
ferred from known malware misbehaviors. Before introducing these heuristics we
define some preliminary concepts. Android devices have a messaging default app,
which is the app that by default handles the operations related to text messages.
Unless changed by user, the messaging default app is the native one. Other apps
may send text messages, asking for the permission SEND_SMS. However, Android
does not introduce by itself controls on the message recipient and on the number
of sent messages and, in fact, SMS Trojans exploit these vulnerabilities. There-
fore, the heuristics introduced by MADAM are aimed at mitigating these threats.
Namely the API level heuristics that we are considering are the following:
• Block text messages that are sent by a non-default message app. If this heuris-
tic is enabled, only the messages actively written and sent by the user, through
the messaging default app, will be allowed. MADAM will stop any other mes-
sage sent by other apps. Furthermore, if the message is sent by an app in-
cluded in the suspicious list, at the act of sending a message, the app will be
proposed for removal.
• Block text messages sent to numbers that are not in the user contact list. When
an app, different from the default messaging app, attempts to send a text mes-
sage, MADAM hijacks the action and verifies if the recipient is in the contact
list. If the recipient is not in the contact list, the action is considered a misbe-
havior and is put on hold. If the sending app is in the list of the suspicious app,
and the global monitor alerts a misbehavior, the app is proposed for removal. If
the user stops the process of app removal, or if the app is not in the suspicious
list, the user is asked if she wants to allow the message to be sent.
• Limit the amount of outgoing message per period of time. This heuristics allows
the user to set a maximum number of messages that can be sent by an app per
period of time. Both the time and the number of messages are configurable.
Outgoing messages are allowed till the threshold is reached, otherwise the
action is forbidden. Moreover, if the global monitor notifies a misbehavior, and
the sending app is in the suspicious list, the app is proposed for removal.
• Limit the amount of processes generated per app. The user can set the amount
of processes that an app can fork. If the number of processes overcomes the
threshold, the app is killed along with all the generated processes. Further-
more, if an alert has been issued by the global monitor, and the stopped app
is in the suspicious list, the app is proposed for removal.
Both API level and system call heuristics can be activated or deactivated man-
ually by the user, as to increase or reduce the severity of the prevention system.
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5.5 Results
This section presents the experimental results of the MADAM framework. First of
all, we recap some preliminary notions used for evaluate the performance indexes.
Then, we present a first a set of experiments to assess the classifier accuracy, per-
formed through cross validation (K-Fold). Afterward, a second set of experiments
evaluates the MADAM accuracy in real usage contexts, focusing on the detection
rate against malware coming from two large databases. A further set of experi-
ments has been conducted to assess the amount of false alarms. Finally, the im-
pact of MADAM on performance and energy consumption has also been evaluated
through benchmarking applications.
5.5.1 Evaluation Indexes
In a binary classification process elements are divided in four sets that, in the
context of malware detection, can be described as follows:
• TP: True Positives, which are the events of an attack correctly classified;
• TN: True Negatives, which are normal events correctly classified as non-attack;
• FP: False Positives, which are normal events classified by mistake as attacks;
• FN: False Negatives, which are attacks that are not recognized by the IDS.
A typical representation for these four sets is the binary confusion matrix, which is
depicted in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Binary Confusion Matrix
0 1
0 TN FP
1 FN TP
The confusion matrix reports the elements correctly classified on its diagonal,
whilst all the other elements are errors. Moreover, from the confusion matrix, the
following indexes can be easily computed. The first is the accuracy, which is de-
fined as the number of correctly classified elements divided by the total number of
classified elements. The accuracy is the index of the classifier goodness, and is
defined as:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
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Other two important indexes are the False Positive Rate (FPR) or False Alarm
Rate, and the False Negative Rate (FNR):
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
FNR =
FN
FN + TP
These two indexes estimate the classification error and are meaningful in under-
standing the effectiveness. In the particular case of IDS, the FPR is also important
to estimate the usability. In fact, an IDS showing an excessive FPR can bother the
user who will likely deactivate or remove the IDS.
5.5.2 Classifier Performances
The classifier exploited by MADAM is the k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), which is a
similarity-based classifier, i.e. it classifies two similar elements as belonging to the
same class. The similarity measure used by the k-NN classifier is the euclidean
distance measured in the features space, i.e. two elements are considered similar
if geometrically close in the features space [118], [86]. In a binary classification
process, where the labels of elements yi are in the set Y = {0, 1}, the output of
the k-NN classifier for a new element x′ is computed using the function fKNN :
fKNN (x
′) =
{
1 if Σi∈NK(x′)yi ≥ 0
0 if Σi∈NK(x′)yi ≤ 0
where Nk(x′) is the set of the K nearest neighbors of the element x′.
The similarity-based approach of the k-NN classifier is well suited with the ratio-
nale of the classification problem of MADAM. In fact, MADAM is trained with known
behaviors, representing genuine device activities (white list), and artificially gen-
erated malicious behaviors, which are strongly different (distant) from the known
ones. New behaviors that are similar to the known genuine behaviors are consid-
ered benign as well. On the other hand, unknown behaviors which are closer to
the artificial behaviors, are classified as malicious. This choice is consistent with
the anomaly-based (white list) approach, which aims at detecting behaviors that
strongly deviates from known good ones, instead of searching those behaviors
close to the ones known as malicious.
To further justify our classifier selection, we have considered other classifiers
used for numerical (quantitative) features, namely Linear Discriminant Classifier
(LDC), Quadratic Discriminant Classifier (QDC), Multi-Layer-Perceptron with back-
propagation (MLP), Parzen Classifier (PARZC) and Radial Basis Function (RBF).
All the classifiers have been trained with the same datasets and the same valida-
tion technique. The k-NN classifier gives the best classification results among all
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other classifiers, achieving the max accuracy when k = 1. Details on the experi-
ments are discussed in the following.
Testbed
Classification tests have been performed on two datasets of unique elements (vec-
tors) representing behaviors collected through a short term monitor (Tshort = 1s)
and a long term one (Tlong = 60s). Each dataset contains both genuine vectors
and anomalous ones. The genuine vectors are behaviors that have been collected
on a real Android device (Samsung Galaxy Nexus). The behaviors have been
generated in different activity conditions, i.e. screen-off native status, user inter-
action with native status, screen off heavy load, user interaction heavy load, user
playing heavy load. Instead, malicious behaviors have been created artificially to
reproduce situations strongly different from the ones reported in the genuine be-
haviors, e.g. by creating vectors with a high number of issued system calls but a
low user activity.
The first dataset, called henceforth short testbed, is composed of 830 vectors
with 14 features. This dataset includes behaviors (system calls and user activity)
collected in Tshort = 1s. The dataset is divided in 747 genuine elements and 83
malicious elements. The second dataset, called long testbed, is composed of 780
vectors with 15 features (system calls, user activity, outgoing messages), divided
in 656 genuine vectors and 124 malicious ones.
Experiment Description
We have tested the accuracy of six different classifiers on the datasets using hold-
out (i.e. division in training and testing set), with the K-Fold Cross Validation ap-
proach, with K = 5 (i.e., the entire dataset is used both as training and testing
set in K iterations, whose results are averaged). The classification results are re-
ported in table 5.4 and 5.3. In detail, each table reports, for each classifier, the total
amount of false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) issued in the k = 5 experi-
ments of the K-Fold cross validation. FPR and FNR instead are averaged on the 5
experiments. Finally, the global accuracy (averaged) is reported for any classifier.
Details are not reported for classifiers performing with an accuracy lesser than
50%. As shown in the tables, the K-NN gives the best accuracy results for both
datasets. In the short term experiments, both LDC and K-NN yield the same accu-
racy, but the FNR (real alarms passing unnoticed) is much larger (more than 18%)
in the case of LDC. Hence, the aim of keeping a “safe-side” approach motivates
our preference on the K-NN also for the short term classifier.
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Table 5.3: Classification Results on Short Term data.
Classifier FN FP FPR FNR Accuracy
K-NN 11 11 1.47% 12,2% 97,35%
LDC 16 6 0.8% 17.78 % 97.35%
QDC N/A N/A N/A N/A < 50%
MLP N/A N/A N/A N/A < 50%
PARZC 19 14 9,3% 21% 96%
RBF 16 20 2.6% 17.8% 96,7%
Table 5.4: Classification Results on Long Term data.
Classifier FN FP FPR FNR Accuracy
K-NN 10 16 1.9% 8% 97,7%
LDC 33 6 0.9% 26,4 % 95%
QDC 17 9 1,4 13,6% 96,6%
MLP N/A N/A N/A N/A < 50%
PARZC N/A N/A N/A N/A < 50%
RBF 21 19 2.6% 16.8% 94.9%
0 2 4 6 8 10
x 104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
# of read in one min
# 
of
 w
rit
e 
in
 o
ne
 m
in
Figure 5.4: Representation of the Dataset in the write and read Feature Space.
These results are sound with the nature of the specific MADAM classification
problem. In fact, genuine behaviors are not homogeneously distributed but, in-
stead, they can be seen as separate “clouds” or clusters of similar behaviors. The
reason is that, for any device, there are different usage patterns, all of which are le-
gitimate. As an example, let us consider the differences in device activity when the
screen is off and when the user is actively interacting. This difference influences
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the frequency and number of the issued system calls, which is shown in Figure
5.4, where the graph reports a two-dimensional representation of the long-term
dataset. The blue plus (+) represent the genuine behaviors, while the magenta
stars (*) represent the malicious ones. The graph only reports, for the sake of rep-
resentation, the two features representing the amount of read and write system
calls issued. From the graph we can seen that the genuine behaviors form six
agglomerated clusters, four in the bottom left of the graph and two with a higher
number of system calls. In particular, the small cluster of genuine behaviors with
more than 4·104 write is related to heavy device usage, i.e. gaming. It is also pos-
sible to deduce that the malicious behaviors are not easily separable from genuine
ones, using those classifiers which try to use hyperplanes or hyper-curves to di-
vide classes. For this reason, proximity-based classifiers, such as K-NN, are more
suitable to address this specific classification problem.
5.5.3 Malware Detection
To verify the effectiveness of MADAM, we have extensively tested the framework
against two large datasets with more than 1,300 malicious Android apps. Experi-
ments have all been performed on a jailbroken Samsung Galaxy Nexus running
Android stock Jelly Bean version 4.3. MADAM has been used with the following
configuration: the app evaluator shows the decision for each installed app, and the
global device monitor alerts for every detected misbehavior. The active heuristics
are “Stop text messages sent to numbers not in contacts”, “Limit the amount of
messages to 3 per minute”, “Limit the amount of processes per app to 20”.
The Genome Dataset
Genome [135] is a collection of 1,242 malicious Android apps collected in the
years 2010 and 2011. The apps are divided in 49 malware families that include
almost all malware categories discussed in 5.3, namely botnet, rootkit, SMS tro-
jans, spyware, installer and trojan. The vast majority of genome apps come from
Chinese unofficial marketplaces and some malware are (or were) effectively dan-
gerous only if installed on Chinese smartphones, i.e. with the user located in China
with a Chinese mobile operator. For example several apps belonging to the SMS
trojans category, contact premium numbers, but without adding the national prefix.
Thus, the number is not reachable from outside the country and the malware is
ineffective. However, regardless of the location, if the app attempts to perform the
misbehavior, MADAM is still able to detect and stop it (even if non harmful). Out
of the 1,242 apps of the original dataset, MADAM could have been tested on 809
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Table 5.5: MADAM Analysis of the Genome Dataset. (P = Pre-filtering, R = Run-
time detection).
Malware Samples Type P R
ADRD 22 Spyware
√ ×
Asroot 8 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
BaseBridge 122 SMS Trojan
√ √
BeanBot 8 SMS Trojan
√ √
Bgserv 9 SMS Trojan
√ √
DogWars 1 SMS Trojan
√ √
DroidCoupon 1 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
DroidDream 16 Rootkit + Spyware
√ √
DroidKungFu 402 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
FakePlayer 6 SMS Trojan
√ √
GamblerSMS 1 Spyware
√ ×
Geinimi 69 SMS Trojan
√ √
Gone60 9 Spyware
√ √
GPSSMSSpy 6 Spyware
√ ×
HyppoSMS 4 SMS Trojan
√ √
Jifake 1 SMS Trojan
√ √
Kmin 52 Spyware
√ √
NickySpy 2 Spyware
√ ×
Plankton 11 Spyware
√ ×
SndApps 10 Spyware
√ √
Spitmo 1 Spyware
√ √
Tapsnake 2 Spyware
√ ×
Walkinwat 1 Spyware
√ √
YZHC 22 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
zHash 11 Rootkit + Spyware
√ √
Zsone 12 SMS Trojan
√ √
Total 809 · · · 100% 95%
apps: the apps that are not considered in this analysis are those that either “crash”
during start, without performing any action, or those app awaiting commands from
a C&C server (botnet), which is not active anymoreMoreover, a consistent set of
malicious apps rely on OS vulnerability which have been fixed in the new Android
releases. Thus, these pieces of malware are not effective anymore on the Android
version that has been used for the experiments. In particular, 63 apps falls in this
last category.
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MADAM detection results are reported in Table 5.5. The second column from
right (P, pre-filtering) specifies if the application has been detected by the App
Evaluator module at deploy-time (
√
) or not (×). The right column (R, runtime de-
tection) specifies instead if the application has been detected at run-time, showing
an alarm to the user and/or stopping the malicious behavior. The global detection
rate on the 809 analyzed applications has been of 100% for the App Evaluator
(P) and 95% for the global monitor (R). Malware belonging to the rootkit category
are detected by the short term and long term k-NN classifiers. In fact, we have
observed that they cause strong fluctuations in the number of issued system calls,
not coherent with the current user activity, both if she is actively interacting with
the device or not. Furthermore, all rootkits using the Rage Against The Cage [98]
technique to perform buffer overflow are detected by the per app classifier, which
observes a large number of forked processes, belonging to the app. Installer mal-
ware are blocked as soon as they try to install a new application. In fact, MADAM
is able to detect through the short term K-NN the behavior change caused by the
unsolicited installation of a new package. Also, the App Evaluator intercepts the
event of installation of a new package, regardless of the installation source. In this
case, MADAM notifies the user, even if the installation of a new package is issued
from a malicious app. Furthermore, MADAM is able to notify the event of outgoing
SMS message through the global monitor, even if the message is stealthily sent
by an app.
We not that, normally, Android does not allow the monitoring of the event of out-
going text messages sent by an app, unless the app developer explicitly declares
the notification intent. For this reason, MADAM intercepts, controls (extracts text
and recipient) and even block any outgoing SMS. Thus, MADAM is able to detect
the app which is sending SMS message, stopping the action if deemed as sus-
picious from the per-app classifier and global one. By joining these two actions,
MADAM results to be totally effective against SMS trojans (100% of accuracy on
the testbed). Spyware actions are detected through the global monitor. In particu-
lar the long term k-NN classifier detects the access attempts to device resources,
not related to the user activity. Analyzing a set of 50 spyware behaviors (vectors),
collected by the long term monitor, using a tree classifier, an heuristic has been
extracted. This heuristic shows that, in several cases, a spyware attack is identi-
fied by detecting a large number of open system calls, not related to a comparable
amount of read and write. In the experiments on the Genome dataset, 8 spyware
families, out of 13, have been successfully detected at run-time, whilst all of them
(13 families on 13) have been correctly pre-filtered by the app-evaluator. We point
out that actions of some spyware are hard to detect at run-time, as once they re-
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ceive the correct authorizations (permissions), they perform operations which are
legal on a behavioral point of view. Moreover, explicit spyware applications (i.e.,
non trojanized) can be found also on marketplaces, distributed with the specific
purpose of sending device information to an external server. To this end, the app-
evaluator is able to discern between a trojanized app and a genuine one [55], to
overcome this weakness of the behavior-based global monitor.
Contagio Mobile
Contagio Mobile is a website that collects malware for several mobile OSes. Mal-
ware samples are submitted by readers, together with links to articles describing
the malware. Differently from Genome, which has several samples for different
pieces of malware, Contagio only presents few samples (generally one) for each
malware family. Contagio collects malware since 2012, including also malicious
apps found on Google Play, which may affect any kind of Android device, regard-
less of the nationality. We have tested MADAM against 18 malware families from
the Contagio database. Detection results are reported in Table 5.6. Currently SMS
trojan account for more than 90% of the total Android malicious apps which can be
found in the wild [90]. In fact, as shown in Table 5.6, new malware families falling
in this category can be found every year. SMS Trojans, results extremely effec-
tive since it cause a direct monetary loss to the user and is difficult to detect and
stop. MADAM is effective against SMS trojans, detecting and stopping them at all
cases. The testbed also show a malware belonging to the general trojan category.
This malware hides inside an app describing Iranian recipes and only asks for the
permission to access the SD card mass storage. The app maliciously exploits this
permission, starting to overwrite any picture in the SD card with another image,
permanently damaging the original files and slowly filling the memory. MADAM
detects this misbehavior by mean of the long term classifier, which detects the
change in the amount of write and open. This example shows the advantage of
using an anomaly-based IDS, which is able to detect misbehaviors even if a policy
has not been specified for it.
5.5.4 Usability Analysis
In this section we analyze the impact of MADAM on user perception and perfor-
mance of the device.
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Table 5.6: Analysis on malware from Contagio dataset. (P = pre-filtering, R = Run-
time detection).
Malware Year Type P R
Dogowar 2011 SMS Trojan
√ √
FakeMart 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
FakeNotify.B 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
FakeRegSMS.B 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
Fireye 2014 SMS Trojan
√ √
FlashFakeInstaller 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
Geinimi 2011 SMS Trojan
√ √
GoogleFakeInstaller 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
Lotoor 2011 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
Moghava 2012 Trojan
√ √
Oldboot.b 2012 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
OpFake 2012 SMS Trojan
√ √
Samsapo 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
Scavir 2012 SMS Trojan
√ √
Selfmite.B 2013 SMS Trojan
√ √
Stiniter 2012 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
XXShenqi 2014 SMS Trojan
√ √
YZHC 2011 Rootkit + Installer
√ √
False Positives
False positives do not have a direct effect on the security of the device. How-
ever, they are not desirable since they require interaction with the user, who has
to choose whether to remove or not the app deemed as malicious. Keeping their
number low is thus of capital importance to avoid that the user prefers to deacti-
vate MADAM. As shown in Table 5.3 and 5.4, the two K-NN classifiers of MADAM
(short term and long term) have a FPR of 1,47% and 1.9%. Considering that in
its operative conditions MADAM is handling 3660 events per hour, such an FPR
would not be acceptable since it would generate about 30 FP per hour. However,
the training set used for Table 5.3 and 5.4 is designed with different behaviors
aimed at representing various possible usage patterns. During the real usage, we
have experimentally verified that the behavioral variance is limited, i.e. the same
or very similar behaviors are repeated for a long time, till a new event (e.g. users
starts to interact with the device) changes the usage pattern. For this reason we
have measured the real amount of false positives generated with three different
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patterns of real device usage. As detailed in the following the false positives with
a normal device usage average to 1 per day.
Usability experiments have been conducted on three devices with three users
and different configurations. In the first experiment, called (i) Light Usage, we
tested a Samsung Galaxy S2 with Android Jelly Bean version 4.2. The device only
installed the native applications except for the super-user manager and MADAM.
The user has been instructed to keep the smartphone mainly in standby, except
for performing/receiving phone calls and/or sending/receiving text messages from
the default messaging app. In the second experiment, called Medium Usage, we
used a Samsung Galaxy Nexus with Android Jelly Bean version 4.3. The device
installed 54 legitimate apps, including the native ones, MADAM and the super-user
manager. The user has been instructed to use the device normally. The user on
a daily basis accessed the Internet, three instant messaging applications and two
social networks. Also he played daily with a 2D graphic videogame (Angry Birds
Space) and a 3D ones (Temple Run 2) and took pictures with the smartphone
camera. No new applications have been installed by this user on the device. In the
thirs experiments, called Heavy Usage, we tested a LG Nexus 4 equipped with An-
droid Kit-Kat version 4.4. At the beginning of the experiment the device equipped
52 apps including MADAM and super-user manager. The user has been instructed
to keep the device always active (screen always on), interacting with it as much as
possible. The user installed during the experiment 91 new legitimate applications
during the tests and heavily used gaming apps, camera to take pictures and record
video, in addition to instant messaging, text messages and phone calls.
The experiments lasted for one week, every day from 10:00 to 21:00, to avoid
the reduction of activity normally caused by the night. Results are reported in Table
5.7. The table reports the total number of false positives issued during the three
experiments by the two K-NN classifiers, and the average number per day. The
FPR computed on the amount of monitored events by the two K-NN classifiers
(60× 60× 11× 7 for the short term and 60× 11× 7 for the long term one).
Table 5.7: False alarms experimental results.
Test FPs FPR FPs/day
Light 3 1 · 10−5 0.5
Medium 8 2.8 · 10−5 1.1
Heavy 75 2.6 · 10−4 10.7
131
CHAPTER 5. MADAM: MULTI-LEVEL ANOMALY DETECTOR FOR ANDROID
MALWARE
We have seen that if the device usage follows an average usage profile, the
amount of false positives is at the threshold of 1 FP per day. It is worth noting that
the number of FP per day noticeably raises with an heavy usage. In particular, a
large number of false positives have been issued contemporary to the installation
of new apps (the user installed 91 legitimate apps during the week). The event of
installation of new apps is, in fact, computationally heavy and causes a sharp in-
crease in the amount of issued system calls. However, the installation of a new app
is handled by the package installer, which is a component of the operative system,
thus MADAM will only notify an anomaly, without deeming any app as responsible
for the misbehavior. Moreover, MADAM offers the possibility to handle false posi-
tives, allowing the users to re-train the classifiers, adding the false positives to the
training set, as genuine eventsThanks to this functionality, the user can teach to
MADAM its own behavior, reducing the amount of issued false positives. As a fur-
ther experiments, retraining the classifiers adding 5 FPs from the third experiment
to the training set and then using the device against in the same conditions of the
same experiment, the FPs average per day reduced to 3. To further reduce the
amount of issued FPs, it is also possible to put MADAM in “Training Mode”. In this
mode, the user will not be notified of any alarm, and the behaviors deemed as ma-
licious are immediately added to the classifier training set. Note that for the k-NN
classifier, this operation of adding a new element to the training set can be done
simply adding the new element to its knowledge base, without training it again
from scratches. This feature further motivate our decision in using the K-NN. How-
ever, “Training Mode” should be used carefully, i.e. the user should be sure that her
device is not infected when activating this mode, to avoid the risk of training the
classifier with malicious behavior as genuine. Moreover, over-training the classifier
may cause over-fitting with a consequent detection performance degradation.
Performance Overhead
The performance overhead of MADAM has been measured through the Quadrant
Standard Edition tool distributed as a free Android application through Google
Play 5. Performance tests have been performed on the same device used for mal-
ware detection experiments: Samsung Galaxy Nexus, CPU dual-core 1.2 GHz
Cortex-A9, RAM 1GB, GPU PowerVR SGX540. The device runs Android 4.3 Jelly
Bean, stock version. Apart from the native apps, the only app installed were the
super user manager and the MADAM application.
5 http://goo.gl/5ds6E7
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Table 5.8 reports the benchmark for the system when MADAM was run-
ning (third column from left, “Vanilla”) and when it was not (second column left,
“MADAM”). The last column reports the overhead computed as a percentage dif-
ference between the two performances. Benchmarks are provided as indexes,
where a highest value means a better performance6. Benchmarks reported have
been computed as the average of five experiments, both in “Vanilla” and “MADAM”
configuration. The overhead of MADAM is caused by both the kernel module which
hijacks system calls and a service which runs in background when the system is
active. This service is responsible to handle the communication between the ker-
nel level and the application level of MADAM. It also intercepts the events related
to SMS and user activity, then classifies each monitored behavior. As shown, the
performance impact of MADAM is acceptable; in fact, the overall performance im-
pact (Total) is of 1.4%. It is worth noting that the stronger impact is on memory
(9.4%). This is mainly due to the chosen classifier. In fact, the K-NN classifier,
does not cause heavy load on the CPU. However, the K-NN requires to contin-
uously keep in memory the whole training set, which may require a noticeable
amount of space [86]. On the other hand, we note that MADAM has no impact on
2D/3D performances. This was expected, since MADAM functionalities does not
influence the GPU. Furthermore, the 4% performance degradation on I/O is not
perceived by user, whose experience is not altered [49].
Table 5.8: Benchmark Tests
Test Vanilla MADAM Overhead
Total 2911 2868 1,4%
CPU 5509 5459 0,9%
Memory 2660 2409 9,4%
I/O 3860 3705 4%
2D 327 327 0%
3D 2250 2250 0 %
Energy Consumption
To measure the energy consumption of MADAM we have measured the difference
in battery consumption over two periods of 24 hours, with and without MADAM.
To apply the measurement, we used the Battery Monitor app 7. Experiments have
6 Units are not specified for each index.
7 http://goo.gl/gg8hzH
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been run on the same Samsung Galaxy Nexus used for the other experiments. The
smartphone equips a 1750 mAh battery whose status reported at the beginning
of the experiment by Battery Monitor is “good”. The smartphone has been kept in
stand-by for the whole experiment, with no apps running, except for MADAM. The
screen has been kept off for the whole experiment, network and localization inter-
faces were not active except for the 3G data connection. The results are reported
in Figure 5.5. The graph of Figure 5.5 reports the two different discharges sampled
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Figure 5.5: Energy impact evaluation of MADAM.
in a period of 24 hours with 77 sampling intervals (x-axis). The blue-dashed curve
(Vanilla) representing the discharge without MADAM and the red-continuous one
when MADAM is active. The monitoring started for both periods when the reported
charge was at 95%. This is to avoid the recorded energy fluctuations happening
immediately after the disconnection from the power supply. The distance between
the two discharging curves is always lesser than 4%, which is the maximum value,
recorded at the end of the monitoring period. The average consumption of the
MADAM application reported by Battery Monitor is of 82 mAh, accounting to 4.6%
of the total battery capacity. Thus, on a period of 24 hours, the MADAM user loses
approximatively one hour of battery time, which is in line with current antivirus [2].
5.6 Conclusion
Starting from the end of 2011, attackers have directed their attention toward smart-
phones and tablets, producing and distributing hundreds of thousand of malicious
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apps. These apps threaten the user data privacy, money and device integrity, be-
ing difficult to detect due to the low profile that they keep. This paper proposes
MADAM, a multi-level host-based intrusion detection system for Android devices.
MADAM enforces security, effectively protecting the device from malicious apps,
detecting them at deploy-time and/or at runtime. MADAM has been tested against
a testbed of 1300 malicious applications belonging to 40 malware families, show-
ing an accuracy of 95% for runtime detection. The usage of MADAM does not
modify the user experience, due to the low performance (1.4%) and energy over-
head (4%) and to the very limited required user interaction.
MADAM has been designed to be totally extensible. In fact, MADAM’s classi-
fiers can learn new behaviors to adapt to different users. Also new heuristics can
be added, to tackle specific misbehaviors. Given the fast malware evolution, this
feature is of fundamental importance. For this reason, we plan as a future work the
development of an interface to define new heuristics and security policies, which
could be used also by the average user.
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Security is of paramount importance on smartphones and tablets. In the last years,
these new generation mobile devices have drawn the attention of attackers aim-
ing at the user money, private information stored on the device, or at damaging
the device itself. The main attack vector are trojanized apps, which are (i) easily
distributed, through official or unofficial marketplaces, (ii) stealthy, since they offer
the functionalities of real apps and perform the misbehavior in background, (iii)
effective, since their effect may seriously compromise the user privacy, her money
or the device.
Given the importance of protecting the user from threats brought by malicious
apps, in this thesis we have presented a multi-component security framework for
Android device protection. This framework combines the actions of four subcom-
ponents which have been object of separate studies. Each subcomponent address
a security issue or enforces a specific security abstraction. As discussed, the syn-
ergy of the four subcomponents successfully protects the device against malicious
apps. The static analysis module MAETROID successfully detects all the analyzed
malware, showing a FPR of 20% on a dataset of 12000 applications. On the other
hand, the runtime monitor MADAM successfully detects 95% of the malicious ap-
plications coming from 40 malware families, with a false alarm rate of one FP per
day. Joining the action of these two components, as proposed in Chapter 5, it is
possible to block malicious apps at two different steps, i.e. deploy-time and run-
time, with a low FPR and a very limited overhead on performances (1.4%). User
acceptance has been measured with a survey distributed to 200 subjects.
The contract generator PICARD and the Probabilistic Security by Contract (Sx-
CxP) give to the user the possibility to define probabilistic security policies. The
SxCxP verifies at deploy time if the behavior of a new app will match the secu-
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rity policies. If the app does not match the policy, the global monitor will avoid at
runtime that the app will perform misbehavior in violation of the policy(es).
Thus, the proposed security framework is effective in protecting Android de-
vices from malicious applications and at the same time allows to define custom
security policies. The security policies may concern company environment, or may
be related to user safety and protection(parental control, personal protection). The
research of new policies is a direction for future works which may stem from this
thesis. Android is being installed not only on mobile devices, but also as the oper-
ative system for Smart-Houses. House appliances, televisions, video-surveillance
cameras and other non-mobile devices already install the Android OS, being able
to exchange information, used for policies generally aimed at optimizing the en-
ergy consumption. If these systems become pervasive, it is likely that they will
also drive the attention of attackers, as already happened for mobile devices. Ex-
tending the framework proposed in this thesis to address security in smart-house
environments and, more generally, in Internet of Things architectures is a possible
though challenging task. In fact, new security policies of the SxCxP module and
MADAM heuristics should be engineered to consider not only the device (host-
based), but a network of device and their interactions.
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